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On Waring's Problem VI

(Polynominal summands).

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§1. INTRODUCTION.

The following notations are used: p denotes always a prime,

$$f(x) = a_0x^n + a_1x^{n-1} + \ldots + a_n,$$

where $a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n$ are integers; a_0 and n are positive integers different from zero; and $f(x)$ is not a multiple of p for all x and any p. (1)

$(a, b, c, \ldots)$ denotes the greatest common divisor of $a, b, c, \ldots$

$$D = (na_0, \overline{n-1}a_1, \overline{n-2}a_2, \ldots, 2a_{n-2}, a_{n-1}) \tag{2}$$

K = the greatest integer which divides $f'(x)/D$ for all values of x. (3)

$\theta_1 = \theta_1(p)$ is the greatest power of p which divides D; *i.e.*, $p^{\theta_1} \mid D$, but $p^{\theta 1+1}$ "does not divide" D.

Similarly θ_2 is the greatest power of p which divides K.

$\theta = \theta(p) = \theta_1 + \theta_2$.

$$\gamma = \gamma(p) = \begin{cases} \theta + 1 \text{ when } \theta_2 = 0,\ p \geqslant 3 \\ \theta + 2 \text{ when } \theta_2 = 0,\ p = 2 \\ \theta + 2 \text{ when } \theta_2 \geqslant 1,\ p \geqslant 3. \\ \theta + 3 \text{ when } \theta_2 \geqslant 1,\ p = 2. \end{cases}$$

$P = P(p) = p^{\gamma}$.

$\varphi = \varphi(p) =$ the highest value of r such that $f(x) \equiv e$, (mod. p^r) for all values of x and suitable e, if any; *i.e.*, $f(x) \equiv e$, (mod. p^{φ}) is true for all x and some e, and $f(x) \equiv E$ (mod. $p^{\varphi+1}$) is not true for all x and any E.

$Q = \prod_{p} p^{\varphi}$.

$U =$ Max. $p^{\gamma-\varphi}$, when p runs through the divisors of KD.

$M = Q +$ Max. $\{2n+1, U\}$.

$G(f)$ is the least value of s such that every large integer is the sum of s or fewer values of $f(x)$, where x takes any non-negative integral value.

The main object of this paper is to prove the following result.

$G(f) \leqslant$ Max. $\{M,\ 25n^3 \log n\} + 2n\{4 \log n + \log\log n + \log 80\} + 3$, provided $n \geqslant 20$. (4)

[See theorem V.]

Hence in particular, if $M = O(n^3 \log n)$, then $G(f) = O(n^3 \log n)$.

When $n \leqslant 20$, a corresponding result is proved. [See theorem VI]

The proof is based on Vinogradow's famous method and his latest results on Weyl's sums. The theory of the Singular series for polynomials is developed partially. In this, though I use only Davenports theorem (lemma 11), it was I Chowla's generalization and applying that to $\Gamma(k)$ in Waring's problem, which gave me the suggestion. As a matter of fact at first I arrived at the main result of the paper only by using I. Chowla's generalization of Davenports theorem.

If we use this generalized theorem, we can improve the value of U, which I hope to do on a later occasion.

§2. THE THEORY OF THE SINGULAR SERIES.

The following further notations are used:—

$\varrho = e^{\frac{2\pi i a}{q}}$, $(a, q) = 1$; $\qquad S_{a,q} = \sum_{r=0}^{q-1} \varrho^{f(r)}$;

$B_{a,q} = {}^1/_q\, S_{a,q}$; $\qquad A(q) = A(q, s, N) = \sum_{a} B_{a,q}^{\,s}\, e^{\frac{-2\pi a i}{q} N}$;

$$\mathfrak{S}=\mathfrak{S}(N)=\sum_{q=1}^{\infty} A(q); \qquad \chi_p=\chi_p(N)=\sum_{\lambda=0}^{\infty} A(p^\lambda).$$

$M(p^l)=M(p^l,N)=$ the number of solutions of

$$\sum_{\nu=1}^{s} f(h_\nu)\equiv N \pmod{p^l}, \quad 0\leqslant h_\nu<p^l. \tag{5}$$

$N(p^l)=N(p^l, N)=$ the number of primitive solutions of (5); *i.e.*, the number of solutions of (5) with the restriction that for at least one h_ν, $f'(h_\nu)$ is not congruent to $\pmod{p^{\theta+1}}$

h' always denotes a number such that $f'(h')$ is not congruent to $0 \pmod{p^{\theta+1}}$.

L.S. always stands for Satz in Landau's Vorlesungen uber Zahlen Theorie Vol. I.

$\delta_1=1/(12\cdot 2n^3\log n)$ when $n\geqslant 20$,

and $\delta_1=-\varepsilon+\tfrac{1}{2}^{n-1}$ when $2\leqslant n\leqslant 19$, where $\varepsilon>0$.

Lemma (1): When $(q_1, q_2)=1$,

$$S_{q1}\cdot S_{q2}=S_{q1\cdot q2}.$$

$$\varrho_1\ \varrho_2=e^{\frac{2\pi i r_1}{q1}}\ e^{\frac{2\pi i r_2}{q2}}=e^{\frac{2\pi i\ (r_1q_2+r_2q_1)}{q1q2}}$$

is a primitive q_1q_2th root of unity, where $(r_1, q_1)=1$, $(r_2, q_2)=1$.

When h_1 and h_2 run through complete residue systems $\pmod{q_1}$ and $\pmod{q_2}$ respectively,

$$S_{q_1}\cdot S_{q_2}=\sum_{h_1}\varrho_1^{f(h_1)}\sum_{h_2}\varrho_2^{f(h_2)}=\sum_{h_1}\varrho_1^{f(h_1q_2)}\sum_{h_2}\varrho_1^{f(h_2q_1)}$$

$$=\sum_{h_1}\varrho_1^{f(h_1q_2+h_2q_1)}\sum_{h_2}\varrho_2^{f(h_2q_1+h_1q_2)}$$

$$=\sum_{h_1}\sum_{h_2}(\varrho_1\ \varrho_2)^{f(h_1q_2+h_2q_1)}=S_{q_1\cdot q_2};$$

because $h_1q_2+h_2q_1$ runs through a complete residue system $\pmod{q_1q_2}$. [L.S. 281]

Lemma (2): When $(q_1, q_2) = 1$, $A(q_1)A(q_2) = A(q_1q_2)$.
[See L.S. 282]

Lemma (3): For $l > 0$,

$$A(p^l) = -p^{-(s-1)(l-1)}M(p^{l-1}) + p^{-(s-1)l}M(p^l).$$

Proof runs exactly on similar lines as for L.S. 285.

Lemma (4): For $l \geqslant 0$,

$$\sum_{\lambda=0}^{l} A(p^\lambda) = p^{-(s-1)l}M(p^l).$$ [See L.S. 286]

Lemma (5): * If $\varphi(x) \equiv 0 \pmod{p^t}$ for all x, where all the coefficients of $\varphi(x)$ are not multiples of p^t, then $(x^p - x)^t$ divides $\varphi(x)$, (mod. p^t).

Let $\psi(x)$ be a polynomial such that

$$\psi(x) \equiv 0 \pmod{p^t} \text{ for all } x. \tag{7}$$

Obviously, $(x^p - x)^t \equiv 0 \pmod{p^t}$ for all x. (8)

Let $g(x)$ be the greatest common divisor of $\psi(x)$ and $(x^p - x)^t$, (mod. p^t).

Then from (7) and (8),

$$g(x) \equiv 0 \pmod{p^t} \tag{9}$$

Now $g(x)$ is a divisor of $(x^p - x)^t$, (mod. p^t)

So if $g(x) \neq (x^p - x)^t$, (mod. p^t), then from (9), for some $0 \leqslant a \leqslant p-1$,

$$(x^p - x)^t / (x - a) \equiv 0 \pmod{p^t} \text{ for all } x.$$

For $x = a + p$, when $t \geqslant 2$ and for $x = a$, when $t = 1$, the above congruence is not satisfied.

So $g(x) = (x^p - x)^t$ (mod. p^t).

Since $g(x)$ divides $\psi(x)$, (mod. p^t), the lemma follows.†

*I am indebted to Dr. R. Vaidynathaswamy for the suggestion that $(x^p - x)^t$ is the polynomial $\varphi(x)$ of smallest degree all of whose coefficients are not multiples p^t such that $\varphi(x) \equiv 0 \pmod{p^t}$ for all x

†If we don't want to make use of lemma (5), in the introduction define γ by the following relation $\gamma = \theta_1 + 2\theta_2 + 1$ or $\theta_1 + 2\theta_2 + 2$ according as $p \geqslant 3$ or $p = 2$. Then all the rest will remain valid.

Lemma (6): Let $\varphi(x) = A_0 x^n + A_1 x^{n-1} + \ldots\ldots + A_n$,

$$A_o = \frac{a}{q} + \frac{\lambda}{q^2},\ |\lambda| \leqslant 1,\ (a, q) = 1.$$

$$F = \sum_{x=R+1}^{R+B} e^{2\pi i \varphi(x)}.$$

Then, when $n \geqslant 20$,

$$F = O(B^{1-\delta}),$$

where

$$\delta = 1/12 \cdot 2n^3 \log n, \qquad \text{when } C_1 B \leqslant q \leqslant C_2 B,$$

$$\delta = 1/20 n^3 \log n, \qquad \text{when } C_2 B \leqslant q \leqslant C_3 B^{n-1-1/n},$$

and $\delta = 1/8n^3 \log(10n^2/c)$, when $C_3 B^{n-1-1/n} \leqslant q \leqslant C_4 B^{n-c}$,

where c, C_1, C_2, C_3, C_4, are arbitrary positive constants.

This is proved by Vinogradaw, see page 393. Zentrabblatt fur Mathematik, 13 Band Heft 9. (4, August, 1936).

Lemma (7): When $n \geqslant 20$,

$$S_{a,q} = O(q^{1-1/12 \cdot 2n^3 \log n}).$$

This follows from lemma (6); by taking $A_o = \dfrac{aa_o}{q}$.

Lemma (8): If $\delta = 1/2^{n-1}$, and $\varepsilon > 0$, then

$$\sum_{x=R}^{R+B} e^{\frac{2\pi i a}{q} f(x)} = O(B^{\varepsilon} q^{\varepsilon}) \qquad \{B^{1-\delta} + \frac{B}{q^{\delta}} + B^{1-n\delta} q^{\delta}\}$$

This is a modified statement of Hilfssatz 6 in Landau's paper 'Zum Waring's Problem' (Mathematische Zeitschrift. Band 12. page 236).

Lemma (9): When $n \geqslant 2$, $\delta = 1/2^{n-1}$,

$$S_{a,q} = O(q^{1-\delta+\varepsilon})$$

This follows from lemma (8), by taking $B = q$.

Lemma (10): $S_{a, q} = O(q^{1-\delta_1})$.

This follows from lemmas (7) and (9).

Lemma (11):* Let $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_m$ be m different residue classes (mod. p); $\beta_1, \beta_2, \ldots, \beta_n$ be n different residue classes (mod. p). Let $\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_l$ be all those different residue classes which are representable as $\alpha_i + \beta_j$,

$$i = 1, 2, \ldots, m.$$
$$j = 1, 2, \ldots, n.$$

Then $l \geqslant m + n - 1$, provided $m + n - 1 \leqslant p$.

This is Davenport's theorem.

Lemma (12): If there are two residue classes (mod. p) in $f(x)$, then there are at least two residue classes A, B (mod. P) in $f(x)$ such that

A is not congruent to B (mod. p).

Let the residue classes (mod. p) in $f(x)$ be a and b.

Then $f(x_1) \equiv a$ (mod. p).

and $f(x_2) \equiv b$ („).

Let $f(x_1) \equiv A$ (mod. P).

and $f(x_2) \equiv B$ („).

Obviously, A is not congruent to B (mod. p).

Lemma (13): If a is not congruent to b (mod. p) and $\alpha_1, \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_s$ be different residue classes (mod. p^l) and $s < p^l$, then in the set

$$\alpha_1 + a, \alpha_2 + a, \ldots, \alpha_s + a \qquad (10)$$
$$\alpha_1 + b, \alpha_2 + b, \ldots, \alpha_s + b$$

there are at least $s + 1$ residue classes (mod. p^l).

(1) $\alpha_r + a$ is not congruent to $\alpha_t + a$ (mod. p^l).

otherwise, $\alpha_r \equiv \alpha_t$ („)

(2) $\alpha_r + a \equiv \alpha_t + b$ („)

and $\alpha_s + a \equiv \alpha_t + b$ („)

are impossible ; for, if it is possible, by subtraction, we get

$$\alpha_r \equiv \alpha_s \qquad (\text{mod. } p^l).$$

So if there are only s residue classes in (10) we should have

$$\alpha_r + a \equiv \alpha_t + b \ (\text{mod. } p^l),$$

where t is unique and different for different r.

Hence $\sum_{r=1}^{s} (\alpha_r + a) \equiv \sum_{t=1}^{s} (\alpha_t + b) \ (\text{mod. } p^l)$

Therefore, $\qquad sa \equiv sb \ (\text{mod. } p^l)$.

Since, a is not congruent to b (mod. p),

$$s \equiv 0 \quad (\text{mod. p}^l).$$

So the lemma follows

Lemma (14): If there are two residue classes (mod. p) in $f(x)$, then when $s \geqslant \text{P}$,

$\text{N(P)} \geqslant 1$, where $\text{N(P)} = \text{N}(p^\gamma)$.

From lemma (12), there are at least two residue classes A and B (mod. P) in $f(x)$ such that A is not congruent to B (mod. p).

Therefore, starting from A and B and by repeatedly applying lemma (13) with A and B for $\beta_1, \beta_2, \ldots, \beta_n$, we get that the number of residue classes (mod. P) in

$$\psi_1 + \psi_2 + \ldots + \psi_s, \text{ where every } \psi = \text{A or B}, \tag{11}$$

$\geqslant s + 1$, provided $s < \text{P}$.

Now $s + 1 \geqslant \text{P}$, if $s \geqslant \text{P} - 1$.

So if $s \geqslant \text{P} - 1$, (11) will represent every residue class (mod. P).

So, when $s \geqslant \text{P} - 1$, $f(h') + \psi_1 + \psi_2 + \ldots + \psi_s$ contains all the residue classes (mod. P).

Since by the definition of h', $f'(h')$ is not congruent to 0 (mod. $p^{\theta+1}$), the lemma follows immediately.

Lemma (15): Corresponding to every N, there is a $t = t(\mathrm{N})$ such that, when $s \equiv t \cdot (\mathrm{mod.}\ p^{\varphi})$, and $s \geqslant p^{\gamma-\varphi}$, $\mathrm{N}(\mathrm{P}) \geqslant 1$.

From (1) and the definition of φ, there is an a such that $(a, p) = 1$, and $f(x) \equiv a \ (\mathrm{mod.}\ p^{\varphi})$ for all values of x; and there are at least two residue classes A and B (mod. $p^{\varphi+1}$) in $f(x)$. Then

$$\mathrm{A} = n_1 \cdot p^{\varphi} + a, \text{ and } \mathrm{B} = n_2 \cdot p^{\varphi} + a,\ n_1 < p,\ n_2 < p$$

So n_1 is not congruent to n_2 (mod. p). (12)

Let $f(x_1) \equiv \mathrm{A}\ (\mathrm{mod.}\ p^{\varphi})$, and $f(x_2 \equiv \mathrm{B}\ (\mathrm{mod.}\ p^{\varphi})$. Further let $f(x_1) \equiv \mathrm{A}_1\ (\mathrm{mod.\ P})$ and $f(x_2) \equiv \mathrm{B}_1\ (\mathrm{mod.\ P})$.

Let $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_s$ be s different residue classes (mod. P). Then if we assume that there are only s residue classes (mod. P) in

$$\alpha_1 + \mathrm{A}_1, \ldots., \alpha_s + \mathrm{A}_1 \qquad (13)$$

$$\alpha_1 + \mathrm{B}_1, \ldots., \alpha_s + \mathrm{B}_1,$$

arguing as in the proof of lemma (13), we arrive at the conclusion that

$$s(\mathrm{A}_1 - \mathrm{B}_1) \equiv 0\ (\mathrm{mod.}\ p^{\gamma}).$$

So, from (12), $s \equiv 0\ (\mathrm{mod.}\ p^{\gamma-\varphi})$.

So, if $s < p^{\gamma-\varphi}$, we get that (13) contains at least $s + 1$ residue classes (mod. P). By applying this successively, we get that when $s \geqslant p^{\gamma-\varphi} - 1$, the set $\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \ldots + \beta_s$, where every $\beta = \mathrm{A}_1$ or B_1 will contain exactly $p^{\gamma-\varphi}$ classes (mod. P) and they are

$$sa,\ sa + p^{\varphi},\ sa + 2p^{\varphi}, \ldots, sa + (p^{\gamma-\varphi} - 1)p^{\varphi}.$$

Let N be any integer and $f'(h')$ be not congruent to 0 (mod. $p^{\varphi-1}$).

Further let $\mathrm{N} - f(h') \equiv ta\ (\mathrm{mod.}\ p^{\varphi})$, $t < p^{\varphi}$.

Then from what we have proved above, we conclude that when $s \geqslant p^{\gamma-\varphi} - 1$ and $s \equiv t\ (\mathrm{mod.}\ p^{\varphi})$,

$\mathrm{N} - f(h') \equiv \beta_1 + \beta_2 + \ldots + \beta_s$ (mod. P) is solvable for β's in terms of A_1 and B_2.

Hence we get that when $s \geqslant p^{\gamma-\varphi}$ and $s - 1 \equiv t\ (\mathrm{mod.}\ p^{\varphi})$, $\mathrm{N}(\mathrm{P}) \geqslant 1$.

Lemma (16): If $\theta = \varphi = 0$, then, when $s \geqslant 2n + 1$, $N(P) \geqslant 1$.

Let $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_t$ denote the number of residue classes (mod. p) in $f(x)$. Then by repeated application of lemma (11), the number of different residue classes (mod. p) in

$$\beta_1 + \beta_2 + \ldots + \beta_s \tag{14}$$

where every $\beta = \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots,$ or α_t,

$\geqslant st - s + 1$, provided this number $\leqslant p$.

Now $st - s + 1 \geqslant p$, if $s \geqslant (p-1)/(t-1)$.

Conversely, if $s \geqslant (p-1)/(t-1)$, (14) will represent every residue class (mod. p).

Hence, when $s \geqslant (p-1)/(t-1)$,

$f(x_1) + \ldots + f(x_s) \equiv N - f(h')$, (mod. p) has at least one solution in $x_1, \ldots, x_s$.

Therefore when $s \geqslant (p-1)/(t-1)$

$$f(x_1) + \ldots + f(x_{s+1}) \equiv N \pmod{p} \tag{15}$$

has at least one primitive solution. When $p > n$, $f(x) \equiv a$ (mod. p) has at most only n solutions; for $\varphi = 0$.

So the number of residue classes (mod. p) in $f(x)$.

$\geqslant [p/n] + 1$ or p/n, according as $p \neq n$ or $p = n$.

Hence, $$\frac{p-1}{t-1} \leqslant \frac{p-1}{\frac{p}{n} - 1} = \frac{n(p-1)}{p-n} \leqslant \frac{np}{p-n} \leqslant 2n, \text{ when } p \geqslant 2n.$$

But when $p \leqslant 2n - 1$,

$$\frac{p-1}{t-1} \leqslant 2n - 2; \text{ for, since } \varphi = 0,\ t \geqslant 2.$$

Therefore, when $s \geqslant 2n$, (15) has at least one primitive solution.

So the lemma follows.

Lemma (17): Corresponding to every N, there is an $r_o = r_o(N)$, such that, when $s \equiv r_o \pmod{Q}$ and $s \geqslant \text{Max.}\ \{U,\ 2n+1\}$ $N(P) \geqslant 1$, for every p.

(1) $\theta = \varphi = 0$.

In this case, the result follows from the previous lemma.

(2) $\theta \geqslant 1,\ \varphi = 0$.

Now also there are at least two residue classes (mod. p) in $f(x)$.

Further $s \geqslant U \geqslant p^{\gamma-\varphi} = p^{\gamma} = P$.

So by lemma (14), we get that $N(P) \geqslant 1$.

(3) $\varphi \geqslant 1$.

From lemma (15), there is a $t = t(N) = t(N, p)$ such that when $s \geqslant p^{\gamma-\varphi}$ and $s \equiv t(N, p) \pmod{p^{\varphi}}$, $N(P) \geqslant 1$. Now it is possible to choose $r_o = r_o(N)$ such that

$r_o \equiv t(N, p)$, $\pmod{p^{\varphi}}$, for every p for which $\varphi \geqslant 1$.

Hence for $s \geqslant U$ and $s \equiv r_o \pmod{Q}$ $N(P) \geqslant 1$.

From (1), (2), and (3), the lemma follows.

Lemma (18): When $l \geqslant \gamma$,

$$N(p^{l+1}) = p^{s-1} N(p^l)$$

Let $f(h_1) + \sum_{\nu=2}^{s} f(h_{\nu}) \equiv N \pmod{p^l}$, (16)

where $f'(h_1)$ is not congruent to 0 $\pmod{p^{\theta+1}}$ and $h_1, h_2, \ldots, h_s \leqslant p^l - 1$.

Further let $h_2, h_3, \ldots, h_s$ be fixed.

Then, since $f(h' + rp^{l-\theta}) \equiv f(h')$, $\pmod{p^l}$, $h_1 = h' + rp^{l-\theta}$, where $r = 0, 1, \ldots, p^{\theta} - 1$ and $h' \leqslant p^{l-\theta} - 1$.

Now

$$f(h_1 + yp^{l-\theta}) + \sum_{\nu=2}^{s} f(h_{\nu} + y_{\nu} p^l) - N$$

$$= f(h' + rp^{l-\theta} + yp^{l-\theta}) + \sum_{\nu=2}^{s} f(h_\nu + y_\nu p^l) - N$$

$$\equiv f(h') + (r+y)p^{l-\theta} f'(h') + \sum_{\nu=2}^{s} f(h_\nu) - N, \quad (\text{mod. } p^{l+1})$$

$$= f(h') + \sum_{\nu=2}^{s} f(h_\nu) - N + p^l m(y+r),$$

$\{$where $f'(h') = m \cdot p^\theta, \ (m, p) = 1.\}$

$= c \cdot p^l + p^l m(y+r)$, from (16).

If $c + m(y+r) \equiv 0$ (mod. p), then

$$f(h_1 + yp^{l-\theta}) + \sum_{\nu=2}^{s} f(h_\nu + y_\nu p^{l-\theta}) \equiv N, \quad (\text{mod. } p^{l+1}) \tag{17}$$

Now when $y_2, y_3, \ldots, y_s$ assume any value from 0 to $p-1$, $h_\nu + y_\nu \cdot p^l \leqslant p^{l+1} - 1$.

Let $r = ip + t$, where $t \leqslant p - 1$.

Then, if $c + m(y+r) \equiv 0$ (mod. p) (18)

then $c + m(y+t) \equiv 0$ (,,).

Since $(m, p) = 1$, the last congruence has a solution $y = z_t$, with $z_t \leqslant p - 1$.

For the solution of (18), take $y = z_t + ip$.

Then the value of y for (18) is unique and different for different values of r.

Hence, corresponding to one primitive solution of (16), there are exactly p^{s-1} primitive solutions for (17). So the lemma is proved.

Lemma (19): When $l \geqslant \gamma$,

$$N(p^l) = p^{(l-\gamma)(s-1)} N(P).$$

This follows from lemma (18).

Lemma (20): $\chi_p \geqslant N(P)/P^{s-1}$.

From lemma (4), when $l \geqslant \gamma$

$$\sum_{\lambda=0}^{l} A(p^\lambda) = \frac{M(p^l)}{p^{l(s-1)}} \geqslant \frac{N(p^l)}{p^{l(s-1)}} \geqslant \frac{N(P)}{P^{s-1}}, \quad \text{from lemma (19)}$$

So $\chi_p = \sum_{\lambda=0}^{\infty} A(p^\lambda) = \lim_{l\to\infty} \sum_{\lambda=0}^{l} A(p^\lambda) \geqslant N(P)/P^{s-1}$.

Theorem I. Corresponding to every N, there is an $r_o \leqslant Q$ such that when $s \geqslant \text{Max.}\{U, 2n+1\}$ and $s \equiv r_o$, (mod. Q),

$$\chi_p > 0$$

For r_o take the r_o in lemma (17). Then $N(P) \geqslant 1$.

So from lemma (20),

$\chi_p \geqslant N(P)/P^{s-1} \geqslant 1/P^{s-1} > 0$.

Lemma (21): $S_{a,q} = 0(q^{1-\delta})$.

(Here δ is a constant which will be chosen later.)

This is assumed.

Lemma (22): $A(q) = O(q^{1-s\delta})$.

This follows from lemma (21).

Lemma (23): If $s \geqslant [2/\delta] + 2$,

$$\chi_p \geqslant 1 - O(p^{-1-\delta}).$$

From lemma (22),

$$\left| \sum_{\lambda=1}^{\infty} A(p^\lambda) \right| = O\left(\sum_{\lambda=1}^{\infty} p^{\lambda(1-\delta s)} \right) = O(p^{-1-\delta}).$$

So the lemma follows.

Lemma (24): When $s \geqslant [2/\delta] + 2$,

$$\mathfrak{S} = \prod_p \chi_p.$$

$$\left| \mathfrak{S} - \prod_{p\leqslant b} \chi_p \right| \leqslant \sum_{q\geqslant b} |A(q)| = O\left(\sum_{q\geqslant b} q^{-1-\delta} \right) = O(b^{-\delta}).$$

Now this tends to zero when $b \to \infty$.

So the lemma follows.

Theorem II. If $S_{a,q} = O(q^{-1-\delta})$ and $s \geqslant [2/\delta] + 2$ and s satisfies the conditions in theorem I, then

$$\mathfrak{S} > c > 0,$$

where c is a constant independent of N.

From lemma (23), $\chi_p \geqslant 1 - O(p^{-1-\delta})$, where the constant in O is independent of p and N. So there is a b such that

$$\chi_q \geqslant 1 - p^{-1-\delta/2}, \text{ for all } p \geqslant b \tag{19}$$

Now from lemma (24)

$$\mathfrak{S} = \prod_{p \leqslant b} \chi_p \prod_{p > b} \chi_p = \Pi_1 , \Pi_2 , \text{ say.}$$

From theorem I,

$$\Pi_1 \geqslant \prod_{p \leqslant b} P^{-(s-1)} = c_1. \tag{20}$$

$$\text{From (19)}, \Pi_2 = \prod_{p > b} (1 - p^{-1-\delta/2}) = c_2 \tag{21}$$

So from (20) and (21).

$\mathfrak{S} > c$, where $c = c_1 \cdot c_2$.

Lemma (25) Under the hypotheses of Theorem II.

$$\sum_{q \leqslant M} A(q) \geqslant c + O(M^{-\delta}).$$

Now, from lemma (22),

$$\left| \sum_{q \leqslant M} A(q) - \mathfrak{S} \right| \leqslant \sum_{q > M} |A(q)| = O\left(\sum_{q > M} q^{-1-\delta} \right) = O(M^{-\delta})$$

Therefore, from theorem II, the lemma follows.

Theorem III. When s satisfies the conditions of theorem I and $s \geqslant [2/\delta_1] + 2$, then

$\mathfrak{S} > c > 0$, where c is independent of N.

(For the definition of δ_1, see the beginning of § 2). This follows from theorem II, lemmas (7) and (9).

Lemma (26): If for a certain N_o and a certain $s \geqslant Q$.

$N(P) \geqslant 1$, then it is true for every $N \equiv N_o \pmod{Q}$.

Since $s \geqslant Q$, from the proof of lemma (15),

$f(x_1) + f(x_2) + \ldots + f(x_s)$, with $f(x_1)$ fixed will contain the residue classes, sa, $sa + p^{\varphi}, \ldots, sa + (p^{\gamma - \varphi} - 1) p^{\varphi}$.

So by hypothesis, N_o belongs to one of the above numbers (mod. p^{γ}). Hence N also belongs to one of the above (mod. p^{γ}).

So the lemma follows.

Lemma (27): Given N_o, there is an $s \leqslant M$, such that for every $N \equiv N_o \pmod{Q}$, $\mathfrak{S}$ $(N) > c > 0$, where c is independent of N.

This follows from the previous lemma and the proof of theorem II.

Lemma (28): If $0 \leqslant f'(t) \leqslant \frac{1}{2}$; $f''(t) \geqslant 0$, in the interval $g \leqslant t \leqslant h$, then

$$\sum_{t>g}^{h} e^{\pm 2\pi i f(t)} = \int_{g}^{h} e^{\pm 2\pi i f(t)} dt + O(1),$$

This is a well-known result.

Lemma (29): If λ is real and positive and is not an integer,

then $$\left| \sum_{x>b}^{H} e^{2\pi i \lambda x} \right| < 1/2(\lambda),$$

where (x) denotes the distance x from the nearest integer.

This is also well-known.

§3. PROOF OF MAIN RESULTS.

3·1. **Further notations and assumptions**: k is a fixed positive integer; $k_o = 2k - 1$.

Since $f(x)$ denotes only a single residue class (mod. p^{φ}), $f(x_1) + f(x_2) + \ldots + f(x_{k_o})$ denotes only a single residue class

(mod. Q) for all values of $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_{ko}$. Let us denote this residue class by R_o. That is

$$f(x_1)+\ldots+f(x_{ko})\equiv R_o \text{ (mod. Q)},$$

for all values of x_r, $(r=1,2,\ldots,k_o)$.

Now for s, we take the least value of s which satisfies the conditions of theorem II when $N_2=W-R_o$, where W is any fixed integer. That means, from lemma (27),

$$\mathfrak{S}\,(N_2)>c>0, \text{ when } N_2\equiv W-R_o, \text{ (mod. Q)},$$

for this $s=s(W, R_o, k)$. (22)

Hereafter s stands only for this particular one; and $s\leqslant\Gamma$

Further, we take $N\equiv W$ (mod. Q). (23)

Let $K_o=a_o+|a_1|+\ldots+|a_n|$.

N_o is a positive integer.

$F=[{}^1/_m(N_o/K_o)^{\nu}]$, where $\nu={}^1/_n$.

$R=[F^a]$, $Y=[F^b]$, $\tau=[2nK_oF^l]$

$N_o-N_oF^{-\psi}<N\leqslant N_o$ and N satisfies (23);

where a, b, l and ψ are positive constants.

x_o is a positive integer such that for all $x\geqslant x_o$ each of $f(x)$, $f'(x)$ $f''(x)$ is positive. (24)

ξ runs through the numbers not exceeding F^{n-1}, which can be expressed as the sum of exactly $k-1$ values of $f(x)$ with each $x\geqslant x_o$; and X denotes the number of such numbers $\leqslant F^{n-1}$.

$$u=\xi+f(v),$$

where $v=F, F+1,\ldots,2F-1$.

When F is large, Numbers u are all different and $u<K_o2^nF^n$.

$\sigma=n(1-\nu)^k$.

c is a positive constant, but it is different on different occasions.

In the rest of the paper we proceed on the assumption that the conditions marked A, B, C, etc., are satisfied and at the end we choose the constants so that these conditions are actually satisfied.

Lemma (30):

When $F^d < q = O(F^l)$, $\sum_{y=1}^{Y} e^{2\pi i a/q f(y)} = O(Y^{1-\delta_2})$.

This is assumed.

(δ_2 is a constant which will be fixed later).

Further let $\Gamma = \text{Max.}\{M, [2/\delta] + 2\}$, where δ has the same value as in lemma (21).

3·2. *Lemma* (31) $X > c \cdot F^{n-1-\sigma}$.

Let $N_s(x)$ denote the number of numbers not exceeding x, which can be expressed as the sum of s values of $f(x)$ with $x \geqslant x_0$.

Now $N_1(x) \geqslant c \cdot x^{\nu}$.

$$N_2(x) \geqslant \sum_{r=x_0}^{x^{\nu}} N_1\{f(r) - f(r-1)\} \geqslant c \sum_{r=x_0}^{x^{\nu}} N_1(c \cdot r^{n-1}) \geqslant c \sum r^{1-\nu}$$

$$> c \cdot x^{\nu(2-\nu)} = c \cdot x^{1-(1-\nu)^2}$$

$$N_3(x) \geqslant \sum_{r=x_0}^{x^{\nu}} N_2\{f(r) - f(r-1)\} > c \sum N_2(c \cdot r^{n-1}).$$

$$> c \sum_{x_0}^{x^{\nu}} r^{(n-1)\{1-(1-\nu)^2\}} > c \cdot x^{1-(1-\nu)^3}$$

Proceeding like this we get that

$N_s(x) > c \cdot x^{1(1-\nu)^s}$

So $X = N_{k-1}(F^{n-1}) > c \cdot F^{(n-1)\{1-(1-\nu)^{k-1}\}} = c \cdot F^{n-1-n(1-\nu)^k}$

$= c \cdot F^{n-1-\sigma}$

3·3. An Integral. We introduce the following sums depending on α.

$$T = \sum_{x=x_0}^{F} e^{2\pi i \alpha f(x)};$$

$$T_1 = \sum_{x=x_0}^{K_1} e^{2\pi i \alpha f(x)}, \text{ where } K_1 = mK^{\nu}{}_{o} F.$$

$$V = \sum_{v} e^{2\pi i \alpha f(x)}; \quad S = \sum_{\xi} e^{2\pi i \alpha \xi}.$$

Let y be an integer $0 < y < Y$; and consider.

$$(3\cdot 21) \quad I_{y, N} = \int_0^1 T^{s-3} T_1 V^2 S^2 e^{2\pi i \alpha f(y)} e^{-2\pi i \alpha N} d\alpha,$$

where for the interval of integration we can substitute the interval $-\tau^{-1} \leqslant \alpha \leqslant 1 - \tau^{-1}$.

For every α in the last interval, we have

$$(3\cdot 22) \quad \alpha = {}^a/_q + z; \ (a, q) = 1; \ 0 < q \leqslant \tau; \ |z| \leqslant 1/q\tau.$$

We divide the interval of integration into two classes, putting in the first class the intervals with

$$(3\cdot 23) \quad \alpha = {}^a/_q + z; \ (a, q) = 1; \ 0 < q \leqslant F^d; \ -\tau^{-1} \leqslant z \leqslant \tau^{-1}.$$

$$A \quad d < l,$$

and in the second class the remaining intervals. It is easy to see that the intervals of the first class do not overlap and every α in the second class can be represented by (3·22). Corresponding to this division, we can write,

$$(3\cdot 24) \quad I_{y, N} = H_{y, 1} + H_{y, 2}$$

§3·3. Asymptotic formula for $H_{y, 1}$. We introduce the following integrals:

$$\varphi_1 = \int_{x_0}^{F} e^{2\pi i z f(x)} dx;$$

$$\varphi_2 = \int_{x_0}^{K_1} e^{2\pi i z f(x)} dx;$$

$$\psi_1 = \int_{F}^{2F} e^{2\pi i z f(x)} dx.$$

In T, put $x = tq + r$; $r = 0, 1, \ldots, q-1$

where for every r, t takes all integral values in the interval $x_o < qt + r \leqslant \text{P}$.

So, for T, we get

$$\text{T} = \sum_{r=0}^{q-1} \sum_{t} e^{2\pi i (a/q + z) f(r+qt)}$$

$$= \sum_{r=0}^{q-1} e^{2\pi i a/q f(r)} \text{K}_r ;$$

where $\text{K}_r = \sum_{t} e^{2\pi i z f(qt+r)}$.

Let $\text{F}(t) = |z| f(qt + r)$

Then $f'(t) = |z| qf'(qt + r) \leqslant \dfrac{q \cdot \text{K}_o n \text{F}^{n-1}}{\tau} \leqslant \dfrac{n\text{K}_o \cdot \text{F}^{n-1+d}}{\tau} \leqslant \tfrac{1}{2}$,

provided,

B $l \geqslant n - 1 + d$.

So in the interval considered for t,

$0 \leqslant \text{F}'(t) \leqslant \frac{1}{2}$ and $\text{F}''(t) \geqslant 0$.

Hence from lemma (25),

$$\text{K}_r = \int_{(x_o - r) q^{-1}}^{(\text{F}-r) q^{-1}} e^{2\pi i z f(qt+r)} dt + \text{O}(1) = \frac{\varphi_1}{q} + \text{O}(1)$$

Hence we obtain

(3·31) $\text{T} = \varphi_1 \text{B}_{a,q} + \text{O}(q)$.

In a similar way we prove that

(3·32) $\text{T}_1 = \varphi_2 \text{B}_{a,q} + \text{O}(q)$.

(3·33) $\text{V} = \psi_1 \text{B}_{a,q} + \text{O}(q)$.

Again

(3·34) $\text{S} = \sum_{\xi} e^{2\pi i a/q \xi} + \text{O}(|z| \text{XP}^{n-1})$.

(3·35) $e^{2\pi i a f(y)} = e^{2\pi i a/q f(y)} + \text{O}(|z| \text{Y}^n)$

(3·36) $e^{2\pi i a \text{N}} = e^{-2\pi i a/q \text{N} - 2\pi i z \text{N}_o} + \text{O}(|z| \text{F}^{n-\varphi})$.

We put

(3·37) $Z = F$, if $|z| \leqslant F^{-n}$.

$Z \leqslant |z|^{-\nu}$, if $|z| \geqslant F^{-n}$.

Then we can verify* that

$\varphi_1 = O(Z)$; $\varphi_2 = O(Z)$; $\psi_1 = O(Z)$.

Therefore by lemma (21), the main term of the right hand side of the equalities (3·31)—(3·36) is $O(Zq^{-\delta})$; $O(Zq^{-\delta})$; $O(Zq^{-\delta})$; $O(X)$; $O(1)$; $O(1)$.

$$* \int_{x_1}^{F} e^{2\pi i z f(x)} dx = \int_{x_1}^{A} + \int_{A}^{F} = O(A) + I \quad \text{(say)}.$$

Put $y = zf(x)$. Then $dy = zf'(x)$.

$y = a_0 z x^n \{1 + O(^1/_x)\}$; $zf'(x) = a_0 z n x^{n-1}\{1 + O(^1/_x)\}$

$$y^{1-\nu} = a_0{}^{1-\nu} z^{1-\nu} x^{n-1}\{1 + 0(^1/_x)\} = \frac{zf'(x)}{(a_0 z)^\nu}\{1 + O(^1/_x)\}$$

So $\dfrac{1}{zf'(x)} - \dfrac{1}{(a_0 z)^\nu y^{1-\nu}}$

$$= 1/a_0{}^\nu z^\nu y^{1-\nu}\left\{1 + O\left(\frac{1}{x}\right)\right\} - 1/a_0{}^\nu z^\nu y^{1-\nu} = O\left(\frac{1}{z^\nu y^{1-\nu}} \cdot \frac{1}{x}\right)$$

$$= O\left(\frac{1}{z^\nu y^{1-\nu}} \cdot \left(\frac{z}{y}\right)^\nu\right) = O\left(\frac{1}{y}\right)$$

$$\text{So } I = \int_{zf(A)}^{zf(F)} \frac{e^{2\pi i y}}{zf'(x)} dy = \frac{1}{a^\nu{}_0 z^\nu}\int_{zf(A)}^{zf(F)} \frac{e^{2\pi i y}}{y^{1-\nu}} dy + O\left(\int_{zf(A)}^{zf(F)} \frac{e^{2\pi i y}}{y} dy\right)$$

$$= O\left(\frac{1}{z^\nu}\right) + O\left(\int_{zf(A)}^{zf(F)} \frac{dy}{y}\right) = O\left(\frac{1}{z^\nu}\right) + O\left(\log|z|f(F)\right)$$

Now $F^{-n} \leqslant |z| \leqslant F^{-l}$, when $l \geqslant n - 1 + d$. So $\log zf(F) = O(\log z)$.

Hence $I = O(z^{-\nu}) + O(\log z) = O(z^{-\nu})$.

Therefore $\varphi_1 = O(A) + O(z^{-\nu}) = O(z^{-\nu})$.

Similarly, we can prove the result for φ_2 and ψ_1.

The ratios of the remaining terms to the last values are

$$O\{Z^{-1}q^{1+\delta}+|z|F^{n-1}+|z|F^{bn}+|z|F^{n-\psi}\}=O(F^{-\psi})(1+|z|F^{n}),$$

provided.

C_1 $d(1+\delta)\leqslant 1-\psi$.

C_2 $\psi\leqslant 1$.

C_3 $bn\leqslant n-\psi$.

So

$$(3\cdot 38)\quad T^{s-3}T_1V^2S^2e^{2\pi i\alpha\{f(y)-N\}}$$
$$=E_yF_y+O(Z^sq^{-s\delta}X^2F^{-\psi}\{1+|z|F^n),$$

where F_y depends only on z, y, n, x_o and N_o, and

$$(3\cdot 39),\quad E_y=B^s{}_{a\,;\,q}(\sum_{\xi}e^{2\pi ia\frac{\xi}{q}})^2e^{2\pi ia/qf(y)}e^{-2\pi iaN/q}.$$

$$(3\cdot 310)\quad E_y=O(X^2q^{-s\delta}).$$

Integrating $(3\cdot 38)$ with respect z between the limits $z=-\tau^{-1}$ to $z=\tau^{-1}$, we get that the

part of $H_{y\,,\,1}$ corresponding to any fixed a and q is Q_yE_y+L,

where Q_y depends only on y, n, N_o and x_o. Now

$$L=O\{X^2F^{-\psi}q^{-s\delta}(\int_o^{F^{-n}}F^sdz+\int_{F^{-n}}^{\tau^{-1}}F^nz^{1-\nu s}dz)$$
$$=O\{X^2F^{s-n-\psi}q^{-s\delta}\}.$$

So $\sum_{q=1}^{F^d}\sum_{a}L=O\{X^2F^{s-n-\psi}),$ for $s\geqslant[2/\delta]+2$.

Hence

$$(3\cdot 311)\quad H_{y\,,\,1}=Q_yD_y+O(X^2F^{s-n-\psi}),\ \text{where}$$

$$(3\cdot 312)\quad D_y=\sum_{q=1}^{F^d}\sum_{a}E_y\,;\quad (a\,.\,q)=1.$$

§3·4. Estimation of Q_y. We sum up the equality .

$$(3\cdot41)\quad I_{y,N} = H_{y,1} + H_{y,2}$$

of (3·24) for all values of N statisfying the conditions

$$N_o - N_o F^{-\psi} < N \leqslant N_o$$

and $N \equiv W \pmod{Q}$. By the definition of our s,

the result of summation of the left side is equal to the number of solutions for x and N_1 of the system of inequalities.

$$(3\cdot42)\quad N_1 - N_o F^{-\psi} < f(x) \leqslant N_1$$

where $N_1 = N_o - f(x_1) - f(x_2) - \dots - f(x_{s-3}) - u - u' - f(y)$, and x runs through $x_o, x_o+1, \dots, K_1$; every x_i runs over the set of values $x_o, x_o+1, \dots, F$; u and u' take the values described for u in §3·1 (independently).

Now

$$N_1 - N_o F^{-\psi} \geqslant N_o - (s-3)K_o \cdot F^n - 2\cdot 2^n K_o F^n - K_o F^{bn} - N_o F^{-\psi}$$

$$\geqslant (mK^{\nu}{}_o F - 1)^n - K_o F^n (s - 3 + 2\cdot 2^n) - K_o \cdot F^{bn} - K_o F^{n-\psi}.$$

$$\geqslant K_o F^n \left\{ m^n - \frac{m^{n-1}n}{F} - 2\cdot 2^n - s - F^{bn-n} - m^n F^{-\psi} + 3 \right\}$$

$\geqslant K_o F^n \{m^n - m^{n-1} - 2\cdot 2^n - s\}$, provided

D_1 $F > n$

D_2 $b \leqslant 1$

D_3 $F^{\psi} \geqslant m^n$.

But $m^n - m^{n-1} - 2\cdot 2^n - s \geqslant 1$, if $m \geqslant m_o = m_o(s)$,

Since s is fixed, we choose for m the fixed value m_o. So,

$N_1 - N_o F^{-\psi} > K_o \cdot F^n$.

So the number of solutions of the inequality (3·42) for every given N_1 is

$$a_o^{-\nu}\{N_1^{\nu} + O(1) - (N_1 - N_o F^{-\psi})^{\nu} + O(1)\} > c \cdot F^{1-\psi}.$$

Hence the whole number of solutions of (3·42).

$$(3\cdot43)\quad > c \cdot X^2 F^{s-1} \cdot F^{1-\psi} = c \cdot X^2 F^{s-\psi}.$$

The part of $H_{y,1}$ corresponding to $q = 1$

$= Q_y X^2$,

and its summation for all N in the above interval

$$\leqslant Q_y X^2 \cdot c \cdot N_o F^{-\psi} < c \cdot Q_y \cdot X^2 \; F^{n-\psi}.$$

When $q > 1$, from lemma (29)

$$\left| \sum_N e^{-2\pi i a/q N} \right| < 1/2(a/q) = \frac{q}{2a}$$

and so by (3·310), when $q > 1$,

$$\sum_N H_{y,1} = O\left\{ Q_y X^2 \sum_{q=2}^{F^d} q^{-s\delta} \sum_a \frac{q}{2a} \right\}$$

$$= O\{Q_y X^2 \sum_{q=2}^{F^d} q^{-1-\delta} \log q\} = O(Q_y X^2).$$

Hence, when q runs through all values in the interval $O < q \leqslant F^d$.

$$\sum_N H_{y,1} < c \cdot Q_y X^2 F^{n-\psi} + O(Q_y X^2) < c\, Q_y X^2 F^{n-\psi}.$$

In the intervals of the second class, by lemma (29),

$$\left| \sum_N e^{-2\pi i \alpha N} \right| = O(1/(\alpha)) = O(F^l).$$

So

$$(3\cdot44) \quad \sum H_{y,2} = O(F^{s-2+l} \int_0^1 \sum_u \sum_{u'} e^{2\pi i \alpha (u-u')} d\alpha)$$

$$= O(F^{s-2+l} XF) = O(XF^{s-1+l})$$

$$= o(X^2 F^{s-\psi}),$$

provided

$$E \; s - 1 + l < n - 1 - \sigma + s - \psi, \text{ i.e., } l < n - \sigma - \psi.$$

Hence from (3·41), (3·42), (3·43) and (3·44), we get that

(3·45) $Q_y > c \cdot F^{s-n}$.

§3·5 Estimation of D_y. It follows from (3·39), that

$$E_y = \sum_{N_2} e^{-2\pi i a/q N_2} B^s_{a,q}$$

where $N_2 = N - \xi - \xi' - f(y)$,

where ξ' also takes the same set of values as ξ but independently.

Therefore

$$D_y = \sum_{N_2} \sum_{q=1}^{F^d} A_q(N_2).$$

From lemma (27), from the definition of s in §3·1, it follows that for all these N_2,

$$\mathfrak{S}(N_2) > c > 0.$$

So from lemma (25), we conclude that

$$\sum_{q=1}^{Fd} A_q(N_2) > c + O(F^{-d\delta}), \quad (c \text{ is independent of } N_2).$$

$$> \frac{c}{2}, \text{ provided}$$

$$F \quad F^{d\delta} > \frac{c}{2}.$$

Hence

$$(3\cdot 51) \quad D_y > \sum_{N_2} \frac{c}{2} = \frac{c}{2} X^2 > c X^2.$$

(c is different on different occasions).

Hence from (3·311), (3·45) and (3·51), we get that

$$(3\cdot 52), \quad H_{y,1} > c X^2 F^{s-n} + O(X^2 F^{s-n-\psi}) > c X^2 F^{s-n}, \text{ provided}$$

$$G \quad F > c.$$

§3·6. The fundamental integral. Now we put $N = N_o$, and investigate the integral.

$$(3\cdot 61) \quad I_{N_o} = \sum_{y=1}^{Y} I_{y, N_o}$$

$$= \int_0^1 T^{s-3} T_1 V^2 S^2 e^{-2\pi i a N_o} \sum_y e^{2\pi i a f(y)} da.$$

By dividing the interval of integration into two classes as in §3·3, we represent the integral as the sum of two terms,

$$(3\cdot 62) \quad I_{N_o} = H_1 + H_2.$$

Now, $H_1 = \sum_{y} H_{y,1}$.

Therefore from (3·52), we have

(3·63) $H_1 > cX^2YF^{s-n}$.

In the intervals of the second class, $F^d < q \leqslant \tau = O(F^l)$.

So $\sum_{y=1}^{Y} e^{2\pi i\alpha f(y)} = \sum_{Y}^{y=1} e^{2\pi i^{a}/qf(y)} + O(|z| Y^{n+1})$

$= O(Y \cdot F^{-d\delta_2}) + O(Y^{n+1}q^{-1}\tau^{-1})$, [from lemma (30)]

$= O(F^{b-d\delta_2}) + O(F^{bn+b} \cdot F^{-d} \cdot F^{-l})$

$= O(A)$ say.

Hence $H_2 = O(A \cdot F^{s-2} \int_0^1 V^2S^2 d\alpha)$

$$= O(A \cdot F^{s-2} \cdot F \cdot X) = O(AF^{s-1}X).$$

$$\frac{H_2}{H_1} = O\left(\frac{AF^{s-1}X}{X^2YF^{s-n}}\right) = O\left(\frac{A}{XYF^{1-n}}\right)$$

$$= O\left(\frac{A}{F^{n-1-\sigma} \cdot F^b \cdot F^{1-n}}\right) = O(AF^{\sigma-b})$$

$$= O(F^{\sigma-d\delta_2} + F^{\sigma+bn-l-d})$$

$$= o(1),$$

provided

H $d\delta_2 > \sigma$.

I $\sigma + bn < l + d$.

Hence

$I_{N_0} > cX^2YF^{s-n} > 0$

§3·7. Now the conditions to be satisfied are:

(1) $d < l$;

(2) $l \geqslant n - 1 + d$;

(3) $d(1+\delta) \leqslant 1 - \psi$;

(4) $\psi \leqslant 1$;

(5) $b \leqslant 1 - \psi/n$;

(6) D_1, D_3;

(7) $b \leqslant 1$;

(8) $l < n - \sigma - \psi$;

(9) F, G;

(10) $d\delta_2 > \sigma$;

(11) $\sigma + bn < l + d$.

Conditions (6) and (9) are satisfied if $N_0 > c$.

Now put

(1) $k = [n \log (2n/\delta_2] + 2.$ (3) $d = \frac{1}{2}$; (5) $\psi = 1/n^6$;

(2) $b = 1 - \dfrac{1}{n^2}$; (4) $l = n - \frac{1}{2}$; (6) $N_o > c$.

Then all conditions are satisfied.

So we arrive at the result that if $N_o > c$, and $k = [n \log (2n/\delta_2)] + 2$, then for a suitable $s \leqslant \Gamma$,

$$I_{N_o} > 0.$$

But I_{N_o} is the number of representations of N_o in the form.

$$N_o = f(x) + f(x_1) + \dots + f(x_{s-3}) + u + u' + f(y),$$

with $x, x_1, \dots, x_{s-1} \geqslant x_o$.

The right side of the above is a sum of

$$1 + s - 3 + 2k + 1 = s + 2k - 1 \text{ values of } f(x).$$

Therefore, we arrive at

Theorem IV. If $\sum_{y=1}^{Y} e^{2\pi i a/q f(y)} = O(Y \cdot F^{-\delta_2})$

for all q, $F^{\frac{1}{2}} < q \leqslant O(F^{n-\frac{1}{2}})$

and $Y = [F^{1-\nu^2}]$, then

$$G(f) \leqslant \Gamma + 2[n \log (2n/\delta_2)] + 3.$$

§3·8. *Lemma* (32): When $n \geqslant 20$, and $F^{\frac{1}{2}} < q = O(F^{n-\frac{1}{2}})$,

$$S_1 = \sum_{y=1}^{Y} e^{2\pi i a/q f(y)} = O(YF^{-\delta_3}),$$

where $\delta_3 = 1/40n^3 \log n$.

(1) $q \leqslant Y \cdot$ *i.e.*, $q \leqslant F^{1-\nu^2}$.

$$S_1 = \left(\frac{Y}{q}\right) \sum_{y=1}^{q} + \sum_{y=1}^{q_1} . \text{ where } q_1 < q.$$

So from lemma (6)

$$S_1 = O(Y/_q \cdot q^{1-\delta} + q_1{}^{1-\delta} \text{ or } q_1) \text{ according as } q_1 \gtrless q^{1/(n-1-\nu)}$$

Therefore

$$S_1 = O(Y \cdot q^{-\delta}) = O(YF^{-d\delta}) = O(YF^{-\delta_3}), \text{ for } \tfrac{1}{2}\delta = \delta_3.$$

(2) $Y < q = O(F^{n-\frac{1}{2}})$.

Since $Y = F^{1-\nu^2}$, $F^{n-\frac{1}{2}} \leqslant Y^{n-\frac{1}{2}+2/n^2} = Y^{n-(\frac{1}{2}-2/n^2)}$.

In lemma (6), put $c = \frac{1}{2} - 2/n^2$.

$$\text{Then } 8\log\frac{10n^2}{c} = 8\log\frac{10n^2}{\frac{1}{2}-2/n^2} < \frac{40\log n}{1-\nu^2}; \text{ for } n \geqslant 20.$$

So in this case

$$S_1 = O(Y^{1-\delta_3/(1-\nu^2)}) = O(YF^{-\delta_3}).$$

From (1) and (2), the lemma follows.

Lemma (33): When $2 \leqslant n \leqslant 19$, and $F^{\frac{1}{2}} < q = O(F^{n-\frac{1}{2}})$,

$$S_1 = \sum_{y=1}^{Y} e^{2\pi i a/q f(y)} = O(YF^{-\delta_4}),$$

where $\delta_4 = (1/_2 - 1/_n)/2^{n-1} - \varepsilon$.

From lemma (8),

$$S_1 = O(Y^\varepsilon q^\varepsilon)\{Y^{1-\delta} + Yq^{-\delta} + Y^{1-n\delta}q^\delta\},$$

where $\delta = 1/2^{n-1}$.

Now ε is arbitrary.

So $Y^\varepsilon q^\varepsilon = O(F^\varepsilon)$, ε has different values on the two sides.

Hence

$$S_1 = O(Y \cdot F^\varepsilon)\,\text{Max}\{Y^{-\delta}, q^{-\delta}, Y^{-n\delta}q^\delta\}$$

$$Y^{-\delta} \leqslant F^{-b\delta} < F^{-\delta/2}.$$

$$q^{-\delta} \leqslant F^{-\delta/2}.$$

$$Y^{-n\delta} \cdot q^\delta \leqslant F^{-n\delta(1-\nu^2)} \cdot F^{\delta(n-1/2)} = F^{-\delta(1/2-1/n)}$$

So $S_1 = O(Y \cdot F^{-\delta(1/2-1/n)+\varepsilon}) = O(YF^{-\delta_4})$.

§3·9. Proof of the main result.

(1) $n \geqslant 20$.

From lemma (32),

$2[n \log (2n/\delta_2)] \leqslant n\{4 \log n + \log \log n + \log 80\}$.

(2) $3 \leqslant n \leqslant 19$.

From lemma (33),

$2[n \log (2n/\delta_2)] \leqslant n\{n \log 2 + 3/n\} = n^2 \log 2 + 3$.

Hence from theorem IV, we get

Theorem V. When $n \geqslant 20$,

$G(f) \leqslant \text{Max}\{M, 25n^3 \log n\} + 2n \{4 \log n + \log \log n + \log 80\} + 3$.

Theorem VI. When $n \geqslant 3$.

$G(f) \leqslant \text{Max}\{M, 2^n + 4\} + 2n^2 \log 2 + 6$.

ERRATA

Page 171 for last 4 lines, read $\gamma = \gamma\ (p) \begin{cases} = \theta_1 + 2\theta_2 + 2 \text{ when } p \geqslant 2 \\ = \theta_1 + 2\theta_2 + 1 \text{ when } p \geqslant 3 \end{cases}$

Omit lemma (5) and the foot notes.

Read $s - 1$ for s in line 2 page 178 ; lines 2, 12, 15 page 180 ; and in line 3 page 182.

Read $p^{\varphi+1}$ instead of p^{φ} in line 8 page 178.

and $p^{\varphi+1}$ instead of $p^{\varphi-1}$ in line 22 page 178.

Read $y_{v} p^{l}$ instead of $y_{v} p^{l-\theta}$ in line 7 page 181.

Read U instead of Q in lines 1, 3 page 184.

Some Experiments on the Utilisation of Indigenous Raw Materials

By

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(Annamalai University)

The Government of India established about two years ago, the Industrial Intelligence and Research Bureau to collect and disseminate industrial intelligence, to co-ordinate industrial research that is being done in different parts of the country — in a few universities, under the Provincial Directors of Industries and by a few enterprising industrialists—and to encourage investigation of industrial problems by the award of prizes, etc. The Bureau has, also, its own laboratories at the Test House, Alipore, Calcutta where work on some selected problems is being done.

It seems, desirable, to place on record some work that has been done in a number of fields during some years, so that the information may be readily available to those who require it. The work relates to utilisation of some minor forest products, manufacture of glue from hide fleshings, utilisation of iron ore for the manufacture of brown paints, etc. The work on forest products was done in collaboration with Messrs. C. Varadhan and S. L. Janniah (*Quarterly Journal of the Mysore Forest Department,* 1934, 7).

FOREST OIL SEEDS

Large scale expression of oil from the following oil-seeds : Sandal, Nagasampige, Mukarthi, Surthi, and Gangunge was investigated at the New Oil Mills, Platform Road, Bangalore. The methods suggested so far for expression of oil from Sandal seed are all uneconomical and wasteful. It was hoped to express a good proportion of the oil in the seed in the Krupp's Expeller, but the oil is so sticky and viscous and contains such a large quantity of resinous matter, that the attempt did not meet with much success. This is very disappointing in view of the fact that sandal seed oil is a drying oil with a high Iodine Value and suitable for the manufacture of soft soap. Medley oil of good quality suitable for the manufacture of ordinary soap was expressed in 35% yield from these seeds mentioned above.

Sagade seed oil. These seeds (called " Kusum " in Northern India, *Schleichera Trijuga*) have a loose outer shell and a hard inner shell or

pericarp. The outer shell, the pericarp and the kernel form 56, 24 and 20 per cent respectively of the total weight of the seeds.

The oil-content of the seeds with the pericarp and without it was determined by extraction with various solvents.

Part of Seed.	*Solvent.*	*Percentage of fat.*
Kernel	30–50° petrol	58·5
Kernel	Carbon tetrachloride	60·7
Kernel and pericarp	do.	29·8
Pericarp	do.	6·2

The semi-solid fat obtained was greenish-yellow in colour, the fat from the pericarp being much harder than that from the kernel.

By expression on a large scale in the Oil Mills (yield 28 to 30 per cent), these seeds gave an oil which deposited a small amount of solid on long standing. The physical and chemical constants of the oil expressed in the Mills were determined and are given below:—

Acid value	..	44·3
Iodine value	..	57·1
Refractive Index at 30° C	..	1·4637
Saponification value	..	220·1
Titre	..	46·5° C

The oil and Nitrogen in the cake were found to be:—

		Per cent.
Oil	..	10·8
Nitrogen	..	2·05

Dhupa fat. Dhupa fruits (*Vateria Indica*) are fairly hard, with an outer shell, which splits and opens out on the fruit ripening. Large quantities of these fruits are exported to Germany and other foreign countries, on account of the high-class edible fat obtainable from them. The chief difficulty in the way of developing this industry, here, has been that the fruits are attacked by maggots immediately on ripening, unless dried very soon. Therefore, any attempt to express the fat has to be made in the area in which the fruit grows, the interval between plucking the fruits and expressing the fat from them being as small as possible.

An attempt was made to prepare the fat by boiling the shelled and crushed seeds with water and skimming out the melted fat which floats on top—a process practised by poorer classes in Malnad Districts in Mysore State. The yield of the fat by this method was, however, very poor—1 per cent. Solvent extraction with petrol (30° to 50°) after drying the shelled seeds and powdering them gave 17 per cent fat. A

yield of 8 to 9 per cent was obtained by expression on a large scale in the expeller. The fat is greenish-white in colour, rapidly bleaching on exposure.

The oil and Nitrogen content of the cake from the Oil Mills were found to be :—

Oil	..	6·7 per cent.
Nitrogen	..	1·0 „

It is hoped to attack the seeds by cellulose-destroying bacteria like "Delbruckia" in order to recover the fat.

Jalari (*Shorea Telura*). The seeds of this tree extracted with benzene gave 1 per cent. of a clear oil. Since the yield was small, the work was not continued.

Ganja Oil (*Hempseed oil*). The seeds gave on extraction with petrol (50° to 60°), 32 per cent. of a clear, light-green oil, which darkened on keeping. The following were the constants of the oil :—

Specific gravity at 27° C	..	0·9254
Saponification value	..	188 to 193
Iodine value	..	146 to 150

It is a semi-drying oil, its iodine value being fairly high, so that its chief use is for making cheap paints. It was being used in Madras and Mysore for being mixed with paints for marking toddy trees which practice has been given up now. It is likely to be useful after purification for the manufacture of soft soaps also.

The seeds are not available in any considerable quantity, so that commercial exploitation of the oil has not been possible.

Sandal seed oil. Sandal seeds are available in large quantities in the forests, each sandal tree yielding a fairly good amount per year. The oil is particularly useful for the manufacture of liquid soaps, its iodine value being fairly high. So far, the commercial exploitation of the oil has not been successful, on account of the difficulty of expressing the sticky, viscous oil from the seeds.

The seed is small and sufficiently soft to be crushed between the fingers. It has a thin pericarp, forming about two-fifths of the weight of the seed.

Extracted with benzene, the seeds give 47 per cent of oil and the kernel alone about 65 per cent. The brownish-yellow oil is thick, vis-

cous, and almost odourless. A drop on a watch-glass exposed to air, dries slowly to a reddish-brown plastic mass, but a small quantity of oil smeared on glass plate and exposed, dries up quickly to a thin tough film. The physical and chemical constants of the oil are given below:

Specific Gravity at 27° ..	0·9305
Refractive Index at 55° C ..	1·4785
Saponification value ..	172 to 175
Iodine value ..	102 to 105
Acid value ..	19 to 22

As can be seen, it is a semi-drying oil and should be most useful for the manufacture of varnishes and liquid soaps. The difficulties in the expression of pure sandal seed oil are sure to be surmounted.

It is hoped that a large scale collection of the seeds at an economical rate will be organised by the Forest Departments. In fact, in the case of all oil-seeds, the chief obstacle in the way of commercial exploitation is the prohibitive cost of collection of the seeds.

ESSENTIAL OILS

Essential Oil of Karibe (Clausena Wildenowii).—The leaves and twigs (44 lbs.) of this shrub were distilled in steam yielding 56 gms. of a reddish-brown essential oil with a powerful odour, possessing a distinct resemblance to lemon grass oil. The yield is 0·25 per cent. It is understood that this shrub grows abundantly round about Bangalore. The oil is under investigation with a view to find out its economic importance.

Essential Oil of Chigatmari (Lansium Aannamalayanum).—This wood is available in fairly large quantities in Malnad parts in Mysore State and has a very powerful smell which seems to disappear on chopping the wood into small pieces and exposing them to the atmosphere for a few days. A large quantity of oil was distilled in order to find out its suitability for incorporation in perfumes and other toilet articles and its consequent market value.

The distillation results are given below.

233 lbs. Milva chippings (mixture of heart-wood and white wood) were distilled in steam. After 10·5 hours when distillation was complete, 4·4 lbs. of oil and 440 lbs. of condensed steam had been collected.

Yield: 1·9 per cent on the weight of the wood. Steam ratio: oil: steam: : 1:100.

209 lbs. Heart-wood chippings were distilled in steam.

Time for distillation	..	11·5 hours
Yield of oil	..	3·7 lbs. *i.e.* 1·8 per cent
Ratio of oil to steam	..	1:81

136·5 lbs. white wood chippings were distilled in steam.

Time for distillation	..	6·0 hours
Yield of oil	..	1·5 lbs. *i.e.* 1·1 per cent
Ratio of oil to steam	..	1:146

The distillation was very rapid in the beginning slowing down considerably towards the end.

During the first 1·5 hours, 1·85 lbs. of oil were collected with only 40 lbs. of condensed steam. During the next 2·75 hours, 1·6 lbs. of oil were collected with 60 lbs. of condensed steam. During the last 7 hours, ·7 lb. of oil was collected with 200 lbs. of condensed steam.

The oil which distilled in the beginning was pale-yellow in colour, while the later fractions were dark-green. The oil has a powerful and penetrating odour not unlike that of sandal oil.

Specific gravity at 27° C.	..	0·8976
Refractive Index at 23° C.	..	1·4952–1·4960.
$(\alpha)^D$	..	—89·8°

A large quantity of wood was distilled at the Sandal Oil Factory, Mysore, where a yield of 1·64 per cent was obtained and a steam ratio of 1:300 was recorded.

MANUFACTURE OF GLUE

Glue is an important article which is imported in fairly large quantities into India, the quantity in 1934-35, being 16,000 cwts. valued at Rs. 3,82,000. Commercially, glues are of many kinds depending on their origin and are classified as hide glue, size glue and bone glue. For our present purpose, taking into account the locally available material, only hide glue need be considered. In tanneries, pieces and cuttings of swollen hides, are obtained as by-products during their shaping and are known as fleshings. These fleshings are available in very large quantities in the tanneries and their disposal is a problem to the tanners. Investigation has been confined to the utilization of these as the starting material.

Manufacture of glue on a large scale from fleshings in the tanneries cannot be strictly considered a cottage industry. For the latter purpose, the process has to be simplified further and the product obtained will necessarily be of a lower quality, but sufficiently good for the ordinary work of the carpenter. The fleshings or sinews from the slaughter house will form the raw material in this case.

Fresh hide fleshings from the tanneries are generally wet and it is not necessary to dry them unless it is desired to preserve them as such for some time before they are treated. Since for dehairing hides, plenty of lime is used in the tanneries, it is necessary to remove the adhering lime and calcium carbonate formed from it by the action of atmospheric carbon dioxide. Plenty of dirt and extraneous harmful impurities are also generally present and have to be removed. The fleshings are therefore thoroughly washed with cold water with efficient stirring to remove these as much as possible by mechanical action. Even after this preliminary washing, plenty of lime and calcium carbonate will be found admixed in the fleshings. They are removed by neutralizing with diluted commercial sulphuric or hydrochloric acid (1:1) in just a little excess over the right quantity, draining off the liquor which contains a lot of salt and washing the residue thoroughly with water to free it of acid. Freedom from acid should be ensured, as any acid in the residue will affect the quality of the final product adversely.

It may be mentioned that the quantity of acid required to remove the lime and calcium carbonate varies considerably in the case of different samples, naturally depending on the quantity of lime that has been used for dehairing and also on the efficiency of the preliminary washing.

This process of cleaning and acid treatment is not necessary in the case of sinews obtained in villages and slaughter houses. Just a little washing with water to remove any mud or dirt adhering will be quite sufficient. In the case of hides, however, dehairing by the use of lime has to be done.

The fleshings which have thus been completely freed of lime are then soaked in good clear water in the proportion of 1 : 4 and vigorously boiled with agitation for 3-4 hours. The aqueous extract is drained off and the process repeated twice or thrice with smaller quantities of water. The extracts are all mixed and evaporated in an open pan by means of steam or on an open fire. In practice, it will be found more convenient to start the evaporation of the first extract, the later extracts being added as and when they are ready. The evaporation is carried

on to a stage when the residue in the pan becomes thick and a smear on a glass plate forms a thin solid film on cooling. The stage at which concentration has to be stopped can be learnt only by experience. This is the most important step in the manufacture.

Immediately this stage is reached, the thick syrup should be poured into shallow trays (about 2″ in depth) to cool and set. In winter, *i.e.*, from October to February, the jelly will slowly harden and thin slabs can be taken out. It is better if some oil, *e.g.*, castor oil is smeared on the trays before the syrup is poured, as this will facilitate the removal of the slabs easily. They are then placed in trays constructed of wire netting and allowed to dry slowly in a shady place with plenty of breeze, rearranging them at intervals to express fresh surfaces. In summer months, it will be necessary to chill the jelly to make it set, by the use of ice or in a refrigerator. It will, however, be more convenient to manufacture most of the glue required, in winter.

Liquid glue itself can be placed on the market and is suitable for most purposes. The difficulty of getting it to set without much expense is the greatest problem and this will be avoided by selling liquid glue as such. Moreover, it can be manufactured during the whole year. It will be an excellent commodity, if only it can be made popular. With cautious propaganda and demonstration of the efficiency of liquid glue which is as good as the solid, it should be possible to introduce it into the market. After all, glue is used in carpentry and other work, only after dissolving in water. In order to keep the liquid glue properly preserved from putrefaction, it will be necessary to add a small quantity of an antiseptic like carbolic acid or creosote.

The quantities handled in the laboratory were one cwt. lot fleshings. The yield of glue on the weight of the wet fleshings has been found to be about 8-10%, and when worked on a large scale, could be improved to about 12%.

Detailed proposals and estimate for the manufacture of glue in the tanneries will naturally depend on the quantity of fleshings available, whether all the glue produced can be sold profitably and whether part-time labour can be had. There is usually a good water supply available in all the tanneries and a hand pump may be necessary to pump the water to the tank where the digestion of the fleshings is done. Wrought or galvanized iron tanks of 200-400 gallons capacity, evaporating pans of similar capacity and a number of trays of galvanized iron and wire gauze will be necessary. The whole cost of the

equipment should not be more than Rs. 600-800. If old vessels are already available, the saving in the estimate will be to that extent.

In the case of villagers who want to carry out the manufacture as a cottage industry, the household earthenware pots themselves will quite do.

It is difficult to discuss the question of marketing the glue produced, in this paper. The sale of glue manufactured in the tanneries will be done by the owners and will depend on their marketing organisation, initiative and enterprise. In the case of villagers who produce glue, the question is a little more complicated. In the U.P., all the glue manufacturers have formed themselves into the Cawnpore Glue Makers Co-operative Society, Fazalganj, Cawnpore, which markets the products for the members who are mostly illiterate. In Punjab, a Co-operative Union under the Co-operative Department was formed with a view to collective purchase of raw materials and sale of finished products. But it is understood that due to certain misunderstandings, it was wound up some time ago.

UTILIZATION OF IRON ORE

The utilization of Hematite and Limonite available at Kemmangudi in Mysore for the manufacture of brown paints was investigated in collaboration with the Whitelead Syndicate, Bangalore. It was found that these materials were very good for making brown paints and far superior to Ochre in that their oil absorption was only 2|5 of that of Ochre. It was also found that different shades of brown could be obtained by heating the ore at different temperatures prior to its admixture with oil. Special equipment was, however, found necessary in order to reduce the ore into a condition sufficiently fine to answer the specifications of the Indian Stores Department.

These investigations were carried out at the Indian Institute of Science and the laboratories of the Government of Mysore.

Annamalainagar,
24th April, 1937.

The Present Status of the Study of Human Emotions

By

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(Annamalai University)

A warmth within the breast would melt
The freezing reason's colder part,
And like a man in wrath the heart
Stood up and answered 'I have felt.'

—Tennyson, 'In Memoriam', cxxiv, 4.

'There is a light in my heart, but when I seek to bring it into the understanding, it is extinguished. Which illumination is the true one, that of the understanding, which discloses, indeed, well-defined and fixed shapes, but behind them an abyss, or that of the heart, which, while indeed it sends rays of promise upwards, is unable to supply the want of definite knowledge?'

—Jacobi from 'Uberweg's History of Philosophy,' Vol. II, p. 200.

'Dynamic' is the word which, more than any other, is truly expressive of the spirit of our age. The change from the old, conservative, and static attitude to the modern, progressive and dynamic attitude to life is the most significant characteristic of this new age of illumination. Nor is this a change affecting only man's attitude to life. It has shaken the very foundations of the external world so confidently laid by nineteenth century science. The physical and the biological sciences have realised, through their penetrating insight into the workings of the sub-microscopic realm, that nature is dynamic; but the social sciences are rather slow to learn the lesson, since the spectre of the 'rational man' still seems to beckon to them from a far off illusory realm. Not science alone, but art too exhibits the unmistakable signs of a profound change in its outlook on life. The revival of Bharata Natyam in our country, to mention only one typical movement, is full of significance, for the very essence of the dance is dynamism.

While his outlook on life is undergoing a profound change, modern man is moved from within by a strange but potent spirit of restlessness, which urges him to strive after the unknown and the undefined. The craze for speed, the hustler's frantic rush round the globe, the growth of the cubist, futurist and impressionist styles in art, and the

rapid spread of sur-realism are so many signs of the times which he who runs may read. Modern man's wistful and lonesome pursuit of he knows not what is pathetically exhibited in his effort to define for himself the ideal relationship between the sexes. Marriage, the sex instinct, preservation and propagation of the species, love and liberty have all been confused each with the others, each being made in turn the standard by which the others should be evaluated. And all the while man has hidden from himself the supreme end for which these are merely so many means. Hence it is that in this particular social institution the restlessness of spirit is intensely manifested at the present day.

Dynamism and restlessness are, therefore, the most outstanding characteristics of our age. So, it is not surprising to find that Psychology has been influenced profoundly by the spirit of the times; for after all, this spirit of restlessness and striving after the undefined is *the* subject for investigation in psychology. It is the task of psychology and psychology alone to probe deep into the mind and get at the source of the universal dynamism of the modern age. The contemporary schools of psychology, in spite of violent disagreement among themselves on several matters of fundamental importance, are agreed in the attitude they take up towards man, the subject of their study. Revolting against the static, elementaristic mental-chemistry of the later nineteenth century, they, with one accord, declared that they would study the activity of man, the dynamic being. The Behaviourist is at one with his opponents in this matter. Even the Factor-School engaged in the investigation of, what for a long time has been considered, the most static aspect of man's endowment, have come to recognise the existence of new factors, such as 'w' and 'v', which make for dynamism in intelligence. Spearman realised the power of conation even in his first work of importance, wherein he says, 'The intensity of cognition can be controlled by conation'.[1] In a later work[2] though he says that 'On the whole it would appear that the influence of instincts and interests upon cognitive ability has an unexpectedly restricted scope', yet he admits that 'In certain exceptional cases, however, such an influence is so strikingly suggested as to urge the pressing need for at least further investigation'.[3] F. C. Thomas in his recent book expounding the standpoint of the London School says, 'It seems, then, that present cognitive efficiency depends always upon these two orectic factors. On the one hand, it depends on conscious conative control; and on the other, on the un-

(1) The Nature of Intelligence, &c., p. 347.
(2) The Abilities of Man, p. 341.
(3) Ibid, p. 341.

conscious effects of volition. It follows, therefore, that we have to enunciate a law of control, namely, that the intensity of cognition can be controlled by conation and volition.'[4] It is plain, therefore, that the leaders of the great schools of psychology, as well as those engaged in research in restricted branches of the science, admit that the subject of their study is the dynamic nature of the living organism.

An important implication in this universal attitude of the different schools of psychology is the suggested affiliation between this science and the physical sciences on the one hand, and the biological sciences on the other. Sir Oliver Lodge has held tenously to the faith that mind could be reconciled with matter through ether. Though this ether as a third entity reconciling two others, matter and mind, through itself, has disappeared, yet Sir Oliver's faith has been fulfilled in a marvellous manner. Matter as the dynamic centre of energy has ceased to be ultra-mental. The essence of the nucleus of matter is restless energy; the urge of this energy manifesting itself in intra-atomic movements. And it is the very same urge which is the essence of mind too, the essence which is studied by psychology.

As in physics so in biology, it is the universal energy in the form of urge *to* life and *for* life that is attracting the attention of the serious minded investigators (of the type of Haldane and Driesch). Not evolution, not embryology, not even cytology and cytogenetics, but it is the change from the bio-physical to the Bionomic or the Ecological attitude that augurs well for the future of biology. The study of the organism in its natural habitat will lead to the investigation of its activity, and of the urge to such activity; in other words, to the investigation of the mind of the organism. Biology and Psychology will have to join forces soon in their attack on the mysteries of organism.

The social sciences are rather behind the times, since they are still obsessed with the idea of the 'rational man.' But the recent publication of Professor J. M. Keynes' book, "The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money," which has evoked violent opposition as well as support, is an indication of the healthy change of outlook in economics. Even the political economist, who loves to be submerged under a pile of statistics and Blue Book reports, is realising that man is dynamic and that his activities can be understood only in terms of the powerful impulses that move his inner nature. Economics has been singled out for special mention here, because, it is the most popular (and also the most

(4) Ability and Knowledge, p. 100.

sought after by governments of the present day) of all the social sciences. In the field of general sociology too the change of attitude is noticeable. Ever since Pareto discussed non-logical conduct in his voluminous work, "Mind and Society," the sociologist has been anxious to secure a proper psychological grounding for his science. But the classical psychologist was so preoccupied with his sterile analysis of consciousness that he could not lend a helping hand to the sociologist in laying the necessary foundations. Professor McDougall, however, came to the rescue by publishing his Social Psychology in 1908. The treatise is a prominent land-mark in the history of psychology and sociology, for it lays bare, for the first time, the hidden recesses of the human mind which impel man to action. Modern Hormic Psychology gives us a glipmse into the secret springs of human action; and when these springs are examined carefully it is found that they rest on EMOTIONS. So it is that emotions have come to occupy the focus of the psychologist's attention.[5] 'The human beings psychology now studies are creatures . . . . in whom emotion and impulse are powerful factors in determining conduct and in whom reason seems less decisive than was long supposed.'[6]

II

Though emotions are so intimate a part of our nature that they cannot be easily brushed aside, yet their study has been neglected for a a long time. 'For some reason human beings, when they become reflective, tend strongly to regard man's rational nature as peculiarly and essentially himself.' This scientific neglect, coupled with the popular illusion, has created in our minds a false scale of values. But man pays a terrible penalty for uprooting violently the main springs of his conduct and character. Charles Darwin writes with great feeling in his auto-biography, 'My mind seems to have become a kind of machine for grinding general laws out of large collections of facts, but why this should have caused the atrophy of that part of the brain alone, on which the highest tastes depend, I cannot conceive...... If I had to live my life again, I would have made a rule to read some poetry and listen to some music at least once in every week; for perhaps the parts of my brain now atrophied would have been kept active through use. *The loss of these tastes is a loss of happiness, and may possibly be injurious to*

(5) The Wittenberg Symposium is a significant indication of the direction in which contemporary psychology is moving.

(6) Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies, p. 48.

the intellect, and more probably to the moral character, by enfeebling the emotional part of our nature.'[7]

Man is moved very powerfully, indeed, by emotions, and he cannot but be aware of the working of the strong impulses within his inner nature. Yet we witness the surprising phenomenon of the denial of emotions by the popular mind, and of their utter neglect by scientific psychology. In a sense this need not cause us any surprise, for one of

(7) C. Darwin, *Autobiography,* London, 1902, pp. 50-1. (The Italics are ours). Mill and Spencer too have deeply regretted the overdevelopment of their intellect at the expense of their finer emotions and feelings. Mill says, '......I now saw, or thought I saw, what I had always received with incredulity—that the habit of analysis has a tendency to wear away the feelings, as indeed it has, when no other mental habit is cultivated, and the analysing spirit remains without its natural complements and correctives . . .

My education, I thought, had failed to create these feelings in sufficient strength to resist the dissolving influence of analysis, while the whole course of my intellectual cultivation had made precocious and premature analysis the inveterate habit of my mind. I was thus, as I said to myself, left stranded at the commencement of my voyage, with a well-equipped ship and a rudder, but no sail; without any real desire for the ends which I had been so carefully fitted out to work for; no delight in virtue, or the general good......

I had now learnt by experience that the passive susceptibilities needed to be cultivated as well as the active capacities, and require to be nourished and enriched as well as guided........I thought that it (analysis) had consequences which required to be corrected, by joining other kinds of cultivation with it . . . The cultivation of the feelings became one of the cardinal points in my ethical and philosophical creed.

J. S. Mill, *Autobiography* (World Classics), pp. 116, 117 & 120.

Herbert Spencer, the redoubtable champion of the intellect, is very sparing in his praise of reason. 'I must have dimly felt then' he says, 'what I afterwards clearly saw, and have set forth in the Principles of Psychology, 388-391, the fact that belief in the unqualified supremacy of reason is the superstition of Philosophers.'

Autobiography, vol. I, 253-4.

'It had become manifest to me that men are rational beings in but a very limited sense; that conduct results from desire, to the gratification of which reason serves but as a guide.'

Autobiography, vol. II, 365-6.

'I was not, and never had been, among those who labour under the delusion that intellectual culture produces moral elevation.'

'The critical tendency dominant in me....has similarly entailed advantages and disadvantages..........A further effect has been to render my enjoyment of works of art less than it might else have been. The readiness to dwell upon defects has diminished the appreciation of beauties.......'

Autobiography, vol. II, 443.

the fundamental lessons that we have learnt from the psycho-analyst is that man loves to screen, from others and from himself too, the real motives to his actions, hiding these in the depths of the unconscious. What, then, are the forces, conscious and unconscious, that have impelled man to cover up elaborately the emotions which are so insistent and powerful in himself? The belief had somehow gained ascendency over the popular mind that emotions, being not respectable, should be suppressed or at least kept from view. Influenced by false Victorian prudery and the standards of a superficial civilisation which demanded the *keeping up of appearances* as the high watermark of polite behaviour, the ordinary man came to look down upon emotions and their natural expression. And this popular attitude infected scientific outlook. Psychology was influenced by the more advanced physical and biological sciences. The fetish of reason ruled science for more than two milleniums. The standard of analysis set up by such science was necessarily rationalistic, mechanistic and deterministic. Emotions, being purposive by nature, do not easily fit into a mechanistic scheme. They are so elusive that they do not lend themselves to an objective treatment of the type prescribed by nineteenth century science. Yet as psychology had borrowed its elementaristic method from the physical sciences, it had to submit itself to the sway of rationalism, and had either to throw emotions overboard, confining itself to an analytic study of consciousness, or to keep emotions within its fold by treating them as static entities, capable of being dissolved into elementary conscious states. Both alternatives were espoused by psychology during the closing decades of the last century. The human mind is approached more easily through its cognitive than its conative aspect. It is easier to theorise on a basis of a mechanistic analysis of conscious processes of the human mind. And theorising is the chief aim of science.[8]

(8) '....theorists have another very powerful motive for preferring to think of non-logical conduct as logical. If we assume that certain conduct is logical it is much easier to formulate a theory about it than it is when we take as non-logical. We all have handy in our minds the tool for producing logical inferences, and nothing else is needed. Whereas in order to organise a theory of non-logical conduct we have to consider hosts and hosts of facts, ever extending the scope of our researches in space and in time, and ever standing on our guard, lest we be led into error by imperfect documents. In short, for the person who would frame such a theory, it is a long and difficult task to find outside himself materials that his mind supplied directly with the aid of mere logic when he was dealing with logical conduct.'

Pareto, Mind and Society, vol. 1, p. 178.

A very significant reason for the general neglect of emotions may be given in the words of W. Trotter. 'The only reason I can find' he says, 'is that during centuries this subject has been treated philosophically, not psychologically and the method of philosophy is necessarily intellectualistic. Only the adult and complex forms of the affective life were considered, without regard to their evolution, which alone brings us to their origin. The part played by movements as psychological factors and by unconscious activity were forgotten, or misunderstood.'[9]

The adoration of Greek ideals, resulting in the worship of reason as the only power making for good conduct in man, because Greek Ethic strove to establish the supremacy of reason, is a general characteristic of western thought. But as Pareto says, 'All these people fail to notice that the worship of 'reason', 'truth', 'progress', and other similar entities is like all cults, to be classed with non-logical actions.' Hedonism and Utilitarianism could not have flourished but for the conational foundation on which they were built. The logical fiction has worked so far in psychology, but we are discovering that it is impossible 'to be completely quantitative and psychological at the same time.' The champions of atomistic psychology are aware of the powerful nature of emotions, but they neglect them because they are unable to find a place for them in their analytic scheme. Though emotions have been neglected wilfully sometimes, unwittingly at other times, they have always asserted themselves against the united efforts of the analytic psychologists and the theologians to repress them.

It should however be noted that emotion was not always the 'Cindrella of the psychic household.' Plato, Aristotle and the early Christian writers recognised fully the importance of emotions to human life. Later Christian thought, however, with its violent and unreasonable antagonism to pagan culture and hatred of all that is natural, came to look down upon the flesh as the seat of passion, and strove to repress the emotions; and early psychology falling under the sway of theology emulated the example set by the latter and banished emotions from its fold. But by the Sixteenth century, long before the present dynamic revolt, we find ungrudging recognition given to man's emotional makeup and its importance in conduct. The French psychologist Vives declared the supremacy of feelings and built up a science of emotions. Brett says that 'his work on the "Passions" marks a new era in the history of that troublesome subject, not by virtue of a new classification, but rather on account of the careful way in which the phenomena

(9) Pareto, Mind and Society, vol. I, p. 304.

are described.' Rousseau, Hobbes and even Huxley were not slow to acknowledge the dominance of emotions in the individual and social life of man. Spencer, Mill[10] and Wundt; Alexander, Ward and Stout (not to mention Schopenhauer and Nietszche) are the leading figures in the movement which culminated in the Hormic revolt against classical psychology. The forces of revolution were gathering volume very gradually, and were ready to burst forth when McDougall raised the standard of revolt in 1908.

Though the ground was, in a general way, favourable for the inauguration of the science of emotions, yet external forces were adverse to its establishment. So we find that scientific interest in emotions is of very recent origin. The Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology very significantly says that 'the use of the word emotion in English Psychology is comparatively modern.' Research in Psychology left the field of emotions severly alone, so that the number of papers on feelings and emotions was scarcely more than a twentieth of the total number. But since McDougall's epoch-making entry into the domain of Social psychology affairs have taken a turn for the better, and emotions are coming into their own.

III

If Psychology became lethargic under the soporofic influence of rationalistic science, what then, we may ask, was it that roused it from its fatal slumber ? We have already mentioned the names of the great leaders of thought who were convinced of the sovereign rule of emotions over the life of man. It was during the last decade of the nineteenth century that experimental psychology and psychiatry gave indications of certain disturbing factors in general psychological theory. The workers in these two fields were pioneers of a very aggressive type. Describing their characteristics as well as of those engaged in allied fields Woodworth says, 'In theory, the psychologists of 1900 subscribed to the definition of psychology as the science of consciousness, but in practice they were studying performance as well as experience, in theory they were for an analytical psychology patterned after chemistry, with elementary sensations, images, and feelings, and with complex thoughts and emotions composed of these elements in varying combinations; but in practice they often disregarded this scheme. In theory they were strong for a physiological psychology, but in practice they made a pro-

(10) Spencer and Mill retracted later their admission regarding the nature of emotions.

found bow to the brain and passed on their way, since cerebral processes were still too obscure to afford much insight into mental processes.'[11]

The most outstanding figure in the movement towards dynamism at the time was Freud. There is supreme significance in the fact that emotional renaissance in psychology synchronised with the reign of Freudianism. The great leader of the Psycho-analytic movement shines as the champion of motive psychology which claims recognition and demands investigation in its own right. 'Freudian psychology is deep psychology, exploring below the surface, it comes upon the trodden and suppressed motives and mechanisms, exposes a sub-conscious activity, discloses the sources of conflict within the competing motives and the imposed struggle between the individual and the encircling collective forces of restraint . . .'[12] Freud unveiled ruthlessly the human mind, exposing it in all its garish hideousness. He forced the artificial civilisation with its sham respectability to look beneath its own surface and behold the slimy repulsiveness of its conflicting emotions. And self-lauding respectability enraged at being exposed within and without chose to deny Freud.

Close on the heels of Freud came the great war of 1914, conducting a vast natural experiment on the human mind. This unparallelled world catastrophe is unique in its revelation of the hidden motives to activity in human life. Ages of repression had altered very little indeed the structure of the mind. When the artificial barriers of a false civilisation were hewn down in the war field the current of emotions, hitherto damned up, burst forth tearing up the bed of the stream and breaking down the banks. The war hospitals were crowded with patients apparently well in body but very ill in mind. The thoughtful doctors had unlimited opportunities for studying the structure of the human mind hidden hitherto from the eyes of the unbelieving medical practitioner of the orthodox school. The war served as a great inspirer and instigator of psychological studies.

The work of Freud, the upheaval produced by the War and Professor McDougall's treatise on Social Psychology are, without doubt, the three great forces that brought about a revolution in the psychology of emotions. One other factor has not been mentioned so far and that is the well known theory of James and Lange. By its very paradoxical nature and by its uncompromising denial of the verdict of commonsense,

(11) R. S. Woodworth, Contemporary Schools of Psychology, Pp. 10-11.
(12) Feelings and Emotions (The Wittenberg Symposium), p. 34.

the theory threw out a bold challenge to the psychologist, who had perforce to take notice of it and carry on the necessary investigation into the nature of emotions. The theory has not been ' buried with elaborate rites ' as Titchner believed he had in his Text-book. Its survival down to the present day is a sign not only of its vitality, but also of the keenness of the interest which contemporary psychology is evincing in the emotional equipment of the human mind. In addition to these factors Jastrow mentions the Doctrine of Evolution, the Genetic and Differential studies in Psychology, improved technique in the study of the problems of Group Psychology, Experimental Psychology and Psychological Aesthetics as the antecedent forces that have stimulated the systematic and scientific investigation of the emotions.[13]

' Reason ' as Hume observes rightly, ' is and ought to be the slave of passions.' Even in abstract thought we find that it is emotion that sustains and preserves intellectual activity. This discovery we owe to hormic psychology. It is in no sense an exaggeration of the fact to say that nothing great has been achieved by one incapable of feeling, since a person without feeling is endowed with but poor intellect. The intellect is a great dissolving and disintegrating force, while emotion binds and unifies the varying elements of human nature. It is true that analysis reveals the component factors in the dynamic nature of man, but the force that holds these elements together and gives them the necessary push is, not the intellect, but the hormic urge to life. Contemporary psychology has realised fully that ' feelings and emotions are no longer a superficial manifestation, a simple efflorescence ; they plunge into the individual's depths ; they have their roots in the needs and instincts . . . ' Mankind is only a little bit reasonable and to a great extent very unintelligently moved in quite unreasonable ways.'

Hence it is that psychologists are proclaiming with one voice the sovereignty of emotions in human nature. In this hymn of praise the voice of the leader, Professor McDougall, sounds loudest and clearest. As the first and most outstanding exponent of hormic psychology, he has propounded a theory of emotions which bids fair to surpass all others in clarity and profundity. But the theory needs extension so that it might cover the moral, the aesthetic and the religious emotions. Such an extension could be made only by one who is steeped in the spirit of Indian Philosophy.

(13) Feelings and Emotions (The Wittenberg Symposium), p. 27.

The Age of Tholkappiam

SECTION II.

BY

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In section (1) we canvassed and critically reviewed the arguments and the data for those arguments set forth in the Chronology to disprove the antiquity of Tholkappiam and to establish its *modernity*. We shall now try to negotiate the theorem on the directly affirmative side and discuss all the available facts, that bear on the question at issue and help us to reach some definite and positive conclusions regarding the age of Tholkappiam. In my thesis, *Tamil classics and Tamilakam,* published in 1913, I reviewed many of these facts ; and the findings they then led me to have since remain unchallenged. Their historic value and probative force are so sound and irresistible as would justify a reference to them here once more.

And these facts, although they accord in their scope of suggestion and in the evidentiary significance, may yet be appropriately dealt under two categories (viz.) (i) external facts of intrinsic historic value incidentally recorded in early literature outside Tholkappiam, and (ii) self-suggestive internal indications in Tholkappiam pointing to irresistible conclusions ; and we shall here discuss them separately.

I. EXTERNAL FACTS.

i. a. In dealing with the external evidence, I shall unhesitatingly ignore all myths and legends, however hoary they be, unless they are warranted by recorded facts to warrant historic calculations. For instance, we have no use for the orthodox allegations that the author of Tholkappiam was Thrana Dhoomagni, brother of Parasurama, and that he was brought to the Tamil country from his north Aryan home by his would-be guru, the mythical Agasthya of yore.

For, these very legends are such cannibalist-monsters that they ruthlessly annihilate each other. Parasurama was already an aged senior contemporary of Dasaratha Rama ; and if one were to believe the stories about Parasurama, he could have had no brother living even when he defied and was discomfited by his junior rival, the youthful Rama of Ayodhya. We are told that, as ordained by his holy father,

Parasurama even in his youth killed his mother and all his brothers too. But this is not after all the most serious inconsistency we encounter in these legendary accounts. We are asked to believe that the Aryan sage Agasthya borrowed this Bargava Brahman boy for his disciple from his own callous father Jamadagni, and brought him down into the far southern Tamilaham along with 18 other knightly scions of martial clans, whom Lord Krishna lent to the Dwarfish sage at Dwaraka to be his escort on his way south and to become the progenitors of all the Velir chiefs and feudal lords in Tamilakam.

But we read that Rama met and vanquished Parasurama early in the second or Treta Yugam, and that Krishna ruled in Dwaraka at the close of the third or Dvapara and till the very dawn of the fourth or Kali yuga. We are also informed in this context that Agasthya after coming south with these Dwarakite A.D.C.'s of Krishna's gift, hypnotised with his sweet-tuned lute the great monster Ravana into submission. These bewildering miracles of making the murdered brother of Parasurama resurrect and survive the catastrophies of two long eons, and then meet Krishna's feudatories in Agastya's company in a colonising campaign in the Tamilian jungles in the extreme south, would stagger of course any imagination. It would be credulity running riot to put faith in such unmeaning and preposterous myths and to try to build history on their foundation.

It is just as probable as otherwise that the name Tholkappiar may be quite a Tamil name, and need not be a Tatbava metamorphosis of the Sanskrit word Kavya. There are other scholars with the name Kappiar in the classical age. We have Kappiyarrukappiyanar and Palkappiyanar. And just to distinguish the earliar scholar of the same name, who was the author of this great Tamil grammar named after him, the distinctive appellation 'Thol' was added to his name. And Thol (தொல்) means 'of yore'. We have a parallel to this usage of distinctive appellations in the instance of two other scholars—Kapilar and Tholkapilar, who have both contributed exquisite poems to the Thokainools or classic anthologies. The very attribute 'Thol' (தொல்) prefixed to the name of the author of Tholkappiam forcibly suggests that his must be an age-long name of fame long anterior to the times of Kappianar and Palkappianar, who were probably among the early third Sangam luminaries living many decades or even one or two centuries before the epic age represented by Silappadikaram. And it is perhaps some later Aryanophiles that suggested a Sanskritic origin for the name Tholkappiar, deriving the word, Kappiyar from its nearest phonetic Sanskritic analogue 'Kavya', and then built a whole legend about this Tamil grammarian being a descendant of the house of Brigu and Kavi of the

Vedic age. He might have been a Tamilian well acquainted with early Aryan literature, or a Tamilised Brahman of great attainments and erudition in both Sanskrit and Tamil lores. It is unnecessary to pursue this question further here.

And I have already shown in my thesis on Agastya published in this Journal Vol. IV. No. (i) how utterly unreliable and unwarranted are the Agastya-legends at least in so far as they relate to the history of Tamil literature, and to the reputed discipleship of the author of Tholkappiam to this Aryan sage. It is thus both unnecessary and irrelevant to traverse all this ground over again in this enquiry. I shall therefore endeavour here only to draw attention to trustworthy facts of literary records, which would stand scrutiny and would thereby warrant belief.

The author of the Chronology affirms, and almost all modern research scholars agree with him that the Heroics 400 (Purananuru) and the Erotics 400 (Ahananuru) should be reckoned as the oldest among the Tamil classics, much older than the Love lyrics (Kalis), Ten Tens (Patirruppattu), the Ten Idylls (Pattupattu), and very much older than the earliest epics of Silappadikaram and Manimekalai. Whatever be the views about Manimekalai, all responsible research scholars now agree to accept the reasoned conclusions of the late Kanakasabhai Pillai as regards the age of Silappadikaram. In his well-known brochure "Tamils 1800 years ago" Mr. Pillai canvassed all the relevant arguments on both sides, and has shown why Silappadikaram cannot be later than the second century A.D. Some doubt was, of course, cast by Mr. Swamikannu Pillai's astronomical speculations based on incorrect data and some unsound hypotheses; but later investigations of veteran students of history have not only dispelled these unwarranted doubts, but have considerably reinforced Mr. Pillai's considered opinion and settled conclusion as to the age of Silappadikaram. Historians have since accepted that there is nothing to suggest that the Chera king Senguttuvan and the poets Paranar and Ilango Adigal may have lived later than the 2nd Century A.D. And all the classic anthologies known as 'Thokai-Nools' are undoubtedly older than this 'epic of the anklet' fondly known to the scholars as Silappadikaram. If this Tamil epic is of the 2nd century A.D., then the classical anthologies must date back some four or five centuries before Silappadikaram. And there is some excellent evidence which makes this inference almost irresistible. This epic expressly refers to the subsidence of the far-famed Pandian's Tamil territories in the Indian Ocean; and what is of especial importance and interest in this connection is that this reference to the lost-land is as luminously informing as it is topographically exact, "வடிவேலெறிந்த

வான்பகை பொறாது, பஃறுளியாற்றுடன் பன்மலையடுக்கத்துக், குமரிக்கோடுங் கொடுங்கடல்கொள்ள." —(Silappadikaram—Kathai XI, lines 18-20.) These lines in substance can be rendered as follows:—"The cruel sea swallowed the tracts of Pandinad along with the watershed of the river 'Pahruli' and all the numerous hills therein right down to the embankments of the river 'Kumari', as if in spite for the hauteur of the Pandian King, who defiantly trampled down the breakers' might and reclaimed or wrested land from the maw of the hungry sea." The Kumari in these lines is the traditional extreme southern-bourn of the prehistoric Tamilaham. There is some controversy as to whether this Kumari was a river or a mountain. While the late scholar Arasan Shanmuganar espoused and expounded the montane theory, all the other savants held fast only to the riverine hypothesis. I have dealt at length with these varying views in my recent thesis "Pre-deluge Pandinad and its southern boundary"; and it is unnecessary to go over the same ground once again in this inquiry. Whether Kumari was a river or was a mountain, it would not affect the value and bearing of this reference in Silappadikaram for purposes of our present inquiry anywise. The only point for us here is that this Kumari formed the southernmost boundary of the Tamilian home of yore, and as such separated Tamilakam from the non-Tamil country to the further south. And as on this point there is perfect unanimity, there is no need to pursue the 'river versus hill' controversy any further.

But what matters much in this connection is the reference to the sea-swallowed old river Pahruli in the Pre-deluge Pandinad. That a large tract of the Pandian's dominions was engulfed by an angry sea is affirmed by many other passages in early Tamil classics. I shall quote just one such reference to clinch the point:

> மலிதிரை யூர்ந்துதன் மண்கடல் வௌவலின்
> மெலிவின்றி மேற்சென்று மேவார்நாடிடம்படப்
> புலியொடு வின்னீக்கிப் புகழ்பொறித்த கிளர்கெண்டை
> வலியினான் வணக்கிய வாடாச்சீர்த்தென்னவன்.
>
> Mullai Kali—verse 104.

This is again positive and plain. The lost Tamil land is located in the south of the modern Cape Comorin; and the poet specifically adds that the Pandian monarch and his surviving subjects after the subsidence moved northward and founded a new dominion, carving out of the old Chera and Chola territories slices for their new colony. There is thus unmistakable and abundant proofs for the traditional subsidence of the southern strips of old Tamilaham and for the advent of the Tennavans —the kings of the Southern Tamilaham—in the present Pandinad from

their submerged southern home. But the reference to the Pandian's river Pahruli in their lost lands has a significance and a bearing on the present enquiry—all unique in itself. Viewed in its proper perspective, it affords cogent reason to postulate an age for some at least of the lyrics of the Purananuru far anterior to that of all the other Sangam works now extant.

It is a well established custom with the early Tamil poets in their songs to wish their kings more days of health and happiness than the sands in the beds of the chief rivers that glided by their capital towns, to wit:—

1. For Chola: சிறக்கநின்னாயுண், மிக்குவருமின்னீர்க் காவிரி எக்கரிட்ட மணலினும்பலவே —*Purananuru*, St. 43.

2. For Chera: "மண்ணாள்வேந்தே நின்வாழ்நாட்கள் தண்ணான்பொருகை மணலினுஞ்சிறக்க" *Chilap*. XXVIII, 126-28.

3. And when we come to the Pandyan King, we find his name coupled with that of the river Pahruli in a similar manner:—

எங்கோவாழிய குடுமி ! தங்கோச்
செந்நீர்ப் பசும்பொன் வயிரியர்க்கீத்த
முந்நீர் விழவினெடியோன்
நன்னீர்ப் பஃறுளிமணலினும்பலவே.

Puram. St. 9.

When we see these lines stand addressed to a king by a contemporary poetess, it will be far too gratuitous and even preposterous to presume that she should have inauspiciously requisitioned the name of a dead imaginary or non-existing river in the case of this Pandyan king alone, while in respect of the other two Tamil monarchs contemporary poets have had recourse only to their respective living streams. It would be strange to expect this poetess to refer to the sands of a dead river, rather than to those of the living Vaigai which has been associated by the later classical poets with the names of the Pandyan monarchs, while their tuneful brethren attached to the other two Tamil kings made use of the Kaveri and the Porunai for a like purpose. And the irresistible inference is that the stanza from Purananuru was composed by a poet, who had lived prior to the classic subsidence of the southern Tamil continent and while the river Pahruli was still watering the submerged southern Pandyan province. That Pahruli was the chief Pandyan river wiped off the Indian Map with a vast extent of Tamil territory, is borne testimony to not only by the great commentators, but also by the old poets of the Sangam era as already shown above.

Thus it will be clear that some at least of the lyrics of Purananuru, (like the one quoted with a direct reference to 'Pahruli' as a living river,) should have been composed some time prior to the subsidence of the Southern continent, and that some centuries should have again intervened between this submersion and the third Sangam age for this story of the deluge to have crystallised itself into a tradition in their poems. If the first or the second century of the Christian Era be taken as the latest date for the literary activities of this third Tamil Academy at Madura, it will not be far wrong if the earlier songs in Purananuru are assigned to at least the 5th or 4th century B.C.

i. b. We have also grounds to believe that Tholkappiam should be as old, if not older. Every Tamil student is aware of the unbroken tradition that Tholkappiam is of the first or second Sangam age, and was one of the standard authorities on grammar for the last and third Tamil Academy. If the tradition were worth anything, this orthodox Tamil grammar should have been in existence long prior to the diluvial catastrophe that swallowed up Kapadapuram, the seat of the second Academy. Valmiki also speaks of this lost city in his Iliad, as the fortified seat of the Pandyan court, south of the river Tambraparni which Hanuman might come across in his southward expedition in quest of Sita (Kishkinda-Kanda, 41st. Sarga, 19th. Sloka). As neither Madura nor the river Vaigai was of any importance in his time, the Aryan Homer evidently took no notice of them in his topography of the Tamil country. Valmiki is now believed by the European and Indian Scholars alike to have flourished at the latest, about the 6th century B.C. According to the tradition, Tholkappiam was composed before the Pandyan kings had moved their court from Kapadapuram into the modern Madura. And so it cannot have come into existence after at least the 6th or the 5th century B.C. For Kapadapuram was sea-engulfed and lost in the deluge long before the age of Chandragupta, Megasthenes and Asoka. And we have unimpeachable records of their times to assure us that already the fame of Modern Madura as the flourishing Pandyan metropolis had spread far and wide so as to reach the brilliant courts of these great Aryan kings in Pataliputra in the north east and of the Grecian monarchs in Bactria in the north west extremes off the trans-Vindhyan half of the great Indian continent.

i. c. In the Arthasastra of Chanakya, he refers to the pearls imported into Patalipuram from the great Pandyan emporiums by the significant causal name "Kapatakam". This was because, to the inland Aryans in north India, pearls were a novelty; they had not been familiar before with these peculiar products of the Pandyan gulfs off the Southern Tamilakam. They were first imported into the north from

the then Pandyan capital Kapatam; and hence they were named "Kapatakam" (i.e.) products from Kapatam. This name for pearls once coined and given currency to naturally stuck on, though the city that gave birth to this name itself was later lost in the sea. Instances of semantic changes of this kind are common in the history of all languages. Koranadu, more properly Koorai nadu—a suburb of Mayavaram, was the original birth place of a type of sarees which were named after this place of origin; but soon this name was appropriated to one type or design of sarees wherever made. In the same way although the city of Kapatam was dead and lost in the subsidence of the southern Pandinad, her fame survived in the name she gave to the pearls she once sent out to the various foreign markets. And Chanakya referred to these pearls received from the Pandyan coasts into Patalipuram by their original causal name of Kapatakam. Surely we know Kapatam was not in existence in the time of Chanakya. For, his contemporary, Megasthenes, mentions Madurai as the then Pandyan Metropolis: and we know from the Tamil classics that only after the deluge which engulfed Kapatam with the Southern Pandinad, the Pandyan kings founded their great capital "Koodal" which has later been known as "Madurai". The very name Madurai is not to be found in the earlier poems of the Sangam classics which speak of this latest Pandyan City only as Koodal. It is only in the later pieces and anthologies, we frequently meet with the name Madurai. In any event, the deluge which cost the Pandyan kings their original capital Kapatam must be prior to the age of Chandragupta and Megasthenes in the 4th century B.C. when Madurai had become the Pandyan metropolis, but after the age of Valmiki (6th century B.C.) who refers only to the original Pandyan capital Kapatam. The natural inference is that in the 6th or the 5th century B.C. the subsidence must have taken place. And the Ceylon traditions recorded in the Mahavamso and Deepavamso just confirm this identical period of the deluge, inferred from the Indian classical tradition recorded in the early Tamil literature about Tholkappiam being composed in the pre-deluge Pandyan Capital of Kapatam, and would more than justify and warrant the inference that its age cannot be later than the 5th century B.C.

i. d. The fact that fewer Aryan words are met with in Tholkappiam than even in the earliest extant Sangam poems such as Aham and Puram is also a circumstance suggesting and supporting a finding in favour of a greater antiquity for Tholkappiam than may be assigned to any of the Sangam classics.

i. e. There is yet another fact that points to a greater antiquity for Tholkappiam than for the earliest of the Sangam classics now extant.

It is a known fact that in Tholkappiar's age, whatever it be, Tamil writers were well conversant with Sanskrit and its literary lores. Tholkappiar himself is believed on all hands to have been an erudite Brahman Sanskritist with profound Tamil scholarship. Nevertheless we are told by his College friend Panambaranar, who writes the preface to the classic grammar, that Tholkappiar found his inspiration only in Aindiram. He does not even refer to Panini's grammar as even a collateral source for Tholkappiar to draw upon. We know that since Panini wrote his now-famous Vyakaranam in Sanskrit, the theory that all Sanskrit dhatus or roots should be verbal and that all nouns are derived from such verbal roots has alone been holding its ground. The earlier theory of Sakatayana, Nairuktas and Gargya that all dhatus need not be verbal probably found their highest authority in 'Aindiram', an earlier pre-Panini grammatical treatise since utterly lost through desuetude. This apparent connexion between Tholkappiam and Aindiram will be patent to all who study in a scientific manner the chapter on Uriccol in the former. That Tholkappiam follows the Gargyan or Aindric theory and does not attempt to derive nouns from verbal roots would itself suggest that he belongs to the pre-Panini school and probably also to pre-Panini age. Had Panini's masterpiece been in existence at his time, it would have been impossible to explain how his Vyakaranam should have been ignored both by Tholkappiar and his college-mate, or why it should have been less known in the south than the obsolete 'Aindiram'. The only reasonable inference therefore is that Tholkappiar wrote his great grammar before Panini was born to enrich the Aryan tongue with his classic grammar. As Panini's age is now taken to be not later than the 4th Century B.C., Tholkappiam must have come into existence many decades prior to it. It may be that each item of these circumstantial evidences taken individually may not be enough warrant to conclude in favour of this great age for Tholkappiam. But it is hardly possible to escape the conviction forced upon us by the cumulative effect of all these links, which taken together point unmistakably and uniformly to about the 5th or the 6th century B.C. being the latest margin for Tholkappiar's age.

II. INTERNAL INDICATIONS

ii. Fortunately for the orthodox school these are not the only proofs available on this issue. There is very strong and cogent internal evidence in this great grammar itself which irresistibly shifts its age back at least by some centuries before that of the earliest poems in the classic anthologies now known as "Togai-nuls". Books like Ahananuru and Purananuru, Narrinai and Kalittogai reveal their great old age

on their very face. That all the gems in these collections are not of the same period, nor even of the so-called third Sangam age, is beyond all question. They bear marks of having been carefully gathered and reverently garnered in the course of some long decades by master critics whose erudition and taste have won for their learned conclave an imperishable niche in the Temple of the Tamil-muse. It is a fact of history that this last royal Academy in the Pandyan metropolis had spent all its palmy days before Jesus was born, and that their evening was almost sinking into shades at the end of the 2nd century A.D. The earliest poems in these anthologies must therefore have been of an age four to five centuries before the gloom of night threw its pall on the tomb of the famous Madura Academy. Nevertheless we come across numerous lapses even in these oldest poems infringing many a rule laid down in the highly venerated treatise of Tholkappiar. A study of some of these derelictions in the classical poems, for which the author of the Chronology claims a greater antiquity than for Tholkappiam, would afford a very highly instructive and interesting reading.

Tholkappiam consists of three divisions, Eluttu, Col and Porul (orthography, etymology and contents or poetic themes). In each of these sections the author has made a masterly marshalling up of the precepts and rules of technique in accord with the usages in the Tamil language and literature of his times. I shall try to cite here a few illustrations showing how violently the classic poems have infringed these rules in Tholkappiam. (1) In Eluttathikaram or the section on letters, we meet with these following rules:—

(i) கதநபமவெனு மாவைந்தெழுத்தும்
எல்லாவுயிரொடுஞ் செல்லுமார்முதலே—28.
(ii) சகரக்கிளவியு மவற்றோரற்றே
அ, ஐ, ஔ, வெனு மூன்றலங்கடையே—29.
(iii) ஆ, எ, ஒ, வெனு மூவுயிர். ஞகாரத்துரிய—31.
(iv) ஆவோடல்லது யகரமுதலாது—32.

In utter defiance of every one of these rules, the poets of the classic period have used many a word in their poems. (vide)

சமம் (புறம். 72)	சந்து (மலைபடு)
சகடம் (குறு. 165)	ஞமலி (புறம். 74 & பட்டின 140)
சண்பு (மதுரைக்காஞ்சி)	ஞமன் (புறம். 6)
சதுக்கம் (திருமுருகு)	ஞரலல் (பதிற்று & திருமுருகு)
சந்தி (... ...)	ஞிமிறு (புறம் 93)
சமம் (... ...)	யவனர் (பதிற்று முருகு & முல்லை)
சலம் (மதுரைக்)	யூபம் (புறம். 15, 224; பதிற் 67; மதுரைக்கா. 27)
சவட்டி (பெரும்பாண் & பதிற்று)	யூகம் (திருமுருகு)

(ii) In Collathikaram or section on etymology, Tholkappiam lays down as follows :— " அவற்றுள்,

முன்னிலைதன்மை யாயீரிடத்தொடு
மன்னாதாகும் வியங்கோட்கிளவி.

(*Sutram,* 221.)

But in Sangam classics, in numerous stanzas, we find instances of a direct violation of this rule against the use of optative mood in reference to the nouns in the 1st and 2nd persons :

"யாணர்வைப்பி னன்னாட்டுப்பொருந!
வானவரம்பனை நீயோ பெரும!
... ...
நடுக்கின்றி நிலீயரோ ... ...
பொற்கோட்டிமயமும் பொதியமும் போன்றே"

Again Puram verse No. 6 ends as follows :

"தண்டாவீகைத் தகைமாண்குடுமி!
தண்கதிர் மதியம் போலவும் தெறுசுடர்
ஒண்கதிர் ஞாயிறுபோலவும்...........
மன்னுகபெருமநீ நிலமிசையானே."

Again we have,

"கார்நறுங் கடம்பின் கண்ணிசூடி
வேலன் வேண்ட வெறிமனைவந்தோய்!
கடவுளாயினுமாக
மடவை மன்ற வாழிய முருகே!"

(*Narrinai,* verse 34.)

And in Puram verse No. 9, the concluding lines read as follows :—

"எங்கோ வாழிய குடுமி! தங்கோச்
செந்நீர்ப் பசும்பொன் வயிரியர்க்கீத்த
முந்நீர் விழவினெடியோன்
நன்னீர்ப்பஃறுளி மணலினும்பலவே."

Again in Ahananuru stanza No. 13, we find as follows :—

a. "(நீ) இவட்பிரிந்துறையின், நோயின்றாக."

And so also in Ahananuru :—

b "..... ....நின்றேர்
முன்னியங்கூர்தி பின்னிலையீயா
தூர்க, பாக..............(அகம்-44)

c. "கடவுக, காண்குவம், பாக!— (*Ibid.,* 54.)

d. "........................தாமரை
வண்டூதுபனிமல ராரூமூர!
யாரையோ? நிற்புலக்கேம்,
வாழியரெந்தை! (*Ibid.,* 46.)

e. "‥ பெருந்தகையிழந்த கண்ணினே! பெரிதும்
வருந்தினே, வாழியர், நீயே !

(*Ibid.*, 59.)

(f) In stanza No. 85 and in many others as well in Ahananuru, and in stanza Nos. 11, 16, 18, 22, 32, 49, 86, 212, and others of Narrinai, we find phrases like வாழிதோழி and வாழியநெஞ்சே frequently used in contexts of direct addresses. In all these, and many similar instances even in the earliest classics, optatives in relation to nouns in the 2nd persons have been freely used. And instances for optatives even in regard to nouns in the 1st person are not wanting. To quote but two stanzas, Nos. 71 and 72 of Purananuru, should suffice for this purpose :

"அவர்ப்புறங்காணே னுயிற்சிறந்த
பேரமருண்க ணிவளினும்பிரிக;
மெலிகோல் செய்தே னுகுக;
… … … … … … …
வன்புலங்காவல் மாறியான்பிறக்கே."

(Stz. 71.)

Yet again, we read as follows :

" ……………………………வேந்தரை
அருஞ்சமஞ்சிதையத் தாக்கி முரசமொடு
ஒருங்ககப்படேனுயின்,
குடிபழிதூற்றுங் கோலேனுகுக,
புரப்போர் புன்கண்கூர
இரப்போர்க்கீயா இன்மையானு றவே.

(Stz. 72.)

These are glaring instances in the earlier classical poems of open violation of Tholkappiar's rules on this head.

(iii) And when we come to the Porulathikaram we are confronted in almost all the extant Sangam classics with wholesale infringements of positive injunctions of Tholkappiam in many directions.

(1) Rule 56 of (Ilampuranam) Agattinai in Porulathikaram reads as follows :—

"நாடகவழக்கினுஞ் செய்யுள்வழக்கினும்
பாடல்சான்ற புலனெறிவழக்கம்
கலியேபரிபாட் டாயிரு பாவினும்
உரியதாகு மென்மனுர் புலவர்"

And Seyyuliyal rule No. 106 lays down

"… … … … … … … புறநிலைவாழ்த்தே
கலிநிலைவகையும் வஞ்சியும்பெறா."

and rule No. 107 extends the same prohibition to a greater extent in the following words :—

"வாயுறைவாழ்த்தே அவையடக்கியலே,
செவியறிவுறூஉவென வவையுமன்ன."

In rule No. 154 the same principle is affirmed from another point of view. Whereas the previous rules quoted above prohibited the use of Kali and Vanji metres for the four types of poetic address, namely, புறநிலை வாயுறை செவியறியுறூஉ and அவையடக்கு Rule No. 154 only allows the use of Venba and Asiriya metres for the first three of these types. And rule No. 153 also lays down that the Kali-venba metre is only appropriate for Kaikkilai poems, while by rule No. 117 Paripadal metre is told out as exclusively appropriate for erotic poems. Even a cursory glance at the Sangam classics would show that every one of these rules is more honoured by breach than observance by the third Sangam poets. Almost all the erotic poems of this age except Kalittogai are in Agaval and Venba metres banned for them by Tholkappiar and prescribed only for ethical poetry. (Vide, the whole of aham, Narrinai, Ainkurunuru and Kuruntogai—all erotics in Agaval metre. And Karnarpathu, Ainthinai—Aimpathu, Kural—(Kamattupal), Etcetera—all erotics in Venba metre.).

And most of the Paripadal verses that are now extant are not erotic, but relate to non-erotic puram-poetry.

(2) Again, instances of infringement of other rules of Tholkappiar's Porulathikaram are also abundantly available in the Sangam classics. Rules 4, 5 and 11 of Marapiyal in Porulathikaram restrict the use of the word 'pillai' பிள்ளை to the young ones of certain species of animals. But in verse 107 of Kuruntogai this word is used for a young wild cat for which Tholkappiar would only allow the appellation of குட்டி (vide Rule 6 of Marapu). Again, Rules 8 and 9 of மரபியல் ban the use of the word குருளை to the young ones of any animals other than the specified five, namely dogs, pigs, tigers, hares and foxes. Verse No. 119 of Kuruntogai violates this prohibition and gives this name to young snakes (vide, சிறு வெள்ளர வினவ்வரிக் குருளை). Verse No. 38 of the same book uses this word for a young monkey, for, which rule 22 prescribes the exclusive appellation of குழவி. Rules 63 and 64 restrict the use of the word நாகு only to the young ones of cows, buffaloes, reindeers and crabs, and taboos its use for all else. And yet in Agam verse 85 we see this rule violated by its use for a young 'Vengai' tree, for which no warrant whatever can be found in Tholkappiam or in any other grammar for that matter. Kuruntogai verse No. 64 affords another instance of infringement of this rule of Tholkappiam by appropriating this word for a young fish.

(3) Tholkappiar classifies the particles of comparisons into four specified divisions, and ordains severally their uses for particular similes of defined purposes or types (vide, sutrams Nos. 287, 288, 289, 290, 291 in Uvama Iyal of Porulathikaram). But there is not any one of the Sangam classics which has not broken all these injunctions in Tholkappiam. All these particles have been taken pell-mell, and used for all kinds of similes irrespective of their types or purposes, and without any reference whatever to the scope, composition or complexion of the similes and metaphors they are made to serve. Thus we find in all the early classics breaches of rules and laws of Tholkappiar's grammar in great abundance. Yet in all these cases of infringements in the classics of injunctions of Tholkappiar, we may notice a phenomenon worth considering.

Even among Sangam classics violations of this kind are less frequent in Purananuru and Agananuru, Narrinai and Airikurunuru, while they are relatively more prolific in the later works like Pattuppattu, Silapadikaram, etc. Manimekhalai, one of the latest works of this age errs most in this direction, as will be apparent to any one who takes a dip into it. If Tholkappiar had lived at the time of or after these works, he could not have made rules in disregard of the usages in all these classic poems, nor would he have ventured to outcaste numerous words enshrined in them by formulating rules of grammar banning them all. Every grammarian should have deduced his principles only from the standard literary works held in esteem in his times ; and he should have scrupulously made provisions to meet even rare usages, and also to anticipate and accord with the tendencies of his times. And no grammar could discountenance or taboo words and forms sanctioned by great masters of literature. Tholkappiar could not therefore have lived anywhere about the time of the Sangam poets and much less after ; for, in that case he could not have framed so many rules in every one of his three sections of his grammar in such utter disregard and defiance of all the classic works of the Sangam age as we have just shown them to be. And if he did, no scholar would have paid any regard or attention to such a grammatical treatise as it would offend all the great classics held in high esteem in Tamilaham. Tholkappyam should have ruled the roast at an age far anterior to the age of these classics ; for, words and morphological forms could not be smuggled into a language in the teeth of the rules of grammar in a single season and in great numbers.

Such words and forms proscribed by the ordinary rules of grammar could only creep in by stealth and in stages, and ordinarily would have to linger long in the shade before they could freely and openly mingle with their privileged fellows. It would take them even longer to

muster into a colony sufficiently strong to extort for themselves a general amnesty, and to secure immunity and sanction for their use in literary works in a manner to enforce rèvision of the system of grammatical laws to make room for them. We have already on the reckoning of the author of the Chronology itself found it necessary to take some at least of the earlier classical poems found in the collections of Purananuru, Agananuru, etc. back to a period not later than the 3rd and 2nd century B.C.; and a few verses like the one referring to the river 'Pahruli' in Purananuru may have to be thrust back even to the pre-deluge Kapatam-age of the Pandyan empire, which would take us to at least the fifth century B.C. The verse of (நெட்டிமையார்) wishing the Pandyan king to live as many days as the countless grains of sand in the bed of his 'Pahruli' river itself offends the rule of Tholkappiyar's grammar by using the (வியங்கோள்) or a verb in the optative mood in relation to a noun in the second person, which is definitely banned in Tholkappiam. It stands to reason therefore that Tholkappiam must have preceded all the earliest poems in Agam and Puram, which in themselves may be as old as the 4th or even the 5th century B.C.

By reviewing the facts of history bearing on this question we found ourselves led to the same conclusion that Tholkappiam could not have been later than the 6th or 5th century B.C. And now a dispassionate discussion of the internal evidences also drives us to the same view. It is thus abundantly clear that the age of Tholkappiam could never be in any post-sangam period, nor could it be even coeval with the poems in the 'togai-nuls', some of which appear to go as far back as the 4th and 5th century B.C. Tholkappiyar therefore must have lived and written his great book in the pre-deluge Pandyan Capital in or before the 6th century B.C. The author of the chronology assigns, on the contrary, Tholkappiyam to the 6th or 7th century A.D.; and the reasons he gives for his opinion were canvassed and found to be untenable in the previous section. And in this section we have dealt with facts and evidences of historic and literary value unmistakably taking Tholkappiyam to the 6th or the 7th century B.C. with a chance of its age being shifted still further back perhaps, but never forward.

தொல்காப்பிய ஆராய்ச்சி

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பொருளதிகாரம், அகத்திணை இயல்.

எழுத்துஞ் சொல்லும் செய்யுளுக்கு இன்றியமையாத மொழியிலக்கணமாத லின்; அவற்றை முறையே முன்னிரண்டதிகாரங்களாக வகுத்துக்கூறின தொல் காப்பியர், புலவர்க்குரிய செய்யுட்பகுதியைப் பொருளதிகாரமெனும் பெயருடன் மூன்ருமதிகாரமாக வகுத்தார். மக்கள் கருத்துக்களை விளங்க வெளிப்படுத்துங் கருவியனைத்தும் செய்யுளெனப்படும். செவ்விதாய உளப்பாடு, அதாவது உளத்து றுங்கருத்தைக் கேட்போருளத்துறக் கூறுதற்குரிய சொற்றொடர்களெல்லாம் செய் யுளாகும். பாட்டே செய்யுளென்பது பிற்காலப் பிழைவழக்கு. உரை, பாட்டு, நூல், பிசி, குறிப்புமொழி, மறைமொழி, பழமொழி எனப்பலவகையானும் பல்வேறுருவிற் ருேன்றி நின்று பொருள்பயப்பனயாவும் செய்யுளேயாம். செய்யுளெல்லாம் பொ ருள்பற்றியவே யாகலானும், பொருளொன்றே மக்கள்குறியாக, செய்யுள் அப்பொ ருளின் குறியீடாகலானும், மக்கள் பொருளாகக் கருதுவன பற்றியும், அப்பொரு ளுரைக்குங் கருவியாகும் செய்யுள்பற்றியும், அவையிற்றுக் குறுப்பும் துணையுமாவன பிறபற்றியும் கூறுவனவற்றைத் தொகுத்துக் கூறும்பகுதி பொருளதிகாரமெனப் பெயரிடப் பெற்றது.

இனி, ஆரியர் செய்யுள் அனைத்தும் அறம் பொருள் இன்பம் வீடு என்ப வற்றுள் ஒன்றும் பலவும் பொருளாகக் கொண்டே அமைதல் வேண்டுமென்பர். தமிழ்ப் புலவர் மக்கள் பொருளாக மதிப்பன எல்லாம் செய்யுளுக்குரிய வாகும் எனக்கொள்வார். அப்பொருளெல்லாம் மக்கள் வாழ்வொடு படுவவாகலானும், மக் கள் வாழ்வும் அகமும் புறமுமென இரண்டிலடங்குவதாகலானும், பொருளை அக மும் புறமுமென இருகூருய் வகுத்துக் கூறுவதே தமிழ் மரபாகும். அம்மரபு மேற் கொண்டு தொல்காப்பியரும் தமிழ்ச் செய்யுட்பொருளை அகப்பொருளும் புறப்பொ ருளுமாக இருகூருக்கி, அவற்றின் பொது இயல்புகள் அல்லது இலக்கணங்களைத் தம் நூலின் பொருளதிகாரப் பகுதியில், முதற்கண் அகத்திணையியல்—புறத்திணை யியல் என முறையே வகுத்தமைத்து, பிறகு அவற்றுள் அகத்தின் சிறப்பியல்பு களை—களவியல்—கற்பியல்—பொருளியல்களில் விளக்கி, அவற்றின் பிறகே அப் பொருள்களை அறியக் கூறும் கருவியாகிய செய்யுளியல்புகளை மெய்ப்பாட்டியல்— உவமவியல்—செய்யுளியல் எனு மூன்றுபகுதிகளிற் கூறி, இறுதியில்—செய்யுள்

செய்வார் தமிழ் மரபு பிறழாமற் காத்தற்கு வேண்டியனவற்றை மரபியலில் தொகுத்து விளக்கிப்போந்தார்.

இதில், முதற்கண்ணதாய இவ்வகத்திணை யியல் மக்களின் அகவொழுக்கம் அல்லது காதலற வழக்குகளின் பொதுவிலக்கணம் கூறுதல் நுதலிற்று. அகமாவது, காதலர் உளக்கிடையும், அவர் காதல் கதிர்த்து வினைப்பட்டு அன்னோர் மனைவாழ்க்கையிற் றொடர்புறுவது மாகும். திணையாவது—ஒழுக்கம். ஆகவே அகத்திணை என்பது காதல்கண்ணிய ஒழுகலாறும். அவ்வொழுக்கப் பொதுவியல்புகள் கூறும்பகுதி அகத்திணையியலெனப் பெயர்பெற்றது. (அதுவேபோல், புறத்திணையென்பதும் மனைவாழ்க்கைக்குப் புறமான மக்களின் சமுதாயத்தொடர்புடைய ஒழுக்கமாகும். அதுபற்றிக் கூறுமிலக்கணப் பகுதி புறத்திணையியலெனப்படும்.)

இனி, அவர்காலத் தமிழ் நூல்வழக்கை மேற்கொண்டு, அகப்புற வொழுக்கங்களைத் தொல்காப்பியர் எவ்வேழுதிணைகளிலடக்கி யமைத்தார். அவற்றுள், அகவொழுக்கங்களை முறையே கைக்கிளை-முல்லை - குறிஞ்சி-பாலை - மருதம் - நெய்தல்-பெருந்திணை எனமுறைப்படத் தொகுத்தார். காதல் ஒருவர் பாற்கதிர்த்து, மற்றையோர் மாட்டுப் பருவமன்மையாற் பால்விளியுணராப் பான்மையிற் சிறக்கத்தோன்று நிலையே கைக்கிளை. எனில், இந்நிலை, கன்றியகாதலன் "காமாஞ்சாலா இளமையோள் வயின்"—தனக்கேமம் சாலப்பெறுனெனினும், தன்னலம் விழையாமல் பழி பிழையொழித்து அவணலம் பேணியொழுகும் காதற்பெற்றிய தாகலின், அதனை முதலில் வைத்து, இருபாலும் காதலொத்துக் கனிந்து சிறந்த அன்பினைந்திணைகளை அதன்பின்னமைத்து, அவற்றின் பின் காதல் கண்ணுது கழிகாமப் பழி பிறங்கும் பெருந்திணையைப் பிரித்து நிறுத்தி முறைப்படுத்தினர். இவ்வெழுதிணைகளையுமிம்முறையாற் றொகுத்துக் காட்டினரெனினும், விரிக்குங்கால் இலக்கணம் நிறைந்த ஐந்திணைகளையும் தொடர்புடன் பலபட விளக்கி, தம்மியல் கூறுமளவில் அமைவவான கைக்கிளை பெருந்திணைகளி னிலக்கணங்களை முறையே இறுதியிலிரண்டு தனிச் சூத்திரங்களாற் றெளித்து முடிப்பர்.

1. கைக்கிளைமுதலாப் பெருந்திணையிறுவாய்
முற்படக்கிளந்த வெழுதிணையென்ப.

(இதன்பொருள்) :—கைக்கிளைமுதலாகப் பெருந்திணை இறுதியாக முன்னே சொல்லப்பட்ட அகத்திணை ஏழாமென்று கூறுவர் தமிழ் மொழி வல்லார்.

இச்சூத்திரத்தில் அகத்திணையேழும் நிரலே கூறப்பெறுமையானும், இதன் பிறகுள்ள சூத்திர வைப்புமுறையில் கைக்கிளையை முதலாகவும் அதனை யடுத்து அன்பினைந்திணையும் இறுதியிற் பெருந்திணையுமாக அமைத்துக் கூறப்பெறுமல், முதற்கண் அன்பினைந்திணை கூறி அவற்றின்பின் கைக்கிளைபெருந்திணைகள் தொடர்ந்து கூறப்படுவதாலும், "முற்படக்கிளந்த வெழுதிணை"என்பது அகத்திணையியலில் இச்சூத்திரத்தின் பின் அமைத்துக்கூறப்பட்ட முறையைச் சுட்டாதென்பது

வெளிப்படை. எனவே ஈண்டு "முற்படக்கிளந்த" என்பது இடத்தால் முற்படக் கூறும் அமைப்பு முறையோடு பொருந்தாமையால், காலத்தால் முற்படக்கிளந்த வொன்றனையே குறிக்குமெனக் கொள்ளக்கிடக்கின்றது.

பொருளதிகாரத்தின் முதலில், பொருள் அகம்புறமென இருவகைப்படு மென்பதும், அவற்றுள் பின் கூறப்பெறும் புறத்திணை ஏழாதல் போலவே அகத்தி ணையும் ஏழாமென்பதும், அவ்வகத்திணையும், கைக்கிளை, நடுவணைந்திணை, பெருந் திணை என ஏழாக வகுக்கப்படுமென்பதும் ஆகிய இவற்றைச்சுட்டிய சில சூத்திரங் கள், அகத்திணையின் முதற்கண் இச்சூத்திரத்திற்கு முன்னே ஆசிரியரால் அமைக் கப்பட்டிருத்தல் வேண்டும். அவ்வாறாயின் மட்டும் 'முற்படக்கிளந்த' எனுமிச்சூத்தி ரச்சொற்களுக்குப் பொருளமைதியும், 'கைக்கிளைமுதலா' எனுந்தொடர்க்குப்பொரு ளும் அமைவதாகும். தொல்காப்பியத்துட் சூத்திரங்கள் சில கடல்கோளாலும் புலம் பெயர்தலாலும் வீழ்ந்து மறக்கப்பட்டிருத்தல் கூடுமென்பது களவியலுரையாலும், "தலைமகள் கூற்று உணர்த்திய சூத்திரம் காலப்பழமையால் (ஏடு) பெயர்த்தெழுது வோர் விழ எழுதினர் போலும்" என்னும் இளம்பூரணர் உரைக் குறிப்பாலும் தெளியப்படும். அவ்வாறு கொள்ளாக்கால் இச்சூத்திரச் சொற்றொடர்கள் பொருந் தும் பொருளமைதி பெறுமாறில்லை. ஆதலாலும் 'முற்படக்கிளந்த' என்னுந் தொட ருக்கு, 'இதற்குமுன்னே ஆசிரியர் கூறிப்போந்த' என்று அமையப்பொருள் காண் பதே பொருத்தமாகும்.

2. அவற்றுள்,
நடுவணைந்திணை நடுவணதொழியப்
படுதிரைவையம் பாத்தியபண்பே.

(இ-ள்.) அவற்றுள் நடுவணைந்திணை — முன்னைச் சூத்திரத்துட்கூறிய ஏழு திணைகளுள் முதலுங்கடையுமான கைக்கிளை பெருந்திணைகளை நீக்கி, நடுநின்றன முல்லை, குறிஞ்சி, பாலை, மருதம், நெய்தல் எனும் ஐந்திணை,

நடுவணதொழிய—
தம்முள்நடுவுநிலைத்திணையாகியபாலையொழிய,
படுதிரைவையம் பாத்தியபண்பே—கடல்சூழ்ந்தநிலத்தைப்பகுத்த
இயல்பேயாம்.

இதில் ஐந்திணை - எழுவாய்; பாத்தியபண்பே-பயனிலை; 'ஒழிய' என்னும் வினையெச்சம் 'பாத்திய' எனும் பெயரெச்சங்கொண்டும், அப்பெயரெச்சம்'பண்பே' எனும் பெயர் கொண்டும் முடிந்தன. வையம்-பாத்திய என்னும் வினைக்குச் செயப் படுபொருள். உலகம் 'நானிலம்' எனப்படுதலானும், அது குறிஞ்சி, முல்லை மருதம் நெய்தலென நிலத்தியல்புபற்றிப் பகுக்கப்படுதலானும், பாலைக்குத் தனித்துரிய நிலம் பிறிதின்மையானும், முல்லைமுதல் நெய்தலீறான நிலங்களையே அவ்வத்திணை யாகப் பொருள் நூலுடையார் கொள்ளுதலானும், உலகத்தை நானிலமாகப்படுத்த

இயல்பே பாலையொழிந்து நாலுதிணையுமாகும் என்பதை இச்சூத்திரம் விளக்கிப் போந்தது.

3. முதல்கருவுரிப்பொரு ளென்றமூன்றே
நுவலுங்காலை முறைசிறந்தனவே
பாடலுட்பயின்றவை நாடுங்காலை.

(இ-ள்.) பாடலுட்பயின்றவை நாடுங்காலை—புலவர் செய்யுளில் வந்து பயிலும் வழக்குகளை ஆராயுங்கால், முதல் கரு உரிப்பொருள் என்ற மூன்றே—முதற்பொருள், கருப்பொருள், உரிப்பொருளென வகுத்த மூன்றுமே, நுவலுங்காலைமுறை சிறந்தனவே—செய்யுளுக்குரிய புலனெறி வழக்கம்பேசுங்கால் முறையே சிறந்தனவாம்.

முறை சிறந்தன என்பதனுல், முதலிற்கருவும், கருவின் உரியும், ஒன்றினென்று முறையே சிறப்புடைத்தாமெனவும், மூன்றே சிறந்தன என்பதனுல் சிறவாப்பிறபொருளும் உளவாமெனவும் பெறுதும். அகப்பாட்டுக்களில் உரிப்பொருளேதலையாய தென்பதும், அதற்கு முதலுங் கருவும் சிறப்புதவுந்துணையாகச் சார்ந்துவருபொருளேயாமென்பதும் வெளிப்படை. இனி, இம்மூன்றுமேயன்றி இவைபோலச் சிறவாத பிறபொருளும் உளவாதல் அகத்திணையியல் “மரபுநிலைதிரியா மாட்சியவாகி, விரவும் பொருளும் விரவுமென்ப” என்னும் 45ஆம் சூத்திரத்தால் தெளியப்படும். இதில் மூன்றே என்பதில் ஏகாரம் தேற்றமும் பிரிநிலையுமாம். சிறந்தனவே என்பதிலேகாரம் இசை நிறையாகவேனும் அசை நிலையாகவேனுங் கொள்ளுக.

4. முதலெனப்படுவது நிலம்பொழுதிரண்டி
னியல்பெனமொழிப இயல்புணர்ந்தோரே.

முன்னைச் சூத்திரங்கூறும் மூன்றனுள் முதற்பொருளினைத்தென இச்சூத்திரம் விளக்குகிறது.

(இ-ள்.) முதலெனப்படுவது—முதற்பொருளென்று கூறப்படுவது, நிலம் பொழுதிரண்டினியல்பு—நிலமும் பொழுதுமாகிய இரண்டினியல்பாம், எனமொழிப இயல்புணர்ந்தோரே—என்று சொல்லுவார் பொருளிலக்கணம் உணர்ந்த புலவர்.

இதில் இறுதியேகாரம் அசைநிலை.

5. மாயோன் மேய காடுறையுலகமும்
சேயோன்மேய மைவரையுலகமும்
வேந்தன்மேய தீம்புனலுலகமும்
வருணன் மேய பெருமணலுலகமும்
முல்லைகுறிஞ்சி மருதம்நெய்தலெனச்
சொல்லியமுறையாற் சொல்லவும்படுமே

இது மேலே இரண்டாஞ் சூத்திரத்துட் கூறியாங்கு, நானிலம் முறையே நான்குதிணைக்கு உரிமைபெறு முறை கூறிற்று.

(இ-ள்) மாயோன்மேய காடுறையுலகமும்—கருநிறக்கடவுள் உறைவிடமாகிய நிரைமேயும் காட்டுநிலப்பகுதியும், சேயோன்மேய மைவரையுலகமும்—செவ்வேளுறையும் மஞ்சுதவழும் மலைநிலப்பகுதியும், வேந்தன்மேய தீம்புனலுலகமும்—இந்திரனுக் கிருப்பிடமாகிய இனிய புனல்நிறை நிலப்பகுதியும், வருணன்மேய பெருமணலுலகமும்—கடல்கெழுகடவுளாகிய வருணன் விரும்பும் அகன்ற மணல் நிலப்பகுதியும், முல்லை குறிஞ்சி மருதம் நெய்தலெனச் சொல்லிய முறையாற்சொல்லவும் படுமே—முறையே முல்லை குறிஞ்சி மருதம் நெய்தல் என்ற பெயர்களாற் சொல்லவும் படுமே.

சொல்லிய முறையாற் சொல்லவும் படுமே என்பதனல், இந்த நாற்றிணைக்குரிய நானிலங்களும் ஈண்டுச்சொல்லாத வேறுமுறையாலும் கூறப்பெறும் என்பது பெறப்படும். இதில் நானிலப்பகுதியும் அவற்றிற்குரிய திணைப்பெயரும் நிரனிறையால் கூறப்பெற்றன. ஈண்டுக்கூறப்பெற்ற மாயோனுஞ் சேயோனும், கருநிறக்கடவுளுஞ் செவ்வேளுமாகத் தொன்றுதொட்டுத் தமிழர் தொழும் கடவுளராவர். கருநிறத்தைப் பழிப்பதன்றிப் பாராட்டுதல் தொல்லாரியர் வழக்கன்று; தமிழிலோ எழில் பாராட்டி "மாயோன்" எனவும், "மாயோயே" எனவும் வரும் பழம்பாட்டுக்களின் தொடர்களும் குறிப்புக்களும் இங்குச் சிந்திக்கத்தக்கனவாம். இனி, இந்திரனும் வருணனும் ஆரியர் வழிபடுங் கடவுளராய்க் கருதப்பெறினும், அறப்பழங்காலத்தே அவர் திராவிடர் வழிபட்ட தெய்வங்களாகவும், பிறகு அவரிடம் ஆரியர் வாங்கித் தம் வழிபடுகடவுளராக்கிக் கொண்டனரெனவும் சிலமேனுட்டுப் புலவரின் ஆராய்ச்சிக்கட்டுரைகளால் அறிகின்றோம். உண்மையெதுவாயினும் பண்டைக் காலமுதல் இக்கடவுளர் பெயரும் வழிபாடும் தமிழகம் அறிந்ததென்பது தெளியப்படும்.

இச்சூத்திரத்தானும் முன்னைய சூத்திரத்தானும் முதற்பொருளின் முதற்பிரிவான நிலத்தியல்பும் திணைத்தொடர்பும் கூறப்பெற்றன. இனிவருஞ் சூத்திரங்களால் அதன் இரண்டாம்பிரிவான காலவியல்பும் பாகுபாடுகளும் கூறப்படும்.

6. காருமாலையு முல்லை ; குறிஞ்சி
கூதிர்யாம மென்மனுர் புலவர்.

(இ-ள்.) காரும்மாலையும் முல்லை-கார்காலமாகிய பெரும்பொழுதும், மாலைப் பொழுதாகிய சிறுபொழுதும் முல்லைத்திணைக்குச் சிறந்தன; குறிஞ்சி கூதிர்யாமம்-கூதிரென்னும் பின்பெயற் காலமாகிய பெரும்பொழுதும், நள்ளிரவாகிய யாமமென்னுஞ் சிறுபொழுதும் குறிஞ்சித்திணைக்குச்சிறந்தன; என்மனுர் புலவர் - என்று கூறுவர் புலவர்.

ஓராண்டு-இளவேனில், முதிர்வேனில், கார், கூதிர், முன்பனி, பின்பனி என இவ்விரண்டு மாதங்கொண்ட பருவம் அல்லது பெரும்பொழுது ஆறுகப்பகுக்

கப்படும். இதில் கார்காலம் முன்பெயற்காலமான ஆவணியும் புரட்டாசியும் எனத் திங்களிரண்டு கொண்டதாகும். கூதிர் பின்பெயலும் வாடையுமுடைய ஐப்பசியுங் கார்த்திகையுமான திங்களிரண்டு கொண்ட பெரும்பொழுதாகும்.

விடியல் அல்லது காலை, நண்பகல், எற்பாடு, மாலை, யாமம், வைகறை யெனப் பகல் மூன்று, இரவுமூன்றாக ஆறு சிறுபொழுதுகள் கூடியது ஒருநாளாகும். ஈண்டு யாமம் என்பது இரவின் நடுக்கூறாகிய சிறுபொழுதாம்.

7. பனியெதிர் பருவமு முரித்தெனமொழிப.

(இதுமேலைச்சூத்திரத்திற்கோர் புறனடை)

(இ-ள்) பனியெதிர் பருவமும்—முன்பனிக் காலமும், உரித்தென மொழிப—குறிஞ்சித் திணைக்குரியதெனக் கூறுவர் (புலவர்).

முன்பனிக்காலமாவது மார்கழி தை எனுந்திங்களிரண்டு கொண்ட பெரும் பொழுதாம். 'பருவமும்' என்பதிலும்மை குறிஞ்சித்திணைக்குக் கூதிரேயன்றி இப்ப ருவமும் உரியதாம் எனப்பொருள்தருதலால், இறந்ததுதழீஇய எச்சவும்மை. 'மொழிப' என்பதனால் அதற்குரிய எழுவாயான புலவர் என்பது அவாய் நிலையாற் கொள்ளப்படும்.

8. வைகுறு விடியல் மருதம்; எற்பாடு
நெய்தலாதன் மெய்பெறத்தோன்றும்.

(இ-ள்) வைகுறு விடியல்மருதம்—பொழுது புலராத இரவினிறுதிப் பகுதியான வைகறையென்னும் சிறுபொழுதும், பொழுதுபுலர்ந்து எல்லெழுங் காலையான விடியலென்னும் சிறுபொழுதும் மருதத்திணைக்குச் சிறந்தனவாகும்; எற்பாடு நெய்தலாதல் மெய்பெறத்தோன்றும்—சுடர்படும் பகற்கால மூன்றாம்பகுதியாகிய சிறுபொழுது நெய்தற்றிணைக்கு உரியபொழுதாதல் பொருள்பெறத் தோன்றுவதாகும்.

எல்படும்பொழுதை எற்பாடென்பது தமிழ் வழக்கு. இன்றும் தமிழ் வழக்கழியா மேல்கடற்கரையில் படுஞாயிற்றின் திசையைப் 'படுஞாறு' எனவழங்குதல் உலகறிந்தசெய்தி. இதில் வைகுறு என்பது வைகறையின்மரூஉ. "வைகறை விடியல்" என்றே இளம்பூரண அடிகள் பாடங்கொண்டிருப்பதும் இதனை வலியுறுத்தும். "வைகுறு விடியல்" என்பதில் எண்ணும்மை சூத்திரச்செறிவுநோக்கித் தொக்கது. இனி, 'வைகுறு விடியல்' என்ற தொடரை வைகுறுதலாகிய விடியல் எனக்கொண்டு பொழுதுபுலர்தற்குமுற்பட்ட இறுதியிரவுக்காலத்தையே குறிக்குமென்றும், எற்பாடு என்பது சுடரெழுந்து வெயிலெறிக்கும் காலைப்பொழுதைக் குறிக்குமென்றும் ஆசிரியர் சிவஞானமுனிவர் தம் தொல்காப்பிய முதற்சூத்திரவிருத்தியில் கூறுகின்றார். வைகறையும் விடியலும் ஒருபொருட் கிளவிகள் என்னுமவர் கொள்கை பண்டைத் தமிழ்ப்புலவர்க் குடன்பாடன்றென்பது சங்கத்தொகை நூல்களில் பல விடங்களிலும் பயின்றுவரும் குறிப்புக்களால் தெளியப்படும்.

வைகறையும் விடியலும், முன்னும் பின்னுமாக வரும், இருவேறு சிறுபொழுதுகளே யென்பது, மதுரைக் காஞ்சியில்

"......................வில்லோர்
நயந்த காதலர் கவவுப்பிணித்துஞ்சிப்
புலர்ந்துவிடி விடியல் எய்த (662, 663, 664)

என்ற அடிகளில் இரவு புலர்ந்து கதிர்விரியும் காலையை விடியலென்றும், பிறகு

"இரவுத்தலைப்பெயரும் ஏமவைகறை" என்று அதேபாட்டில் 686 - ஆம் வரியில் வைகறையை விடியலினின்றும் வேறுபிரித்து, அது இரவுத்தலைப்பெயரும் ஏமஞ்செய் காலமென்றும், மாங்குடிமருதனர் கூறுதலால், வலிபெறுவதாகும். அன்றியும் பெருங்குன்றூர்ப் பெருங்கௌசிகனர் தாம்பாடிய மலைபடுகடாத்தில்

"வேய்ப்பயில் விளையுட் டேக்கட்டேறல்
குறைவின்றுபருகி நறவுமகிழ்ந்துவைகறைப்
பழஞ்செருக்குற்ற அனந்தல்தீர" எனும்

171, 172, 173 வது அடிகளில் வைகறைப் பொழுதைக்கூறி, பிறகு

......................"நள்ளிரு ளலரி
விரிந்தவிடியல் வைகினிர்கழிமின்" என்று

இருளலர்ந்து பொழுது புலர்ந்து கதிர்விரிந்த விடியற்காலத்தை வேறுபிரித்தோதினர். இஃது இவ்விருபொழுதையும் இவ்வாறே வெவ்வேருக மதுரைக் காஞ்சியில் விளக்கிய மாங்குடி மருதனர் கொள்கையே அடிப்பட்ட தமிழ் வழக்கென்பதனை வெள்ளிடை மலைபோல் விளக்குவதாகும். ஈண்டுப்பெருங்கௌசிகனர் "நறவுமகிழ்ந்து வைகறைக் காலத்தே அனந்தல்தீர, கடமான் கொழுங்குறையும் .... பயினிணப் பிளவை......தடியொடு விரை இ......குறமகளாக்கிய வாலவிழ்வல்சி அகமலியுவகை யார்வமொடளை இ.........மனைதொறும் பெறுகுவிர்" என்றுமுதற் கூறி, பிறகு அவ்வாறுண்ட நீவிர் விடியல்வரை வைகி விடிந்தபிறகு கழிவீராக; ஏனெனில், நீர்போகும் ஆறு,..................."பரலவற்போழ்விற்

கரந்துபாம் பொடுங்கும் பயம்புமாருளவே" (அதனல்)
" குறிக்கொண்டு.........நோக்கி
வறிதுநெறியொரீஇ வலஞ்செயாக் கழிமின் " எனக் கூத்தருக்கு

வைகறைப் பொழுதில் வழிக்கொண்டு பாம்பொடுங்கும் பள்ளங்களில் வீழ்ந்திடர்ப்படாமல் தங்கிக் கதிர்விரிந்த விடியற்காலத்தே புறப்படுமாறு கூறுதலால், இவ்விரு காலமும் இருவேறு சிறுபொழுதுகளே என்பது தெள்ளத்தெளியக்கிடைப்பதாகும். இன்னும் மலைபடுகடாத்திலேயே

" வான்கண் விரிந்த விடியலேற்றெழுந்து" என 257 வது வரியிலும்,

"நொய்ம்மரவிறகின் ஞெகிழிமாட்டிப்
பனிசேணீங்க வினிதுடன்றுஞ்சிப்
புலரிவிடியற் புள்ளோர்த்துக்கழிமின்"

என 446 முதல் 448 வது வரிகளிலும் வைகறையின் வேறுபட்ட விடியற்காலத்தை விளக்கியிருப்பது பாராட்டிச் சிந்திக்கத்தக்கது. இனி, அகநானூற்றில் 37, 41-ஆம் பாட்டுக்களில்

"வைகுபுலர் விடியல் வைபெயர்த்தாட்டி" எனவும்

"வைகுபுலர் விடியல் மைபுலம்பரப்ப" எனவும் முறையே இரவுபுலர்ந்து கதிர்விரியும் விடியற்காலம் இனிது விளக்கப்பெற்றும், 42 வது பாட்டில்

"பெரும்பெயல் பொழிந்த ஏமவைகறை" எனவும், 308 வது பாட்டில்...... "கங்குல்.........

.........ஆலியழி துளிபொழிந்த வைகறை" எனவும், வைகறை விளக்கப்பெற்றுமிருக்கிறது. இவ்விரு சிறுபொழுதும் ஒழிய, எற்பாடு இவற்றின்வேறாய பகலிறுதிப்பொழுதென்பது,

"பகன்மாயந்திப் படு சுடரமையம்" என அகம் 48-ஆம்பாட்டிலும் தெளிக்கப்படுகிறது. விரிவஞ்சி இதனுடன் நிறுத்தலாயிற்று. இனைய பல பழம்புலவர் பாட்டுக்களால் பொழுது புலர்ந்து கதிர்விரியும் இளவெயிற் காலையாய பகற்பொழுதின் முதற்பகுதியே விடியலென்றும், பொழுது புலருமுன்னுள்ள இரவின் இறுதிப்பகுதி நேரமே வைகறையென்றும், சுடர் படும் பகலிறுதிக்காலமே எற்பாடென்றும் மயக்கத்திற் கிடனின்றித் தெளியக்கிடக்கின்றது.

"முல்லை குறிஞ்சி மருதம் நெய்தல் பாலையென முறைசெய்தற்கேது, மாலை, யாமம், வைகறை, காலை, நண்பகல் என்னும் சிறுபொழுதின் கிடக்கைமுறையேயன்றி வேறின்மையானும், ஏனைத்திணைகட்குச் சிறுபொழுது ஓரோவொன்றேயாகலின் மருதமாத்திரைக்கிரண்டு கோடல் பொருந்தாமையானும், அஃதுரையன்றெனமறுக்க" என்னும் சிவஞானமுனிவர் கூற்றும் பொருந்தாமையறிக. சிறுபொழுது ஐந்து மாலைமுதல் நண்பகல் வரையெண்ணி நிறுத்தப்படின், ஒருநாளுலப்புறாமல் பிற்பகல் பேரின்றி வீணேவிடப்படுவ தாகலின், ஈண்டு எண்ணப்பெறாத பிற்பகலாகிய சிறுபொழுதொன்றுண்மையும் அதுவே எற்பாடாவதும் விளக்கமாகும். அன்றியும் அன்பினைந்திணைமுறை சிறுபொழுதின் கிடக்கை முறைபற்றியதேயாகும் என்பதற்கு முனிவரவர்களின் கொள்கை தவிரப்பிறிதாதரவின்மையானும், பெரும்பொழுதாறினை ஐந்துதிணைக்கு ஒரோவொன்றாய்க் கொடுத்தமையாமல், குறிஞ்சிக்குக் கூதிரொடு முன்பனியும், பாலைக்கு வேனிலொடு பின்பனியும் ஆக இவ்விரண்டு பருவந்தந்துவைத்தும், மருதத்திற்கும் நெய்தலுக்கும் பெரும்பொழுதெதுவும் பிரித்துரிமை செய்யாமலும் சூத்திரிக்கும் ஆசிரியர் முறையிற் பொருத்தம் காணும் முனிவரவர்களுக்கு மருதத்திணை யொன்றற்குச் சிறுபொழுதிரண்டமைத்தலில் பொருந்தாப் பெருந்தவறு காணுதற்குரிய அவசியத்தை விளக்கினார்களுமில்லை. இனி, நாற்கவிராஜ நம்பியார் சிறுபொழு தைந்தென்று கூறுதலால் பண்டைப்புலவர் பாட்டுக்களைப் பொய்யாக்கித் தொல்காப்பியர் சூத்திரங்களுக்கும் புதுப்பொருள் காண்பது உரையறமாகாது. மேலும் வைகறையும் விடியலும் மருதத்திணையான ஊடலுக்கு

உரித்தாமாறும், மாலையையும் யாமத்தையும் பரத்தையர் வீட்டிற்கழித்த தலைவன் தன் மாட்டு மீட்டுவரும் வைகறை விடியற்காலங்களில் தலைவி அவனோடூடுதல் இயல்பாவதும், பிறகு பொழுதேறி விருந்ினர்க்கு வேளாண்மை செய்தலால் ஊடல் தீர்தல் முறையென்பதும், பண்டைய அகத்துறைப் பாட்டுக்களால் இனிது விளங்கும்.

"ஊடுதல் காமத்திற்கின்பம் அதற்கின்பம்
கூடிமுயங்கப்பெறின்" எனும் குறளால்

ஊடுமிடத்தெல்லாம் கூடுதலினின்றியமையாமை பெறுதற்கில்லை. கூடி முயங்கப்பெறின் அதற்கின்பம் என வள்ளுவர் விதந்து கூறுதலால், ஊடலிறுதியில் கூடப்பெறாப் பொழுதுகளும் பலவுளவாதல் இயல்பென்பது பெறப்படும். அள்ளூர் நன்முல்லையாரின் குறுந்தொகைப் பாட்டில் விரிகதிர் விடியலைக்காலையென்றும், வைகறையை விடியலென்றும் மாறிக்கூறியதனால் வைகறையின் வேறுபட்ட விரிக திர் விடியல் உண்டெனப் பண்டைப்புலவரின் பல பாட்டுக்கள் கூறுவதைமறுக்க வொண்ணாது. அதுவேபோல் அப்பாட்டில் எற்பாடு கூறப்பெறாமை கொண்டு 'பகல் மாயந்திப்படு சுடர்ப்'பொழுதான எற்பாடு இல்லையெனலும் இயலாது. கூறப்பட்ட தொன்று உண்டெனலாமன்றிக் கூறப்பெறாமைகொண்டு உள்ளதொன்றை இல்லை யெனத்துணிதற்கு அளவை நூலிடந்தராது. மேலும், இப்பாட்டினடிகளில் சொற் றொறும் வருகின்ற வும்மை எண்ணும்மையே யாகும். 'என்று இப்பொழுதைந்தும்' என முற்றும்மை பெறாமையானும் சிறுபொழுதைந்தேயாம் என்னுமுடிவிற்கு இக் குறுந்தொகைப் பாட்டடிகள் இடந்தராவாம். எவ்வாற்றானும் பண்டைப்பாட்டுகள் பலவற்றுள்ளும் வைகறையும் விடியலும் இருவேறு சிறுபொழுதுகளாமென விதந்து கூறப்பெற்றிருத்தலானும், இச்சூத்திரத்தில் வைகறையையும் விடியலையும் கூறி அவற்றின் வேறாய எற்பாடும் கூறப்பெறுதலானும், இரவுக்குச்சிறுபொழுது மூன்றா வதுபோல் பகலுக்கும் மூவேறு சிறுபொழுது வேண்டப் படுதலானும், ஈண்டு வை குறு, விடியல், எற்பாடு என்பனமூன்றும் முறையே கங்குலிறுதிப்பொழுதானவை கறையும், வெயிலொடு விரிகதிர் விடியலான பகல் முதற் சிறுபொழுதாகிய காலை யும் மருதத்துக்கும்; பகலிறுதியில் சுடர்படும் பொழுதான எற்பாடு நெய்தலுக்கும் சிறப்புறவருமெனும் உரையே உண்மையுரையாமெனத் தெளிதலெளிதாம். அத னால் நச்சினார்க்கினியரோடு இளம்பூரண அடிகளும் இதுவே இச்சூத்திரப்பொருளா கக் கூறுதல் அமைவுடைத்தாகும்.

9. நடுவுநிலைத்திணையே நண்பகல்வேனிலொடு
முடிவுநிலைமருங்கின் முன்னியநெறித்தே,

(இ-ள்) நடுவுநிலைத்திணையே—அன்பினைந்திணையுள் நடுநின்ற பாலைத்தி ணையே, நண்பகல் வேனிலொடுமுடிவு நிலைமருங்கின்—நடுப்பகல் வேனில் முதிர்ந்த நிலையில் அதனொடு பொருந்துமிடத்து, முன்னிய நெறித்து—கருதிய பிரிவுக்குரிய வழித்தாகும்.

எனவே நண்பகலாகிய சிறுபொழுதும் முதிர்வேனிலாகிய பெரும்பொழுதும் பாலைத்திணையாகிய பிரிவிற்குத் தனித்தனியுரிமை கொள்ளுதலேயுமன்றி, இவை தம்முட் கூடிய முதிர்வேனிலின் நண்பகல் பிரிவுக்கு மிகவும் சிறப்புரிமையுங் கொள்ளுமென்பது இச்சூத்திரத்தில் விளக்கப்படுகிறது. முதிர்வேனிற்காலம் ஆனியும் ஆடியுமாகிய திங்களிரண்டுமோம். இதில், வேனிலென்பது முதிர்வேனிற் பருவத்தையே குறிக்கும்; அதுவே பிரிவுக்குரித்தாகலின். முதிர்வேனிலிற் பிரிந்தார் கார்காலத்திற் கூடுவர். இளவேனில் கூடுதலுக்கே உரிய பருவமாகும். பனிக்காலத்திற் பிரிந்தார் இளவேனிலிற் கூடுவர்.

"அறவர் ... ...
பாண்டி லொப்பிற் பகன்றை மலருங்
கடும்பனி யற்சிர நடுங்கக் காண்டக
... ...
கோங்கங் குவிமுகை யவிழ ஈங்கை
நற்றளிர் நயவர நுடங்கு
முற்று வேனின் முன்னிவந் தோரே." [நற்றிணை. 86.]

என்ற நக்கீரரின் நற்றிணைப்பாட்டும்,

"........புணர்மினோ என இணர்மிசைச்
செங்க ணிருங்குயி லெதிர்குரல் பயிற்று
மின்ப வேனிலும் வந்தன்று." [நற்றிணை. 224.]

என்னும் பெருங்கடுங்கோவின் நற்றிணைப்பாட்டடிகளும், பிரிந்த காதலர் திரும்பக் கூடும் "காமர் வேனின்மன் இது" என்னு மகப்பாட்டடியும்,

"ஊடினீ ரெல்லா முருவிலான் றன்னாணை
கூடுமி னென்று குயில்சாற்ற—நீடிய
வேனற்பா ணிக்கலந்தாண் மென்பூந் திருமுகத்தைக்
கானற்பா ணிக்கலந்தாய் காண்."

எனவரும் சிலப்பதிகார வெண்பாவும், பனிக்காலம் பிரிவுக்கும், இளவேனில் கூடலுக்குமே ஏற்புடைத்தென்பதை வலியுறுத்தல் காண்க.

10. பின்பனிதானு முரித்தெனமொழிப.

(இ-ள்.) (முதிர்வேனிலேயு மன்றி) பின்பனிக்காலமும் பிரிவுசுட்டும் பாலைத்திணைக் குரித்தாகுமென்று கூறுவர் (புலவர்).

பின்பனிப்பருவம் மாசியும் பங்குனியுமாகிய திங்களிரண்டும் கொண்டதாகும்

11. இருவகைப்பிரிவும் நிலைபெறத்தோன்றினும்
உரியதாகு மென்மனார்புலவர்.

(இ-ள்) இருவகைப்பிரிவும்—முன்னையிரு சூத்திரங்களிலும் கூறப்பெற்ற வேனிற் பிரிவும், பின்பனிப்பிரிவும், நிலைபெறத்தோன்றினும்-பிரிதனிமித்தங்களாக

அமையாது, பிரிந்துநின்ற பாலையாகவே உருப்பபடினும், உரியதாகும் என்மனுர் புலவர்—அது பாலைக்குரியதேயாகும் என்று கூறுவர்புலவர்.

முதிர் வேனிலிற் பிரிந்தார் கார்காலத்து மீண்டுவந்து கூடலும், பனிக்காலம்பிரிந்தார் இளவேனிலில் மீண்டு கூடலும் மரபென்பது அகத்துறைப் பழம்பாட்டுக்களாலும் இனிது விளங்கும்.

இதில் இருவகைப்பிரிவென்பதற்கு உரையாசிரிய ரிருவரும் இருவேறுரைகள் தருவாராவர். தொல்காப்பியர் தம் இலக்கணநூலில் யாண்டும் தாம் நுதலும் பொருளை ஐயமறவரையறுத்து விளக்குவதைக் கடனாகக்கொண்டொழுகும் பான்மைபாராட்டத்தக்கது. உரைகாரர் கூறும் பிரிவுவகைகளை அவர்கருதினராயின் அவற்றை இங்குக் குறியாமல் இருவகைப் பிரிவெனப் பொதுவிற்கூறி, வேண்டுவோர் வேண்டியாங்கு மாறிப்பொருள் கொள்ளுமாறு கூறிப்போகார். தானே வகைகளை விளக்காது தொகையைமட்டும் கூறுவது இலக்கணநூலார் மரபாகாது. அதனால் ஈண்டு 'இருவகைப்பிரிவு' என்னுந் தொடர் சுட்டும் வகையிரண்டும், இதனொடு தொடர்புபடத் தொல்காப்பியர் தாமே கூறியவாதல் வேண்டும். முதிர்வேனிற்பிரிவை முன் ஒன்பதாஞ் சூத்திரத்திலும், பின்பனியிலும் பிரிவுண்டென்பதைப் பத்தாஞ் சூத்திரத்திலும் கூறியமைத்தாராதலின், இவ்விருவகைப் பிரிவு என இச்சூத்திரத்தில் அவற்றைத் தொகுத்துச் சுட்டினரென்பதே பொருந்துவதாகும். காலிற்பிரிவும் கலத்திற் பிரிவுமென நச்சினர்க்கினியர் கூறுவதே தொல்காப்பியர் கருத்தென்பது அவர் சூத்திரங்களில் யாண்டும் சுட்டப்பெருமையால் அஃது இங்கு பொருளன்மையறிக.

இனி இளம்பூரணர் கொள்கையும் அமைவுடைத்தன்று. "தலைமகளைப் பிரிதலும், அவளையுடன் கொண்டு தமர்வரைப் பிரிதலும்" என்று பிரிவிருவகைத்தாமென் பதிவர் கூற்று. இதற்கும் தொல்காப்பியத்தில் யாண்டும் ஆதரவில்லாததோடு, தலைமகன் தலைமகளைக் கொண்டுதலைக்கழிதலையும் பாலையென்ற இவர்கூற்று பொருளொடு பொருந்தாப் பெயரிடும்பிழைக்கும் ஆசிரியரை யாட்படுத்துவதாகும். பிரிவும் புணர்தலேபோல் தலைமகன் தலைமகள் தம்முளாவதோர் ஒழுக்கமேயாதல் வேண்டும். கொண்டு தலைக்கழிதலில் இவ்விருவருந் தலைக்கூடித் தம்முட் பிரியாமல் ஒருங்கு செல்வராதலால், அஃதவர் காதற்றுறையில் பாலையாமாறில்லை. அவர் கூடியிருக்கவும் தலைவி தலைவனுடன் செல்லும்பொருட்டுத் தன் தமரைப்பிரிந்து செல்லல் பாலையெனில், தலைவியைக்காண வருந்தலைவன் தன் தமரையும் பாங்கரையும் பிரிந்து வரல் பாலையேயாதல் வேண்டும். இவ்வாறு யார்யாரைப் பிரிந்தாலும் பாலையென்று கொள்ளுதற்கு இலக்கணநூலிடந்தராது. அகத்திணைகளனைத்தும் காதலர்தம்முள் நிகழும் அன்பொழுக்கம் பற்றியதேயாகுமன்றி, அவருள் ஒருவருக்கும் அயலவர்க்கும் இடைப்பட்ட ஒழுக்கத்தையும் தொடர்புகளையும் சுட்டமாட்டா. ஆதலானும், காலத்தால் வேறுபட்ட பிரிவிரண்டையும் இதற்குமுன் தனியிரண்டு சூத்திரங்களில் ஆசிரியர் விளக்கினராகலானும், இச்சூத்திரத்தில் அவற்றையே இருவகைப் பிரிவுமெனத் தொகுத்துக் கூறி நிறுத்தினர் எனலே பொருத்தமாகும்.

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देहादिविशिष्टसम्बन्धितया दृश्यमानसुखदुःखज्ञानादिकार्यं विशिष्टवर्तिनीमेवात्मोत्पादशक्तिं कल्पयति धूम इवार्द्रेन्धनसम्बन्धिनि धूमध्वजे स्वोत्पादनसामर्थ्यम्, व्रीह्यङ्कुर इव च सतुषतण्डुले। अपि च बोधे सत्येवात्मनोऽनात्मव्यवच्छेदे सम्भवति कृतं तच्छक्त्याश्रयणेन।

न चैवं सति बोध एव परमात्मेति युक्तम्; तस्याश्रयप्रतियोगिसापेक्षस्वरूपत्वात्, आत्मनश्च तद्विपरीतस्वभावत्वात्; साक्षाच्च चेतयितुरहमर्थस्य स्फुरणात्, अनुभवतर्कागमबलेन चितिमत आत्मभावस्यानन्तरमेव प्रपञ्चितत्वाच्च।

न च चितिमात्रात्मवादेऽपि तस्यागन्तुकविषयसम्बन्धे बोधत्वमध्यारोप्य बोद्धृत्वसमर्थनं साधीयः; सम्बन्धस्योभयनिष्ठतया अर्थस्यापि बोद्धृत्वप्रसङ्गात्।

Effects, such as, knowledge of pleasure and pain, which are found to be associated with one connected with a body, will lead to the conclusion that the potency to produce them resides only in the self thus qualified; even as smoke will only point to the fact that the capacity to produce it resides in the fire associated with wet fuel; or as paddy-sprout leads to the inference that the capacity to produce it resides only in the rice associated with the husk. Further, when it is possible to differentiate the soul from the non-soul with the aid of the presence of consciousness alone, it is unnecessary to posit the potency to know.

It is not right to maintain that consciousness itself is the self; because the nature of consciousness is to depend upon a substrate and a correlative, while the self has an opposite character; and because the self, the knower, unlike consciousness, shines forth directly; and because, on the strength of every-day experience, reasoning (*tarka*) and scriptural testimony, it has already been shown at great length that the quality of being the self belongs only to that entity which is endowed with knowledge.

Even on the doctrine that consciousness itself becomes the soul, owing to the erroneous superimposition of the quality of knowledge on its accidental relation with objects, it is unreasonable to contend that consciousness itself (which possesses this relation) may (as a consequence of this illegitimate transference) be justifiably treated as the knower. For, inasmuch as the relation dwells in both the relata, the object too would have to be regarded as knower.

न च कार्यकारणभाववद्व्यवस्थितत्वम् । तत्र जनिमतो जनयितुश्च परस्परापेक्षा-नियमलक्षणसम्बन्धः । इहापि स एवेति चेन्न ; अपेक्षाहेत्वभावात् । किमर्थमर्थश्चैतन्यमपेक्षते, चैतन्यं वार्थम् ?

सिद्ध्यर्थमिति चेत् , कः सिद्ध्यर्थः ? न तावदुत्पत्तिः ; तस्या निर्ज्ञातनिमित्तान्तरत्वात् । घटादयो हि प्रसिद्धमृद्दण्डचक्रभ्रमणादिपर्याप्तनिमित्तान्तरशालिनो न चितिमपि निजजननेऽपेक्षन्ते । निरस्तश्च विज्ञानमात्रवादः । नित्यस्यात्मन उत्पत्त्यर्थमर्थापेक्षेति सुव्याहृतम् ॥

सिद्धिः प्रकाश इति चेत् , किं भो आत्मा स्वयंज्योतिरप्यर्थाधीनप्रकाशः, यदसौ तदर्थमर्थमपेक्षते ? महनीयमिदमात्मवेदित्वम् ।

It is not right to suggest that, though the relation is found in both the relata, the quality of being the knower is definitely attributed to only one specified member of the relata (i.e. consciousness), just as in the case of the relation of cause and effect (where, while the causal relation resides in both, only one specified member of the relata is taken to be the cause, and the other to be the effect). For there (i.e. in the case of cause and effect) the relation is in the form of invariable mutual dependence of the producer and the produced. If it be said that here also the same mutual dependence prevails, (we reply) not so. For (in the present case) there is no occasion for mutual dependence. Why (we ask) does the object stand in need of consciousness ? And why, again, does consciousness require the object ?

If you were to reply, (that this dependence is) for the purpose of *siddhi,* (we ask) what is meant by *siddhi ?* It cannot denote origination ; for origination is well-known to depend on other causes. Indeed, pots and the like have for their causes other well-known factors, which are complete in themselves, such as, clay, staff, the rotation of the wheel, etc. ; (hence) they do not require for their origination consciousness also. (If it be said that the so-called factors are in reality only consciousness, and hence, objects such as, pots and the like, really depend on consciousness itself, it may be replied that) the doctrine that things are nothing but thoughts (*vijñāna*) has already been refuted. To maintain that the soul which is eternal depends upon objects for its origination would, indeed, be ridiculous.

If you were to say that *siddhi* denotes manifestation, (we ask) 'Well sir ! do you then contend that because it depends on objects for its manifestation, the soul, though self-luminous, possesses a manifestation which is dependent on objects ? Your understanding of the nature of the soul would, indeed be praiseworthy !'

प्रकाशश्च न संविदतिरेकी कश्चिदर्थधर्मस्सम्भवतीत्यावेदितम् ॥

सम्भवन्नप्यसौ न चितिस्वरूपमात्रनिमित्तः ; सर्वदा सर्वार्थप्रकाशप्रसङ्गात् । न हि सदा सन्निहितसमग्रकारणं कार्यं कदाचिद्भवति । आगन्तुकातिशयाश्रयणे वा नामान्तरेण ज्ञानमेवाङ्गीकृतमिति तद्वानेवायमात्मा आयातः ॥

नन्वेवमर्थसिद्धिव्यवस्थापकतया अभ्युपगतं ज्ञानमागन्तुकं क्रियारूपमिति कथं तदात्मस्वभावः ? तथाहि—अर्थान्तरगतत्वे सति जनकद्रव्यान्तरं प्रति कार्यत्वादिकेन रूपेणासाधारणो गन्तव्यदेशप्राप्त्यादिर्यं प्रत्यसाधारणः, तत्समवेतागन्तुकासाधारणगमनादिक्रियाजन्यो दृष्टः । तादृशी चार्थसिद्धिर्यं पुरुषं प्रत्यसाधारणी तत्समवेततादृशक्रियाजन्येति शक्यमनुमातुम् ॥

(Nor could the object depend on consciousness for its manifestation; for) it has already been shown that manifestation cannot be a quality different from consciousness and residing in objects.

Even if it were a quality different from consciousness, it cannot be said to be dependent on consciousness alone; for (in that event) there would be the manifestation of all objects at all times. Indeed, all the causal factors being present at all times, the effect could not arise on some occasions only (i.e., since consciousness which is the cause of manifestation is eternal, the manifestation cannot be occasional). If the specific quality (known as manifestation) were treated as an occasional property, then, it would amount to (your) admitting consciousness itself under a different name. Thus, the conclusion is inevitable that the soul is the possessor of consciousness, and not mere consciousness.

(The objector may ask) since knowledge, which has been admitted to account for the manifestation of different objects at different times, is occasional and is of the nature of a process or activity, how can it be treated as an essential quality of the self ? To make the matter clear:— When results, such as, reaching a certain destination, reside in some objects (e.g. the places reached), they are peculiar to others (e.g. Devadatta) who are responsible for these (results) in so far as these are effects; such results are found to be produced by activities, like proceeding and so on, which are occasional, peculiar and inherent in those to whom the said results are peculiar. Hence, it is but right to infer that the manifestation of objects which resembles these (i.e. reaching the destination and the like) is produced by an activity, which is similar to the activities mentioned before and which is inherent in that person to whom the manifestation is peculiar.

मैवम्; अक्रियाजन्येनाभावप्राप्तक्षेत्रादिस्वत्वेन क्षेत्रिणं प्रत्यसाधारणेन क्षेत्रजव्रीह्यादिस्वत्वेन चानैकान्त्यात्। न च निर्व्यापारतया क्षेत्रिणस्तत्राजनकत्वम्; व्यापारकालादिना व्यभिचारात्, तद्भावभावित्वस्य चाविशेषात्। तज्जीवनमेव तत्र जनकव्यापार इति चेत्,

It is not so; for, in view of the fact that the ownership of land and the like is acquired on account of the mere absence of heirs[166] and not in virtue of any activity (on the part of the owner), and in view of the fact that the ownership of paddy and other grains grown in the field—an ownership which is peculiar to the person to whom the field belongs—is not acquired through any activity, (the aforesaid *hetu*) may be said to be vitiated by *anekānta doṣa*. (In order to escape this fallacy it may be suggested that) the owner of the land is not the cause of his ownership in as much as he is devoid of activity;[167] (but this suggestion) is rendered fallacious by instances, such as activity and time (which, though devoid of activity, are still considered to be causal factors). The statement that when they (i.e. time, activity and the like) exist, the effects follow, (and hence they are considered to be causal factors) is equally applicable to the case of ownership.[168] If it be said that the activity which is responsible for ownership is, indeed, the activity involved in being alive, (we ask) "My dear sir, as this activity is responsible in common with this for taking care of the crops and the like also, how can you maintain that ownership is brought on by a peculiar activity on the part of the owner?"

166. It is likely that *abhāvaprāpta* . . . is a haplographical error for *nābhibhāvaprāpta* . . . As the expression *nābhibhāva* is used in the Dharma śāstras in the sense of relationship, the text as emended, would mean 'on account of the mere fact of a person being a near kinsman.'

167. To prove that consciousness is an occasional property of the soul, the opponent advances the following argument:—Any result which, while remaining in one object, is peculiar to another causal substance, must be produced by an activity which is occasional, peculiar and inherent in that causal substance. Manifestation, while remaining in pots and the like, is peculiar to the knower (e.g. Devadatta); therefore it must be caused by an activity which is occasional, peculiar and inherent in the knower. As this activity goes by the name of knowledge, it follows that knowledge is an occasional quality of the knower.

The *anekānta doṣa* vitiating this argument is exposed by citing the case of ownership, where the *hetu* is present, while the *sādhya* is absent. Though ownership is peculiar to the causal substance, namely, the owner, it need not be produced by any activity on his part.

The opponent may try to escape the fallacy by suggesting that in the instance cited the *hetu* is absent together with the *sādhya*. In other words, he may say that as the owner is not a causal factor at all, ownership cannot be taken to reside in a causal substance.

168. In other words, when the owner exists, his ownership does follow. Hence, though devoid of activity, the owner is certainly a causal factor in respect of his ownership.

ननु तच्छस्यपालनादिसाधारणमिति कथमसाधारणक्रियाजन्यत्वम् ॥

अपि चैवं सति तदेवार्थप्रकाशेऽपि जनकव्यापारोऽस्तु, किमक्लृप्तकल्पनया ? सत्यपि तस्मिन्नर्थो न प्रकाशत इति चेत्, स्वत्वं वा किं यथोदितं सति जीवने जायत एव ? व्रीह्यादिसत्ताप्यपेक्ष्यत इति चेत्, इहापीन्द्रियादिप्रत्यासत्तिरिति समानश्चर्चः । अतो यं प्रत्यसाधारणो यथोदितधर्मस्तदीयासाधारणधर्मनिमित्त इत्येतावत् । स चेष्यत एवात्मनश्चैतन्यं रवेरिव तेजस्वित्वम् ।

न च हेतुभेदानुविधायितया 'जानामि' 'अज्ञासिषं' इत्यादि कालावच्छेदप्रतीतेर्गमनादेरिव ज्ञानस्यागन्तुकत्वमनुमेयम्; आदित्यप्रकाशेनानैकान्त्यात् । अस्ति हि तत्रापि 'इमं देशमादित्यः प्रकाशयति, प्राकाशयत्प्रकाशयिष्यति' इति प्रतीतिः ॥

Further, even if being alive were admitted to be a peculiar quality, it might as well be the activity responsible for the manifestation of objects also. Where is the point in positing something unproved? If it be said that although there is life no object is (sometimes) manifested (and hence, life is not responsible for the manifestation of objects, we ask you in reply) 'Does the aforesaid ownership follow whenever life exists?'[169] If it be said that the existence of grains, such as, paddy, is also required, (we reply) that here also (i.e. in the case of the manifestation of objects) contact with the senses and the like is required. Thus, in either case the difficulty that may be raised and the explanation offered are similar. Therefore, only this much (can be said):—the aforesaid quality which is peculiar to a given person has for its cause a special attribute belonging to that person; and (in conformity with this principle) the fact that the special attribute responsible for the manifestation of objects is consciousness, which belongs to the self even as light belongs to the sun, is acceptable to us.

It is not right to say that, like the act of going, knowledge may be inferred to be occasional, for the reason that there arise cognitions—such as, 'I knew,' 'I know'—which, on account of the fact that they are dependent on several causes, are found to be limited by time. For the instance of the sun's light renders this argument liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa*. Indeed, here also, there are the cognitions 'The sun illumines this place,' 'The sun illumined it' and 'The sun will illumine it.'[170]

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169. A person may live and still have no ownership, if the thing owned is either lost or given away to another.

170. Thus even though light is an essential property of the sun, it appears limited by time. Even so, consciousness, though an essential property of the self, may still be limited by time.

स्वारसिकत्वेऽप्यादित्यप्रकाशस्य प्रकाश्यदेशसम्बन्धकादाचित्कतया अवच्छेदप्रतीतिरुपपद्यत इति चेत्, इहापि तर्हीन्द्रियादिप्रत्यासत्तिसमासादितयोग्यभावोऽनुभाव्यभेदः स्वाभाविकमात्मनश्चैतन्यगुणमवच्छिनत्तीति तदपेक्षयैवेन्द्रियाद्यनुविधानमतीतानागतप्रत्युत्पन्नत्वप्रत्ययप्रयोगौ चोपपद्यन्ते ।

कथं पुनरत्र निर्णयः द्युमणिमणिप्रकाशादेरिवौपाधिकोऽयं भेदः, न तु गमनपचनादेरिव स्वाभाविक इति? ताद्रूप्येणैव प्रत्यक्षत्वात् । न हि जातु चिदचिद्रूपोऽयमात्मा लोष्टादिवदृष्टचरः । यश्च यद्गुणतयैव साक्षाद्भवति स तत्स्वभावः, मरुदिव स्पर्शगुणतयैवाध्यक्ष्यमाणः । यो यत्स्वभावो न भवति, स तद्विरहेणापि स्वरूपत उपलभ्यते, गमनादिरहिततयेव देवदत्तादिः ।

If it be suggested that even though the light of the sun is its essential quality, the cognition limited by time may be justified on the ground that its contact with the region to be illumined is occasional, it may be replied that here also the various objects cognised, which acquire the capacity (to limit knowledge) from their contact with the senses, limit the quality of knowledge which is an essential property of the self; and it is for this reason that the following become intelligible :— the dependence on the senses and the like, cognitions limited by time into the past, the future and the present and all references to the same.

(The opponent may ask) how can it be determined that in this case the distinction of knowledge (implied in the cognitions—'I knew,' 'I know' and 'I will know'), like the distinction of the light of the sun or that of the precious stone, is dependent upon limiting conditions, and that, unlike the distinction between the activity of going and cooking, it is not based on the essential nature (of knowledge itself)? (We reply) the soul is, certainly, perceived as having that nature (i.e. as having consciousness for its essential quality). Indeed, unlike the clod of earth, the soul is never found to be of a non-sentient nature. That which is perceived as having a certain quality necessarily possesses it as its essential nature, even as air, which is perceived to possess the quality of (*sparśa*) touch, (owns it as its essential quality). That which does not possess a certain quality as its essential nature may also be perceived in itself, bereft of that quality, just as persons like Devadatta are perceived even without the activities of proceeding and the like, (which do not form part of their essential nature).

शरीरवदिति चेन्न, असिद्धत्वात्। स्यादेतत्—यथैव खल्वस्वभावभूतेनापि शरीरेण सध्रीचीन एवायं चेतनश्चकास्ति, तथा चैतन्येनापीति। तन्नैवम्; असिद्धत्वात्। न हि तनुविशिष्टतयैवायं चेतनः परिस्फुरति; योगिनां प्रणिहितमनसामुपरतबहिरिन्द्रियाणां च देहानुसन्धानविरहेणाप्यहमिति स्फुटमनुभवात्। जानामीति प्रत्ययः शरीरवर्णसन्निवेशनिर्भासशून्यतया तत्त्वान्तरगोचर इति च प्रागेवावोचम्। कर्मानुगुण्येन सुरमनुजादिजातीयतया भिद्यमानास्वागमापायिनीषु तनुषु मनस इवैकस्य वर्ष्मणः स्वभावानुबन्धित्वेनाश्रयितुमशक्यत्वात्। लिङ्गस्य पुनरनुवृत्तावप्यप्रत्यक्षत्वान्न व्यभिचारित्वम्।

बोधस्वाभाव्ये पुंसः स्वापमूर्छयोः प्रकाशप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्न; विकल्पासहत्वात्।

If it be said that consciousness is like the body (in being invariably manifested, though only an accidental possession), (we reply) not so; for (what is said with regard to the body) itself stands in need of proof. In other words, you may contend that just as the conscious entity shines forth as being invariably associated with the body, even though the latter is not its essential nature, it always shines forth along with consciousness also (even though the latter is not its essential property). (Our reply is) it is not so; for what is said of the analogous instance requires proof. Indeed, the conscious entity does not shine forth only as being associated with the body; for to the adepts in yoga whose minds are concentrated and whose external senses have become quiescent the conscious entity clearly shines forth as the 'I,' without there being any thought of the body. I have already stated that the cognition 'I know,' being devoid of the apprehension of the complexion and configuration of the body, must have something other than the body for its object. Further, when bodies become differentiated into several classes, such as, devas and men, in accordance with past deeds, and when they appear and disappear, it is not possible to maintain that a given body, unlike the manas, forms part of the essential nature (of the soul). Although there is the continuity of the subtle body (*liṅgaśarīra*), the charge of *vyabhicāra* cannot be levelled against the argument, as it is not perceived.[171]

Should it be said that if consciousness is an essential attribute of the soul, it should be manifested in the states of sleep and swoon, (we reply) 'not so'; for none of the possible interpretations of this state-

171. The gross body may appear and disappear and thus may not accompany the soul at all times; but the subtle body, at any rate, being continuous, may accompany the soul at all times and may thus be said to nullify the statement that the soul does not always shine forth along with the body. To this the reply is that as the *liṅgaśarīra* is not open to perception, it cannot be stated that the soul shines invariably along with the *liṅgaśarīra*.

तथाहि—प्रकाश इति पदार्थमात्रसाधारणं बोधजन्यं प्रकटतादिपदपर्यायं धर्ममभिप्रेत्य वायं प्रसङ्गः, अथ बोधमेव, तदविप्रकर्षं *वा ? आद्ये तद्भावादेव न प्रसङ्गः । अभावश्च प्रकटित एव संवित्स्वतस्सिद्धिसमर्थनसमये । भावेऽपि तमःप्रतिबन्धादप्यनुदयस्सम्भवी । इतरयोरभिमतमेवापादितमित्यदोषोद्भावनम् । बोधस्वाभाव्ये हि पुरुषस्य स्वापादि-दशासु च तथाभावोऽभिमत एवेति, न हि तदापादनं दोषाय ॥

अथ मतं स्वापादावपि स्वानुभवसद्भावे जागर इव व्यवहारप्रसङ्ग इति । मैवम्; व्यवहारागोचरत्वात् । कः खल्वात्मनि व्यवहारः ? न ह्यसावादातुं हातुमुपेक्षितुं वा शक्यः । व्याहारः‡ प्रसज्यत इति चेत्; किमङ्ग निर्विकल्पबालमूकादिवेदनविषयो व्याह्रि-

ment will stand scrutiny. To make the matter clear :—When this unwelcome position is said to result, do you mean by *prakāśa,* (1) the quality which is commonly present in all objects and which is generated by jñāna and which has for its synonyms terms *prakaṭatā* and the like, or (2) knowledge itself, or (3) the proximity of knowledge ? On the first alternative, there is no room for this unwelcome position at all, because no such quality (known as *prākaṭya*) exists. The non-existence of *prākaṭya* has already been clearly indicated while establishing the self-luminosity of consciousness. And even if it were to exist, its non-origination might as well result from the obstructing factor, namely, *tamas* (darkness). On the other two alternatives, as what has been said is acceptable to me, no defect in my contention has been brought to light. Indeed, when the puruṣa possesses consciousness as his essential nature, his possessing knowledge even in the state of sleep is acceptable to us ; hence, to suggest this as a defect in our contention is no charge at all.

If you were to contend that, in case consciousness of oneself were admitted in states of sleep and the like, there would result the prevalence of everyday activities in these states, as in that of waking, (we reply) 'not so'. For the soul is not the object (*viṣaya*) of any activity. What is the nature of the activity in regard to the soul (which, you think, would result) ? Indeed, the soul is incapable of being lifted or cast away or treated with indifference. If it is suggested that there would have to prevail discussion concerning the soul, (we ask) "Dear Sir, is the object of indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) knowledge or that of the knowledge of children, dumb persons and others like them ever discussed (by them) ?" If it is argued that the non-

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* The Benares and Telugu editions read *tadviprakarṣam ;* and the Telugu edition refers in a foot-note to a variant reading *tadaviprakarṣam.* In fact, the reading suggested—*tadaviprakarṣam*—is correct.

‡ From the context it is clear that *vyāhāra* is preferable to the variant reading, *vyavahāra.*

यत एव ? करणपाटवव्यवजिहीर्षादिसहकारिविरहात्तत्र व्याहारानुदय इति चेत्, समानोऽयं विधिरितरत्रापीति निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः ॥

स्मृतिप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्न ; अवृत्तित्वात् । यद्युच्येत मूर्छादावात्मानुभवाभ्युपगमेऽर्थान्तरानुभव इव 'एवमहमन्वभूवम्' इति परस्तात्स्मृतिः प्रसज्यत इति, तन्न ; अवृत्तित्वात् । न हि मूर्छा प्रस्वापो वा बुद्धिवृत्तिविशेषः दर्शनस्पर्शनादिवत्, येन स्मृतिबीजं संस्कारमादधीयाताम् । किन्तूद्भूतेन तमसोपरतव्यापारेषु करणेषु निर्वृत्तिकसांसिद्धिकबोधस्वरूपेणावस्थानमात्रमात्मनः ॥

न च बोधस्वभावत्वादेवास्य संस्काराधायकत्वम्; अनवरतोपचीयमानसंस्कारतया अनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गात् । अनुभवे च स्वानुरूपसंस्काराधाननिरुद्धे सदृशसम्बन्धिदर्शनादि-

origination of discussion in regard to these cases is due to the absence of auxiliary causes, such as, the efficient condition of the senses, the desire for discussion and the like, (our reply is) as this type of explanation is equally applicable to the other case also, you are addressing your query to the person who cannot be questioned.[172]

If you were to say that remembrance would have to occur, (we reply) 'not so'; for the states of sleep and swoon are not forms of experience (*vṛtti*). To explain:—Should it be stated that knowledge of the self exists in the state of swoon or the like, there would have to occur at a subsequent time remembrance (of the self) taking the form 'I experienced it thus,' as in the case of knowledge of other objects, (the reply is) 'not so.' For swoon and the like are not experiences (*vṛtti*). Indeed, swoon and sleep, unlike the acts of seeing and touching, are not particular modifications (*vṛttis*) of the intellect. If they were such modifications, they would give rise to impressions (*samskāras*) which are responsible for remembrance. But, really, swoon and sleep are nothing but the very existence of the soul in its essential nature of jñāna, devoid of modifications (*vṛtti*), when the senses have been withdrawn from their activities on account of the quality of darkness (*tamas*) which is in the ascendent.

It cannot be said that, for the very reason of its having jñāna as its nature, the soul can itself generate the impressions; for, as the soul would then possess incessantly accumulating impressions (*samskāras*), release would for ever become impossible. When an experience has served its purpose by leaving behind impressions appropriate to itself,

172. Compare-Yaścobhayossamo doṣaḥ Parihāropi vā samaḥ | Naikaḥ paryanuyoktavyaḥ Tādṛgarthavicāraṇe ||
When an identical difficulty is encountered by both the rival disputants and when it could be met by either in the same way, it is not open to one of them to level that difficulty as a charge against the other.

समुद्बोधितनिजबीजानुसारेण स्मरणमुपजायते । न चेहात्मस्वरूपबोधस्य जातु चिन्निरोधो जन्म वा; नित्यात्मसत्ताप्रयुक्तत्वात् । निमित्तान्तराभावश्चानन्तरमेव व्याकरिष्यते । तदेवमनुवर्तमान एवानुभवे कथं स्मृतिरुदयमासादयेत्?

'य एवाहं पूर्वेद्युरासं स एवाहमद्यापि' इति स्मृतिसम्भिन्नप्रत्ययोऽपि कालावच्छिन्नस्वरूपगोचरः, न स्वरूपमात्रे ।

अविशदश्च स्वापादौ स्वानुभवः, निर्विकल्पश्च; पटीयसा सविकल्पकेनावगमेन स्मृतिबीजमाधीयत इति कुतस्तत्प्रसङ्गः? साम्याच्चाननुभवाभिमानः, शरीरधारणप्रयत्नाननुसन्धानवत् ।

न चाविकृतस्वाभाविकबोधमात्रेणावस्थाने स्वापमोक्षयोरविशेषापत्तिः; क्लेशवासनानां

remembrance arises in accordance with its root cause, (namely, the samskāras), which is stimulated by factors, such as, experience of similar objects or of associated things. But here no origination or obstruction for the consciousness of the self can ever exist; for the consciousness of the self is dependent on the existence of the soul which is eternal. That there is no other cause responsible for the same will presently be shown. Thus, at the very time when an experience continues to exist, how can its remembrance take birth?

(It may be pointed out that the cognition 'I who existed yesterday am the selfsame individual even to-day' clearly indicates that there is remembrance of the self; to this it is replied—). Even the awareness—'I who existed yesterday am the selfsame individual even to-day'—which is mixed up with remembrance must be said to be concerned with the self limited by time, and not with the self in its pure nature. In sleep and other similar states, the consciousness of the self is indistinct and is also indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*); (only) with the aid of knowledge which is clear and distinct and which is determinate (*savikalpaka*) is the basis of remembrance (i.e. the *samskāra*) produced; when that is so, how could it be said that remembrance would result? Since, having no knowledge of the self and having a knowledge of the self which lacks clearness and distinctness are similar, there arises the false belief that (in sleep) there is no knowledge of the self, even as there is no knowledge of the effort involved in maintaining the body (while such an effort does exist).

It cannot be maintained that if (in the state of sleep) the self exists in its essential nature as an unchanging consciousness alone, there would be no difference between this state and that of release. For in the one case (*i.e.*, in sleep) impressions (*vāsanās*) born of *kleśas*[173] as well as

173. All the manuscripts and printed editions read *samprajñātasamādhāvapi*. But judging from the context, *asamprajñātasamādhāvapi* appears to be the proper

गुणाभिभवस्य चैकत्र भावात्, इतरत्र तदत्यन्तनिवृत्तेः। असम्प्रज्ञातसमाधावपि [174] परमवैराग्यशालिना पटुतरनिरोधसंस्कारेण चरिताधिकारिणा अपवर्गिणा विशेषः ॥

कथं पुनर्निद्राया अवृत्तित्वे प्रबुद्धस्य प्रत्यवमर्शाः 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' इत्याद्याः? न ह्यननुभूतगोचराः स्मृतयस्सम्भवन्ति। सत्त्वसचिवसमुल्लसिततमोगुणानुभवभावितभावनायोनिः खलु 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' 'प्रसन्नं मे मनः' 'लघूनि मे गात्राणि' इति प्रत्यवमर्शः। रजस्तमस्समुद्रेके तु 'दुःखमहमस्वाप्सम्' 'भ्रमत्यनवस्थितं मे चित्तम्' इति। सत्त्वरजसी त्वभिभूय नितान्तमुद्भूते तमसि 'गाढमूढं* सुप्तोऽस्मि' 'गुरूणि मे गात्राणि' 'मुषितमिव मनो मीलितमिव' इति।

the obscuration of the guṇas exist, while in the other (i.e. in release) they are totally annihilated. (If it be stated that, at least, between sleep and *asamprajñāta samādhi* (super-conscious samādhi) there would have to be no difference, it may be replied that) even the soul existing in the state of super-conscious samādhi that has acquired complete detachment (*vairāgya*), that possesses the most intense samskāras conducive to restraint, and that has discharged its duties and is about to enter upon the state of final release, must to be distinguished from the self existing during sleep.

If sleep is not a form of *vṛtti,* how (it may be asked) can remembrances, such as, 'I slept soundly', arise to the person who is awake? Indeed, remembrances having for their object what has not been experienced before never arise. Certainly, remembrances, such as, 'I slept well', 'My mind is perturbed', 'My limbs feel light' have for their causes the impressions (*bhāvanas*) produced by experiences relating to the quality of tamas which is associated with the sattva quality and which is preponderant. When there is an excess of tamas and rajas, there arise cognitions—such as 'I slept uneasily', 'My mind is whirling', 'My mind is unsteady'. When tamas is wholly preponderant having overpowered sattva and rajas, there arise the following recollections—'I have slept wholly oblivious of everything', 'The limbs of my body feel heavy', 'My mind is, as it were, robbed away', 'And it is, as it were, covered over'.

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reading. It is reasonable to suppose that a reference to the state of release is followed up by a doubt concerning a state which is the nearest approximation to it.

174. Compare *Yoga-Sūtra* II. 3. 'Avidyāsmitārāgadveṣābhiniveśāḥ kleśāḥ.'

* *Gāḍham mūḍham* is a variant reading.

सत्यमेवम्; दत्तोत्तरं ह्येतत्, नैवामी वासनायोनयः प्रत्ययाः, अपि तु तात्कालिकशरीरेन्द्रियमनोवस्थाविशेषपर्यालोचननिमित्ता आनुमानिका इति। एवंरूपा हीमे, 'यतः प्रसन्नं मे मनः सम्यगाहारपरिणामवशाल्लघूनि चाङ्गानि, अतस्सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' इति। स्वापावस्थायां वेन्द्रियोपरमतारतम्यवशादविशदतात्कालिकतत्तदनुकूलप्रतिकूलविषयानुसन्धाननिबन्धनतयापि स्मरणमुपपद्यत इति न वृत्त्यन्तरत्वं निद्रायाः।

कथं तर्हि पारमर्षं सूत्रम् 'अभावप्रत्ययालम्बना वृत्तिर्निद्रा' इति? निरोधपरत्वात्प्रकरणस्य न वृत्तिस्वरूपे तात्पर्यं विपर्ययवत्। न ह्यतद्रूपप्रतिष्ठं मिथ्याज्ञानं किञ्चिदस्ति; सर्वसंविदामर्थाव्यभिचारात्। स चाधिकरणसिद्धः। साधयिष्यते चोपरिष्टात्। कैवल्यभागि यच्चित्, तत्प्रत्यनीकतया निद्रादेर्निरोध्यत्वेनोपदेशः॥

(We reply) all this is true enough; but your question has already been answered thus:—Assuredly, these cognitions do not have the impressions (*vāsanās*) for their source; but are based on the consideration of the then-existing specific states of the body, senses and the mind (manas); and these cognitions are the result of inference. Indeed, such cognitions take the following form:—'On account of the fact that my mind is tranquil, and that the organs are light consequent on the proper assimilation of food, 'I slept well'; (hence, they must be inferential). (Even if they are remembrances), the remembrance may become intelligible, for the reason that it is based on the thought of several desirable and undesirable objects—a thought which exists at the moment (of sleep) and which lacks clearness and distinctness, on account of the varying degrees to which the senses have been withdrawn during sleep; hence, *nidrā* need not be a separate *vṛtti.*

(You may ask) how, then, could the sūtra of the great sage have come in at all?—"Nidrā (sleep) is the *vṛtti,* which is the cause of the non-existence of other vṛttis."[175] (The reply is) as the context aims at stating what has to be suppressed, its intention is not to describe the nature of the *vṛttis;* as in the case of *viparyaya* (which, though not a vṛtti, is yet mentioned as that which has to be suppressed). Indeed, a false knowledge which is not based on the object which it reveals cannot be met with; for all knowledge is invariably associated with an objective reality.[176] And this fact has clearly been proved in the *adhikaraṇa;*[177] and later it will be established again. As sleep (*nidrā*) is a hindrance to the soul (*cit*) which is to attain release, it is mentioned as something that deserves to be suppressed.

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175. Vide p. 109.

176. Compare *Yoga-Sūtra* I. 8. 'Viparyayo mithyājñānamatadrūpapratiṣṭham.'

177. Evidently the reference is to an adhikaraṇa in Nāthamuni's *Nyāyatattva Śāstra.* As the author is generally in the habit of mentioning the name of the adhi-

अस्तु वा पूर्वोक्तप्रमाणादिवृत्त्यभावकारणभूतप्रचिततमतमोगुणावलम्बना वृत्तिरेव निद्रा, सन्तु च प्रबुद्धप्रत्यवमर्शाश्च स्मरणानि, *तथा सत्यप्यनवरतानुवृत्तबोधतया स्थितमेव पुंसो बोधस्वभावत्वम् ।

आह—बोधकारणानुवृत्त्यापि बोधानुवृत्तिरुपपद्यत इति कथं तया‡ स्वाभाव्यनिश्चयः? इत्थम्

यतस्स्वतस्सतो बोधादृते पुंसो यथोदितम् ।
तमस्स्वापादिकालीनं न सिद्ध्येद्धेत्वसिद्धितः ॥

उपरतानि हि प्रस्वापकाले सर्वाण्येवेन्द्रियाणि सह मनसा । संस्कारस्य च न स्मृतेरन्यत्र सामर्थ्यम् । न च स्वप्रकाशं तमः; अर्थान्तरवर्तिनोऽप्यनिशं प्रकाशप्रस-

Let it be granted that sleep (*nidrā*) is a *vṛtti* having for its object the most highly developed tamas, and that it is responsible for the absence of other *vṛttis* mentioned already, such as, *pramāṇa*;[178] let it also be granted that the cognitions arising to the person awake are remembrances. Even then, the fact does remain that the soul possesses consciousness as its essential nature, for the reason that it owns a knowledge which always continues to be.

(The opponent may say that) the continuity of knowledge may as well be explained in terms of the persistence of the causes of knowledge, (and ask) how it can be asserted that knowledge is an essential property of the soul, on the strength of the continuity of knowledge. (The reply is:—this assertion is made) on the strength of the reason that without knowledge, which exists in the very nature of the soul, tamas which prevails in the states of sleep and the like will not be manifest to the soul; for there is no causal factor that could manifest it. (It might be said that though knowledge is absent, tamas may be manifested with the aid of the senses or manas or the samskāras; but this is untenable). For in sleep all the senses together with the mind (manas) are quiescent. And the power to produce any knowledge other than remembrances does not belong to the impressions (samskāras). (Nor can it be said that tamas may reveal itself; for) tamas is not self-luminous; since it would then have to be invariably manifested to the soul (in the waking state also), when it grasps objects other than tamas.

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karaṇa to which he refers, in all probability, he would have mentioned the name here also. But unfortuntely, it has been lost. cf. pp. 90, 95 and 127.

* The Telugu and Benares editions read *tathā satyanavarata.* The former refers in a footnote to a variant reading *tathā na satyanavarata.* The emendation we suggest is *tathā satyapyanavarata.*

‡ *Katham tathā* is the reading found in the printed editions; the proper reading ought to be *katham tayā.*

178. Vide note No. 163.

ज्ञात्। कृत्स्नश्च सर्वार्थसाधनतया बोध इति तेनैव करणविरहिणा सता स्वभावभूतेनोद्भूते-नोद्भूतवृत्तेस्तमसोऽन्यस्य वा आत्मवर्तिनो गुणस्य स्फुरणमिति बलादभ्युपगमनीयम्।

नित्यप्रकाशश्च आत्मा, प्रमातृत्वात्। अप्रमातृत्वव्यापकबद्धं ह्यनित्यप्रकाशत्वं व्यापकविरुद्धप्रमातृत्वभोगिन्यात्मनि नात्मानं लभते।

स्वतस्सिद्धप्रकाशत्वमप्यस्य ज्ञातृभावतः।
अज्ञातृत्वेन हि व्याप्ता परायत्तप्रकाशता ॥

कः पुनरयं प्रकाशो योऽस्य नित्योऽभ्युपेयेत स्वाभाविकश्च? कश्चास्यात्मना सम्बन्धः? यदि ज्ञानमेव सम्बन्धश्चाश्रयाश्रयित्वम्, ततो हेत्वभावेन साध्याभावस्य व्याप्तिमुपदर्शयितुं निदर्शनतया घटाद्युपादातव्यम्; यदनित्यप्रकाशमन्याधीनप्रकाशं वा तदप्रमातृ,

For the reason that knowledge is established to be the means for the manifestation of all things, it must be admitted, whether you like it or not, that predominant tamas or any other quality residing in the soul becomes manifest (with the aid of this knowledge alone), which, being patent and having in its turn no instrument (for its own manifestation), forms an essential feature of the soul.

Besides, (to put the same syllogistically)—The soul possesses an eternal illumination; for it is a knower. The possession of non-eternal illumination, which is invariably concomitant with what pervades (*vyāpaka*)—the quality of being other than a knower—cannot find a place for itself in the soul which possesses the quality of being a knower—a quality opposed to the *vyāpaka* (i.e. the quality of being other than a knower).[179] The possession of illumination as an innate property is attributed to the soul, because it is a knower. The possession of an illumination which is dependent upon something other than itself is invariably associated with the quality of being other than a knower.

What is meant by this illumination (*prakāśa*) which is said to be eternal and innate to the soul? And what exactly is the nature of its relation to the soul? If illumination means knowledge itself, and if the relation is that of being the container and the contained (*āśrayāśrayitvam*), then (with regard to the aforesaid syllogism) in order to cite the invariable concomitance of the absence of the *sādhya* with the absence of the *hetu,* pots and the like must be cited as illustrative examples in the following way:—Whatever possesses a non-eternal illumination or an illumination depending upon something else is other

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179. The syllogism may be stated thus—Nothing possessing non-eternal illumination is a knower. The soul is a knower. Therefore, the soul does not possess non-eternal illumination Cf. *Ved. Sū.* II. iii. 31. Pumstvādivattvasya satobhivyaktiyogāt.

यथा घटादीति। तत्र च विशेषनिषेधस्य सामान्याभ्यनुज्ञाक्षेपकत्वादागन्तुकं ज्ञानं घटादावनुमतमापद्यते।

अथ तन्मा भूदिति विषयविषयिभाव एव सम्बन्धस्सङ्गीयेत, ततो नित्यवज्ज्ञानविषयत्वमात्मनः प्रसज्येत। ज्ञानविषयीकारश्च साधनविशेषायत्तत्वेन नियत इति न स्वाभाविकत्वसम्भवः।

अचेतनगोचर एव तथा नियम इति चेन्न; चेतनान्तरविषयीकारेऽपि तथाभावदर्शनात्। न चानात्मगोचर एव साधनसापेक्षत्वनियम इति वाच्यम्; आत्मनोऽप्यानुमानिकागमिकयोगज्ञानविषयीकारे तत्सापेक्षत्वदर्शनात्।

विरुद्धे चैकस्यैकक्रियायां कर्मकर्तृत्वे, सूच्यग्रस्येवात्मनि वेध्यवेधकत्वे। नित्यत्वनिरतिशयसूक्ष्मत्वव्यापित्वचित्स्वाभाव्यादिरूपेण प्रत्यगर्थस्यौपदेशिकत्वमानुमानिकत्वं वा,

than a knower; like pots, etc. Then, as the negation of something specific presumes the affirming of something else belonging to the same general category, it would result in the admission that occasional knowledge resides in pots and the like.

In order to obviate this difficulty if it be said that the relation (in question) is no other than that of being the object apprehended and being the subject apprehending (*viṣayaviṣayibhāva*), then, the soul would have to be the object of an eternal consciousness. And since the quality of being an object of consciousness is invariably concomitant with that of being dependent upon some specific causal factors, consciousness cannot be an innate property of the soul.

If it be said that this universal concomitance is met with only in the case of insentient objects, the reply is 'not so'; for even when some other soul is cognised, this dependence on certain causal factors is noticed. It cannot be said that this general law, namely, that all objects of consciousness depend on specific causal factors, applies only to cases other than oneself; for even in regard to oneself, when it becomes the object of inferential knowledge, knowledge born of scripture, and yogic perception, this dependence upon causal factors is noticed.

Further, in respect of one and the same entity the character of being the object and that of being the subject (or agent) of the self-same activity are contradictory; just as in the case of a needle, with regard to its point, the qualities of being the piercer and the pierced are contradictory. It is not in respect of itself, but in respect of its features—such as, eternity, extreme subtlety, capacity to penetrate all things, the possession of consciousness as its essential nature—that the soul (*pratyagartha*) comes to be the object of knowledge obtained through inference or through instruction. Since the

न स्वरूपतः। स्वरूपापेक्षयैव स्वतस्सिद्धिरभ्युपेयत इत्यसमाधेयो विरोधः। रूपभेदेन गम्यगमकत्वाङ्गीकारपक्षे सपक्षस्येव* शब्दादेर्न स्वतस्सिद्धत्वम्।

अथोच्येत न प्रकाशो ज्ञानम्, अपि तु तन्निमित्तश्चेतनेतरसर्वपदार्थसाधारणो धर्मः, यद्वशात्प्रकाशत इति प्रख्योपाख्ये प्रतायेते सर्वपदार्थेषु। अविशेषेणाश्रयाश्रयित्वलक्षणश्च सम्बन्धस्तेन सह सर्वभावानाम्। स च यथोदितसाधनबलादेव सांसिद्धिको नित्यश्चात्मन इति

पराकृतोऽयं पक्षः, न ज्ञानातिरेकी प्रकाशो नाम; यद्व्यवहारोपजननानुगुणं ज्ञानं तत्प्रकाशत इत्युच्यते। ज्ञेयस्य ज्ञातुः स्वात्मनश्च व्यवहारानुगुणं ज्ञानमुदयत इति

illumination described as being innate in the soul is admitted to flow from its very being, the contradiction cannot be reconciled. On the view that the self may be admitted to be at once the knower and the known in virtue of its different aspects, the self, like the examples relied upon, such as, *śabda* (the word), cannot be said to be self-established.[180]

As a third alternative, you might hold that illumination is not knowledge, but a quality which is dependent upon knowledge and which is found alike in all objects, sentient or non-sentient—a quality by whose aid all understanding and reference, namely, 'It is illumined', arise in regard to all objects; and that the relation of this illumination to all objects, without varying from instance to instance, is just that of being the container and the contained; and that, on the strength of the aforesaid reasons themselves, it follows that such a quality is eternal and essential to the soul.

But this view has already been refuted. There is no prakāśa distinct from knowledge. The object about which it could be said 'It is manifested' is that concerning which there is the knowledge capable of rendering it fit for thought and discussion. Since there arises knowledge conducive to discussion concerning the object known, the knower

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*180. (*i*) The reading in the text is *pakṣasyeva śabdādeḥ;* but the correct reading should be *sapakṣasyeva śabdādeḥ*. This argument presupposes a syllogism in which *śabda, dīpa*, etc., are relied upon as illustrative examples (*sapakṣa*). The syllogism may be set forth as follows:—ātmā svaviṣayaḥ; svaprakāśatvāt, śabdavat dīpavat ca. It may also be added that the Vaiyākaraṇas hold that a word (*śabda*) illuminates itself while illumining its sense and that there is no verbal cognition (*śābdabodha*) which does not involve a verbal configuration. Compare Bhartṛhari—na sosti pratyayo loke yaśśabdānugamādṛte.

(*ii*) *Vipakṣasyeva śabdādeḥ* is the reading suggested by some. Ātmā is the *pakṣa* in this argument; pots and the like constitute the *vipakṣa* (i.e. examples where the sādhya, namely, self-luminosity, is absent). Śabda also must be classed among counter examples. If this reading is accepted the translation of the latter part of the sentence would have to be modified as follows:— . . . . the self, like the counter examples, such as śabda, cannot be said to be self-established.'

युक्तस्त्रिष्वप्येकप्रकारः प्रकाशते इति व्यवहारः ।

तत्त्वान्तरप्रकाशाभ्युपगमे तत्स्वाभाव्ये च पुनः किं चैतन्याश्रयणेन ? न च प्रकाश एव तदिति वाच्यम् ; घटादेरपि प्रकाशवत्तया चेतनत्वप्रसङ्गात् । यद्युच्येत सति चेतनावत्त्वे पुंसः प्रकाशमानत्वमिति, संविदीदानीं का वार्ता ? चेतनैव हि सा, न चेतयते ।

अथ संविदस्तत्सम्बन्धाधीनस्स धर्म इति चेत् , कस्तया सम्बन्धो यस्तन्निबन्धनम् ? नाश्रयाश्रयित्वम् ; घटादेस्तदभावप्रसङ्गात् । न विषयविषयिभावः ; तस्यैवानिरूपणात् । अनिरूपणञ्च भ्रान्त्यधिकरणसिद्धान्तारम्भे संवित्सिद्धौ चानुसन्धातव्यम् । आत्मनस्तस्य चाप्रकाशप्रसङ्गश्च ।

and knowledge itself, it is but right that the reference 'It is manifested' should apply in an identical way to all these three.

If the illumination were to be admitted as a separate entity (i.e. if it is distinct from knowledge), and if the soul has this *prakāśa* for its innate quality, where, again, is the need for attributing consciousness to the soul ? It cannot be said that consciousness is nothing but *prakāśa ;* for even objects, such as pots and the like, would become conscious entities, inasmuch as they possess *prakāśa.* If it is said that (consciousness and *prakāśa* are different and that) *prakāśa* is that which is manifested to the soul when there is possession of knowledge, what about knowledge *(samvit)* ? Indeed, *samvit* is itself consciousness ; and it is not possessed of knowledge.

If it be said that this quality (i.e. *prakāśa*), dependent upon the relation in question, may belong to knowledge, (it may be asked) what exactly is the nature of the relation which acts as the basis of prakāśa ? It cannot be that of being the container and the contained ; for, then, pots and the like would have to be deprived of *prākaṭya.* Nor can it be the relation of being the apprehending subject and the object apprehended, for the precise nature of this relation defies analysis. The impossibility of such an analysis may be ascertained from that part of the *Bhrāntyadhikaraṇa*[181] (of the *Nyāyatattva*) where the statement of the conclusion (*siddhānta*) commences and from *Samvitsiddhi.* Moreover, (if the quality of being the apprehending subject (*viṣayitva*) was the cause of prakāśa, since this quality does not exist in the soul and in non-sentient objects like pots, it (prakāśa) would have to be denied to the soul as well as to non-sentient objects.

181. While discussing the nature of error, the *Sarvārthasiddhi* (Buddhisara) refers to this *adhikaraṇa.* See the *Tattvamuktākalāpa, Sarvārthasiddhi* p. 404.

ज्ञानाधीनप्रकाशाश्रयतैव सिद्धिः, तया चानुमेयं ज्ञानमिति पक्षः प्रागेव प्रतिक्षिप्तः । स्वप्रकाशसंविद्वादिनोऽपि व्यवहारानुकूल्ये वैरूप्यमशक्यपरिहारम् ।

आत्मनि समवेतं ज्ञानमसम्बन्धिन्यर्थे प्रकाशं व्यवहारं वा कथं प्रसुवीतेत्यपि चिन्त्यम् । इन्द्रियलिङ्गादिस्वकारणप्रत्यासत्तिवशादिति मा वोचः । न खलु लब्धात्मकं कार्यं स्वनिमित्तकारणमनुरुध्य कार्यमारभते । मा भूदुदकाहरणादि घटादेः कुलालादिसमानाधिष्ठानम् । न च निमित्तकारणनाशे कार्यनाशः । नश्यति चेन्द्रियसम्प्रयोगादिनाशे रूपादिज्ञानम् । अत इन्द्रियेण सह चैतन्यमपि निस्सृत्य तेन तेनार्थेन सन्निकृष्यते, हस्तादिनेव त्वगिन्द्रियम् । तथा सति हि तदुपाधिकत्वात्तज्ज्ञानस्य युक्तं तद्भावानुविधायित्वम् । अन्यथोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षनिवृत्तौ किमिति निवर्तते ? ।

The view that *siddhi* is nothing but being the seat of *prakāśa,* which is dependent upon jñāna, and that it is with the aid of that *siddhi* that knowledge is inferred to exist has already been refuted. (The defect of mutual dependence—*anyonyāśraya*—involved in that view can by no means be got over by the suggestion that consciousness is itself self-luminous; and is not inferred with the aid of *prakāśa*). Even to the person who contends that consciousness is self-luminous it would be impossible to get over the diversity in regard to the manner in which objects become fit for discussion.

Again, how knowledge, which is inherent in the soul, could generate in the object, which is unrelated to it, a *prakāśa* or discussion is a matter for consideration. Do not say that it is generated by the proximity of the causes of knowledge, such as the senses and reasons (*liṅga*). Indeed, that which has already come to exist does not produce its effect by depending upon its own efficient cause. Activities pertaining to the pot—such as, fetching water—cannot be treated as having for their bases or superintendent (*adhiṣṭhāna*) what is identical with the potter and the like. Further, when the efficient cause perishes, there is no destruction of the effect; but here, when factors—such as, the contact of the senses—perish, knowledge of colour and the like disappears. Therefore, it has to be said that consciousness proceeding outward along with the senses gets into contact with different objects,[182] just as the organ of touch comes into contact with hands and the like. If that were so, since the knowledge of the respective objects is dependent upon this contact, it is but right that such knowledge should be dependent upon the existence of this contact. Otherwise, why should the knowledge which has already arisen vanish when the contact of the senses with objects falls away?

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182. Compare *Śrī Bhāṣya* on *Ved Sū* II. ii. 27—nābhāva upalabdheḥ—sambandhaśca samyogalakṣaṇaḥ. see also the *Tattvamuktākalāpa* p. 652. Dravyam prāg buddhiruktā paramiha viṣayaissaṅgamādirnirūpyaḥ samyogam Bhāṣyakārāḥ prathamamakathayan nyāyatattvānusārāt.'

ज्ञानजन्यार्थप्रकाशवादिनोऽपि समानोऽयं दोषः। निमित्तकारणं हि ज्ञानम्। कुतस्तन्निवृत्तावर्थप्रकाशो निवर्तते? कुतो वा यावत्तद्भावमवतिष्ठते? न च सङ्ख्यादिनिदर्शनेनात्र प्रत्यवस्थानं युक्तम्;।

असिद्धत्वेन नाशस्य सङ्ख्याया बुद्धिनाशतः।
एकसङ्ख्येव सङ्ख्यात्वादन्याप्याद्रव्यभाविनी॥
सर्वा ह्येकाश्रया सङ्ख्या नित्यानित्यार्थवर्तिनी।
यावदाश्रयसत्येव सम्मता सर्ववादिनाम्॥
द्वित्वादिका परार्धान्ता सङ्ख्या याऽनेकवर्तिनी।
सापि सङ्ख्यात्वसामान्ये सति कस्मान्न तादृशी॥

ननु नैकत्वं सङ्ख्या, स्वरूपानतिरेकात्। अतस्साधनविकलमुदाहरणम्। मैवम्;

The same difficulty confronts also the person who admits *prakāśa* as a quality which resides in objects and which is produced by jñāna. For knowledge is the efficient cause of prakāśa. Then, why (it may be asked) should the *prakāśa* of the objects disappear at the disappearance of knowledge ? And why should it exist only so long as knowledge lasts ? It is no good trying to meet the difficulty by citing the analogy of number (*saṅkhyā*) and the like.[183] For with the disappearance of the enumerative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*) there does not result the disappearance of numbers. Like number 1 (unity), the other numbers, namely, 2, 3 and so on, for the very reason that they are numbers, exist as long as objects last. That everywhere the number which is based on a single entity and which resides individually in objects, eternal or non-eternal, (i.e. the number 1, unity) lasts as long as the (particular) support lasts is admitted by all disputants. While the generality, namely, numberness, exists therein, why should not the numbers commencing from 2 and ending in infinity, and residing in multitudinous objects, be similar (to number 1 in lasting as long as the support lasts) ?

An objection may be taken to this argument :—Since number 1 is not a number at all, for the reason that it is not something distinct from the *svarūpa* (i.e. the object wherein it is said to dwell),[184] the example cited in the foregoing argument is defective in being devoid of the *hetu*.

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183. The analogy may be expressed thus :—When the enumerative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*), which is the efficient cause of numbers 2, 3 and so on. disappears these numbers vanish ; in the same way, when knowledge which is the efficient cause of *prakāśa* ceases to be, prakāśa also falls away.

184. This objection is met by Vedānta Deśika in the *Tattvamuktākalāpa* (Adravyasara thus—'aikyam svābhedamāhuḥ katicana na bhidāstyekameveti dṛṣṭeḥ bhedādṛṣṭyaikyamohaḥ taditi ca vacanam tattra tatrābhyupetam anyetvetat svasatt-

सङ्ख्यैव सा; द्रव्यान्तरेऽप्यनुवृत्तेः। यदि हि घटादेस्स्वरूपमेवैकत्वं, ततो घट एकः पट एक इति सर्वद्रव्यसाधारण्यमेकत्वस्य न स्यात्। न हि घटस्वरूपस्य पटस्वरूपेण सम्भवति सामानाधिकरण्यम् 'घटः पटः' इति। अस्ति तु तदेकत्वस्य। किञ्च

सङ्ख्यैकता विरुद्धत्वाद्द्विसङ्ख्येवान्यसङ्ख्यया।
एकं द्वाविति न ह्यस्ति सामानाधिकरण्यधीः॥

यत्त्वनेकद्रव्यवृत्तित्वे सति गुणत्वात् संयोगवदयावद्द्रव्यभाविनी द्वित्वादिसङ्ख्येति, तन्नानात्वेऽनैकान्तिकम्। न हि सतोरेव घटपटयोस्तन्नानात्वं नश्यति। न च तद्द्वित्वसङ्ख्यैव; त्रयाणां तदभावप्रसङ्गात्। न च तदेकत्वाभावमात्रम्; तुच्छस्यापि नानात्वापत्तेः।

(The reply is) not so. Unity (NO. 1) is certainly a number; for it persists equally in other objects (besides the one with whose very being it is sought to be identified). If NO. 1 were identical with the very being of the pot or anything else, then, unity cannot be common to all objects, as is suggested in the expressions, *one* pot, *one* cloth and so on. Indeed, there is no equation of the being of the pot (*ghaṭasvarūpa*) with that of the cloth to the effect 'The pot is cloth'; but that equation of No. 1 with the pot (as is evident in the expression 'one pot') exists. Being contradictory to other numbers, unity, like NO. 2, must necessarily be a number. In fact, there is no knowledge equating unity with number 2 in the form 'Unity is NO. 2.' It may be contended that, like contact (*saṃyoga*), the numbers commencing from 2 do not last as long as the objects exist, because while they exist in many objects, they are qualities. But such a contention is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa,* in the light of the instance of 'diversity'. For as long as the pot and the cloth exist, diversity will never vanish.[185] It cannot be said that diversity is nothing but duality. (Therefore, it is not possible to get over the fallacy of *anekānta* by suggesting that, after all, diversity and duality are identical). For (if they were identical) in respect of any three objects there would be the absence of diversity. Nor can it be said that diversity is merely the absence of unity. (Hence, the suggestion that diversity is merely a negative quality would not help to remove the fallacy). For (in that case) diversity would have to be attributed to even absolute unreality (*tuccha*). Even though

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vam viduritarasamuccityavasthānuvṛttam tatpakṣepi svarūpādadhikamidamiha dvittvamohadisiddheh. pp. 634-5.

185. How the argument comes to be vitiated by *anekānta doṣa* is here explained. In the instance of diversity, even though the *sādhya* is absent, the **hetu** is still met with.

आपेक्षिकत्वाद्द्वित्वादेः प्रतियोग्यनवग्रहात् ।
बुभुत्सोपरमाच्चापि सत्या एवानवग्रहः ॥

अतश्चैतन्यस्यैवेन्द्रियद्वारा अर्थसन्निकर्ष एव तद्भावानुविधानोपपत्तिः ॥

अन्यच्च—अर्थस्य प्रकाशकं ज्ञानं भवताम्। सर्वं च प्रकाश्यवस्तुसन्निकृष्टमेव प्रकाशकं दृष्टं दीपप्रभादि। अतस्तदपि तथेति युक्तमाश्रयितुम्

व्योमवदमूर्तस्य न क्रियावत्त्वमिति चेत्, केयं मूर्तिर्नाम यद्विरहिणः क्रियाऽयोगः। यदि परिभाषिकी द्रव्यत्वे सति काचित्कतेति, इष्यत एव सा चैतन्ये। न हि तत्सर्वगतं द्रव्यम्; तथा सति युगपत्सर्वार्थसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात्। काचित्कत्वे तु तद्धि यदैकदैकेन्द्रियेण सम्प्रयुक्तं तदर्थाभिमुखं, न तदेन्द्रियान्तरमधितिष्ठति। अत एव हि युगपत् ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिः।

the numbers commencing from 2 exist, being dependent upon enumerative cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*), their non-apprehension is due to the non-apprehension of the correlative (*pratiyogin*) and the cessation of the desire to know. Therefore, it is only on the admission that consciousness proceeds by way of the senses and establishes a contact with objects that the dependence of *prakāśa* on the presence or absence of this contact could be rendered intelligible.

Indeed, on your view, consciousness is the entity which manifests the object. All manifesting entities, such as, the light issuing from the lamp are found to manifest objects only by getting into contact with the objects to be illumined. Therefore, it is right to admit that consciousness also is of such a nature (i.e. it manifests objects only by getting into contact with them).

If it be objected that a formless object like ether cannot be endowed with activity (in other words, if it is said that consciousness, being formless, cannot enter on the activity of proceeding and getting into contact), (it may be asked) what exactly is meant by 'form' when it is said that the substance wherein it is absent is devoid of activity. If the reply is that it is a technical term standing for that which, while being a substance occupies a limited area, (we say) the attribution of such a form to consciousness is acceptable to us. In fact, consciousness is not an all-pervasive substance. If it were so (i.e. all-pervasive), there would be the manifestation of all things simultaneously. But, on the view that it pervades a limited area, when it is in contact with one sense-organ and directed to the object falling within the range of that sense, it does not (at the same time) permeate another sense-organ. That is why different kinds of sensory knowledge do not originate simul-

निरतिशयवेगं च तत्; युगपदिवातिशीघ्रमनेकेन्द्रियाधिष्ठानदर्शनात्। अतो यथोदितं मूर्तत्वं सिद्धम्।

स्पर्शवत्ता मूर्तिः, तद्विरहान्निष्क्रियत्वमिति चेत्, शब्देनानेकान्तः। स खलु शङ्खमुखादेर्दवीयसोऽपि देशान्नोदनविशेषेण लोष्टादिरिव यावद्वेगं प्रतिष्ठते स्पर्शविहीनोऽपि। स्पर्शरहितस्यापि मनइन्द्रियस्य क्रियावत्त्वं पदार्थवाक्यार्थविदामुभयेषामपि सम्मतमेव।

कथमतीतानागतयोरसतोश्चैतन्येन सम्प्रयोग इति चेत्, कथं वा विषयभावः? प्रकाशमानत्वं सङ्ख्यादियोगो वा यस्तत्र निर्वाहस्स एवात्रास्तु।

taneously. Consciousness moves with exceeding quickness;[186] for its rapid permeation of the different senses (one after another) is perceived as if it were simultaneous. Therefore, it is to be concluded that the character of possessing a form, in the sense described above belongs to consciousness.

If it is urged that form (*mūrti*) is the quality of possessing touch, and that consciousness, being devoid of such a form, cannot posses any activity, (the reply is) this argument is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa,* in view of the instance of sound (*śabda*). For the sound emanating from the conch, the mouth and the like, though devoid of touch, proceeds, like a missile, with extreme rapidity to places far distant from its source by piercing through space. The fact that manas, though devoid of touch, is endowed with activity is admitted both by the Naiyāyikas who have understood the categories (*padārthas*) and by the Mīmāmsakas who have inquired into the import of propositions.

How (it may be asked) can objects, past and future, which are non-existent, come into contact with consciousness? (We ask you in turn) how do they become the objects (*viṣaya*) of knowledge? The same explanations that you offer with regard to these[187]—such as (their becoming the object of knowledge means just this:) their becoming mani-

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186. Compare the definition of jñāna:—'atyantavegitātyanta śaukṣmyam nirbaratātathā tathā . . . . .'—given Prathamādhikaraṇa of the *Nyāyatattva* and quoted in the *Nyāyasiddhāñjana,* Buddhiparicheda. Vide *infra* p. 95 and note 150.

187. Vedānta Deśika quotes these passages and discusses them in the *Nyāyasiddhāñjana.* Rangarāmānujaswāmi also comments on them. They identify the first (i.e., the view that objects, past and future, become the object of jñāna) as the view of the Naiyāyikas, and the second (i.e. the view that these objects possess prākaṭya) as that of the Bhāṭṭas. See Buddhipariccheda, p. 266.

NYAYAKULISA

Edited with Introduction and Notes

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श्रीः

न्यायकुलिशे षष्ठो वादः ।

आमुष्मिकाणामर्थानां चतुर्णामपि सिद्धये ।
देहादिभ्यो विभिन्नत्वमात्मनः प्रतिपाद्यते ॥

तत्रेन्द्रियादीनां देहव्यतिरिक्तानामनात्मत्वं सुप्रतिपादमिति न तत्रातीव प्रयतितव्यम् । तथा हि—अहम्प्रत्ययसामानाधिकरण्यमात्माविवेकमूलम् । तन्न तावदिन्द्रियेषु दृश्यते । न हि कश्चिच्चक्षुरहं श्रोत्रमहमिति वा प्रत्येति । देहेऽपि समानमिति चेन्न ; देवोऽहं मनुष्योऽहमिति सामानाधिकरण्यदर्शनात् । देवमनुष्यादेः शब्दस्य च नेन्द्रियादिवाचित्वम् ; देवस्य चक्षुर्मनुष्यस्य चक्षुरिति व्यतिरेकनिर्देशात् । देवस्य देह इत्यपि निर्देशो दृश्यत इति चेन्न ; देहापेक्षायामौपचारिकत्वात् , आत्मापेक्षायां वा निष्कर्षकत्वात् नीलस्य पटस्य गुण इतिवत् । चक्षुरादयोऽपि सन्तु निष्कर्षकाः, व्यतिरेको[1] वा तेषामौपचारिक इति चेन्न ; चक्षुश्श्रोत्रादीनां सर्वेषां तथात्वे पर्यायत्वप्रसङ्गात् कायदेहादिवत् । नानासामानाधिकरण्यात्तत्तन्निष्कर्षकनानाशब्दा······[न्वितदेवादिशब्दार्थस्य] एकत्वे तस्य पूर्वपूर्वानुपमर्देन प्रतीयमाननानात्मत्व(?)सामानाधिकरण्यानुपपत्तेः । नानात्वे चात्मनां प्रत्ये······[कानुभूतप्रतिसन्धाना] भावप्रसङ्गात् , न देवादिशब्दाः श्रोत्रादिषु भेदेनैव प्रथमानेऽप्येकस्यैव व्युत्पत्त्या साधारणा वर्तितुमर्हन्ति । न च तेषामिन्द्रियत्वमेकं रूपमर्थ इति वाच्यम् ; मनुष्यपिण्डादिशब्दानां पर्यायत्वप्रसङ्गात्[2]; तेष्विन्द्रियाणां भेदाप्रतिपत्तेः देहभेदस्यैव तत्र प्रतीतेः । इन्द्रियाणाञ्चाहमर्थत्वे प्रतिनियतविषयत्वेन तेषां मिथःप्रतिसन्धानानुप-

१. देवस्य चक्षुरित्येवं व्यतिरेकनिर्देश इत्यर्थः ।

२. देवस्य चक्षुरित्यादिवत् मनुष्यस्य चक्षुरित्यादिप्रयोगाद्देवशब्दस्येव मनुष्यादिशब्दस्यापीन्द्रियवाचित्वात्पर्यायत्वप्रसङ्गः । न च तस्य तस्य विभिन्नेन्द्रियवाचित्वादपर्यायत्वम् ; तत्र तत्र देहभेदेऽपि इन्द्रियभेदाभावादिति ।

पत्तिः । मनस्तु प्रतिसन्धत्तामिति चेन्न; तस्य का (क?) रणत्वात् । व्यासङ्गयुक्ते(:?) स्मृतिकरणत्वेन वा सिद्धत्व(त्वाद ?) स्य कर्तृत्वायोगात् । अतः किमत्र विस्तरेण ?

अस्तु इन्द्रियातिरिक्तोऽहमर्थः, प्राणस्तु स्यात्; स खल्वेक एव वृत्तिभेदाद्भिद्यत-इति चेन्न; तस्यापि देवादिशब्दगोचरत्वात्[1] । देहवैजात्ये वैजात्यानुपलम्भेन प्रतिनियत-शब्दगोचरत्वाभावात्[2] । निष्क्रिये शरीरे सक्रिये प्राणेऽहमर्थस्य निष्क्रियत्वप्रतीतेश्च । बुद्धिस्तु बा (सा ?) ध्यत्वेन प्रतीयत इति साहसम्[3] । आश्रयाश्रय(यि ?) त्वरूपकर्तृत्वक्रि-यात्वयोरेकत्वा (त्रा ?) नुपपत्तेः । ततो द्वितीयापि बुद्धिरित्यवशिष्यते । न च सा सवि-षया; गोचरान्तराप्रतीतेः । अप्रतीतस्य च विषयत्वकल्पनानुपपत्तेः । निर्विषयाया बुद्धित्वं स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमेव । तत्तु सिद्धान्ती वक्ष्यति । तस्मादिन्द्रियमनःप्राणबुद्धीनाम-नात्मत्वे सिद्धे देह एवात्मेति युक्तम् ।

अत्राह परः कश्चित्—अस्ति तस्यैवाहमिति प्रतीतेः (तिः ?) । न हि स्थूलोऽहं कृशोऽहमित्यत्रार्थान्तरमहमाद्याकारस्सम्भवति; मम शरीरं स्थूलमिति व्यतिरेकदर्शनात् । तत्राहम्प्रत्ययो भ्रान्तिरिति चेत्; तर्हि ममात्मा वेत्तीति व्यतिरेकदर्शनादात्मनो वेदितुरप्य-र्थान्तरमहमर्थः किन्नेष्यते ? तत्रौपचारिको भ्रान्तिरेव न दृष्टत्वात्....[भ्रान्तिनिबन्धनो वा दृष्टत्वादसौ व्यतिरे] कनिर्देश इति चेत्, इहाप्येवमस्तु । नैवम्, वेदनानुपपत्तेरिति चेन्न; न हि दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नं नाम ।

उपपत्त्या शरीरस्य दृष्टचैतन्यवारणम् (णे ?) ।
अनुमानादनुष्णेषु पर्वं[4] (परं ?) (स्पर्शि?) तेन्द्र(तेज?)स्सुसिद्ध्यति[5] ॥

१. इन्द्रियात्मपक्षे तस्येव प्राणस्याप्यस्मिन् मते देवादिशब्दवाच्यत्वस्यावश्यकत्वादित्यर्थः ।

२. प्रतिनियतशब्दगोचरत्वायोगादित्यर्थः ।

३. बुद्धेस्साध्यात्मना ज्ञाधात्वर्थत्वेन प्रतीयमानतया तस्या आत्मत्ववचनं साहसमित्यर्थः ।

४. सर्पं० पा०

५. तेजस्युष्णस्पर्शमस्वीकृत्य तदाश्रयतया परमपि तत्र साध्येतेति भावः ।

देहो जानातीति नोपलभ्यत इति चेन्न; भेदासिद्धावात्मान्तरपर्यवसानस्यासिद्धेः अयं त्वात्मशब्दो देहवचन इत्येव पश्यतु भवान्। ज्ञानाधिकरणत्वाय चात्मान्तरान्वेषणम्; अस्यैव ज्ञातृत्वनिर्वाहे किमर्थान्तरगवेषणया ? भवत्सिद्धान्तवासनाविपर्यासविधुरा[1]: कतिचित्प्रामाणिकास्तु देहो जानातीत्यपि प्रतिपद्येरन्नेव। तथापि .... [पदार्था] न्तरेषु .... [भौतिकेषु] चैतन्यानुपलम्भादभावे सिद्धे कथं तज्जातीये देहे तत्स्वभाव इति चेत्; न तावदयं स्वभाववादिनो दोषः; सर्वस्य दर्शनादर्शनाभ्यामेव तथा तथा व्यवस्थापनादनुमानप्रचाराभावात्; व्यवहारस्य सम्भावनामात्रेणापि सिद्धेः। अत एव हि क्वचित्क्वचिद्व्यवहरमाणानां विसंवादसम्भवः। न हि व्यवस्थिते तदवकाशः।

भवतामपि यद्येषा व्याप्तिस्सिद्ध्येत्प्रमाणतः।
अदृष्टमपि काष्ठादौ चैतन्यं सूक्ष्ममिष्यताम्॥

शरीरेषु चैतन्योपलम्भात्, इतरत्रानुपलम्भेऽपि जातिभेदेनौषधिषु रूपरसादिविशेषवत्तत्रैव तदिति व्यवस्था युक्ता। गुणावान्तरजात्या रूपरसादिमात्रस्य सजातीयेष्व(षु ?) सिद्धस्यावान्तरभेदमात्रं तथा व्यवस्थापनमर्हतीति चेन्न; तथापि दर्शनानुगुण्येन देहचैतन्यसिद्ध्यर्थं भूतान्तरेषु सूक्ष्मचैतन्यं कल्प्यताम्। न तु तत्रादर्शनादृष्टबाधः। यद्येवं नेष्यते, कथं तर्हि पृथिव्यां रसादिस्समवेयात् ? पृथिव्येकदेशभूतशिलादिषु रसाद्यनुपलम्भादपृथिव्यात्मकाश्शर्करादयो भवेयुरायुष्मताम्। यदि च दर्शनानुसारेण शिलादिष्वपि तज्जातीयतया सूक्ष्मतत्तद्गुणसद्भावकल्पना, एवमिहापि।

न च गुणावान्तरजात्यां सजातीयेषु सिद्ध(द्धिः ?)दोषाय। एकभूतगुणेष्वेव सा व्याप्तिः। अनियमात्। चैतन्यं तु समुदायगुणः। न हि वैशेषिकवदेकाभूतारब्धं शरीरमभ्युपेमः। पाञ्चभौतिकं हि शरीरमुपलभामहे। न च तथा सति मृतशरीरेऽपि चैतन्यप्रसङ्गः; तस्य सङ्घातान्तरत्वात्। रक्तादिधातुवच्चैतन्यस्यापि तत्र नाशाभ्युपगमात्। अतो मदशक्तिवत्प्रत्येकादृष्टमपि समुदाये दृष्टमभ्युपगम्यताम्।

१. वासनाधीनविपरीतज्ञानरहिता इत्यर्थः।

स (न ?) च सङ्घातत्वादिना पारार्थ्यानुमानमचेतनत्वानुमानं वा ; कालात्ययापदेशात् । कथञ्चित्परार्थत्वमात्रेऽपि सिद्धसाधनत्वात्। न च देहस्य चेतनत्वे प्रतिसन्धानानुपपत्तिः बाल्युवाद्यवस्थाभेदेन भिन्नत्वादिति वाच्यम् ; एकत्वेनैव तत्रापि प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वात् । एवमेव हि मीमांसकानामभ्युपगमः । अत एव मात्रानुभूतस्य पुत्रेण स्मरणप्रसङ्गोऽप्युपकार नियमः(म्यः ?) तयोरेकत्वाभावात् । एकवस्य(त्र?) च तस्यानपायात् । तस्माद्य (त्किञ्चित्प्र-देशा ?) पायेऽपि तत्तत्प्रवे(दे ?)शानुभूतस्मरणोपपत्तिः ; यतः शिरःपादादिदेशभेदेन सुख-दुःखानुभवेऽप्यवयविनस्तत्र तत्र व्याप्त्या तत्समवायाविरोधः ॥

न च देहस्य जन्मान्तरदृष्टस्मरणानुपपत्त्या प्रथमप्रवृत्त्यसिद्धावुत्तरोत्तरसर्वव्यवहार-विलयश्शङ्कनीयः ; तत्तत्सुखदुःखानुभवसमनन्तरजनितयादृच्छिकप्रवृत्तिविशेषेष्वन्वयव्यति-रेकाभ्यां हेतुसाद्धया(द्ध्य ?)भावावगमपूर्वकं सर्वव्यवहारोपपत्तेः । न हि निपुणावलोकित-समस्ततत्त्वाद्याश्च तीव्रदुःखानुभवे तत्परिहारौपयिकमेव देहव्यापारमातन्वते ; किं पुनर्बालाः । अत एव केषाञ्चित् स्तन्यपानादिव्यापारासन्निपाते विपत्तिर्भवति । प्रायेण च स्वरसवाहिप्राणादियोगवशेन शरीरचेष्टाः स्वाभाविक्यस्तथा तथा दृश्यन्ते । बुद्धितीव्रत्वादि-योगविशेषोऽपि स्वभावभेदादेवोपपद्यते । स्वसामग्रीसमवधानञ्च सहकार्युपनायकसामग्र्यन्तरा-धीनम् । तदपि तथेति नादृष्टतत्समवायिकल्पना(वि?)कल्पनावकाशः । अतश्शरीरस्यैव प्रत्येमुः प्रत्येतव्यादव्यतिरेकात् प्रमितिव(द?)शाया महमिति भासमानस्यात्मत्वं नार्थन्तरस्येति युक्तं पश्यामः ॥

अत्रोच्यते—

पाणी पादौ च नाहं न च भवति सुखं तेषु मय्येवं[1] दृष्टं
प्रत्येकं चेतनाश्चेत्करतदवयवा नैकतन्त्रा भवेयुः ।

१. मय्येव—अहमर्थ एव

तत्रात्मत्वं न सिद्धयेदवयविनि नतद्भेदमभ्येति तेभ्यः
देवादौ प्रत्यवस्ता स्मृ (प्रत्यवस्थं म ?) तिरपि[1] न भवेदेकदेशानुषङ्गात् ॥

अहंप्रत्ययगोचरो ज्ञाता, स एवात्मेत्यत्र तावद्भवतामविवाद एव । तत्र (न ता ?) तावत् देहावयवाश्चेतयन्ते, तेषामहमिति भानाभावात् । न हि कश्चिदहं पाणिः अहं पाद इति वा प्रतिपद्यते , ततोऽहंत्वाभावात्तेषु ज्ञानाभावः ।

[2]शिरःपादादिषु सुखदुःखे समवेतः, पादे मे सुखं, शिरसि मे सुखमित्युपलम्भात् । अतस्तत्समानाधिकरणं तदात्मकं वा ज्ञानमपि तत्रैवेत्युचितम् । नैतद्युक्तम् ; यतस्तत्रास्मदर्थस्य सुखसमवायित्वम् । नह्यस्मदर्थमपहायान्यसमवेतं सुखमध्यक्षमनुभूयत इति कस्य चिद्भ्रान्तिरपास्ता भवति। अतो 'मे सुखम्' इति समवायिनि सिद्धे, बहुप्रदेशत्वात्तस्य, कुत्रेत्याकांक्षायामुपलक्षणतया पादादिव्यपदेश इति । अत्रास्मन्मते अणुरेवात्मा सुखमप्यनुकूलवेदनात्मकं तस्मिन्नेव स्थितमपि तत्तदनुकूलस्पर्शादिविषयदेश···[सम्बन्धिप्रदेश] विशेषितं तथानुभूयते । अत एव हि गीतादिसुखं न श्रोत्रादिस्थमुपलभ्यते, शब्दस्य तद्देशतयानुपलम्भात् । यदि ह्यस्मदर्थः पादादिरेव स्यात्, वैयधिकरण्यमेव न स्यात् । अतोऽवयवेषु सुखासमवायात् तन्मुखेनापि चैतन्यसमवायो दुरुपपादः ॥

अपि चावयवाश्चेत्प्रत्येकं चेतयन्ते, ततस्स्वार्था एव भवेयुः। न हि चेतनस्स्वप्रयोजनमपहायार्थान्तरे प्रयतते । अतः स्वप्रयोजनापेक्षिष्वितरपराङ्मुखेषु मिथस्साभ्यसूयेषु च हस्तपादादिष्ववयवेषु एकग्रामवासिषु पुरुषेष्विव महान् विवादस्स्यात् । ग्रामीणानन्तपुरुषव्यवहारास्सर्व एवैकशरीरे प्रसज्येरन् । न च निर्विकल्पकज्ञानमात्रा (मात्रज्ञाना अ?) वयवा इति युक्तम् ; प्रवृत्तिविरोधात् , सुखादिव्यवहारानिर्वाहाच्च । यस्य खल्ववयवस्य चेष्टा दृश्यते तस्य चेष्टानुरूपप्रयत्नचिकीर्षाज्ञानसमवायाभावे तदनुपपत्तेः । ज्ञानविशेषरूपाणां

१. अवयवेभ्योऽवयविनो भेदाभावेऽप्यवयवव्यवस्थामात्रे ज्ञानमित्यपि न भवति । अवयवानुषङ्गदोषतादवस्थ्यादित्यर्थः स्यात ; उपरि तदुक्तेः । शुद्धपाठो निरीक्ष्यः ।

२. शङ्कते—शिर इति

वा तेषां प्रवृत्तिकारणत्वेन प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात्। न चावयविन्येव समवेतानामेषामवयवव्यापार-हेतुत्वमिति वाच्यम्, ज्ञानमात्रस्यापि तथाभावप्रसङ्गात्। अस्त्वेवमिति चेत्, तत्र वक्ष्यामः। अपि च (अयञ्च ?) प्रादेशिकस्सार्वत्रिको वावयविगुणश्चैतन्यादिः। न ताव-त्प्रादेशिकः; प्रदेशभूतावयवासमवेतस्य प्रादेशिकत्वानुपपत्तेः। न च सार्वत्रिकः; सर्वत्र चेष्टादिप्रसङ्गात्।

भेदाग्रहादवयवानां परस्परकार्यभेदानध्यवसाय इति स्थवीयः; अवयवानां मिथो भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात्। नाप्यवयविभेदाग्रहो युक्तः; अवयवकर्तृकस्यावयवि-भेदाग्रहस्यावयवान्तरभेदाभेदयोरकिञ्चित्करत्वात्। अवयवान्तरे चावयविनो भेदाग्रहेऽवय-विन एव नानात्वेन प्रतीतिस्स्यात्, अद्वैतिनामिवाहमर्थभेदवादिनामात्मनः। अवयवि-कर्तृकोऽवयवभेदाग्रहोऽप्यवयवानां स्वातन्त्र्यं द्विगुणयति। स ह्यवयवभेदभिन्नमात्मानमनु-सन्दधानो रागद्वेषाभ्यामाभिमानिकभेदगोचराभ्यां व्याहन्यतैवाद्वैतिनामेव, यथा ब्रह्मेति।

एकावयविपरिग्रहस्त्वेकग्रामपरिग्रहादिवदन्योन्यस्पर्धाविच्छेदाय नात्यन्ताय प्रभवति। एकावयविशेषतया सर्वेषां तदवयवानामविवादः भव...[न्म]त....[इव] मुक्तात्मवदिति चेत्, नैतदपि साधीयः; अहंत्वमादिभावेनावयवानां मिथो भेददर्शनानुपलम्भात्। संसारे हि न तावदेकश्चेतनश्चेतनान्तरमध्यक्षमीक्षते; देहान्तरेऽपि प्रसङ्गात्। न हि हस्तः पादं पादो वा हस्तमुभौ वावयवी सम्बोधयन् दृश्यते, दूरे शेषशेषिभावावबोधः। अपि च तेषामेवावयवानां नावयवस्या (नानावयव्या ?) रम्भकत्वेन नाशानुत्पादावस्थावयविबाहु-ल्यात् तत्तत्तादर्थ्यालाभनिमित्तदुःखबाहुल्यं प्रसज्येत। न च तत्प्रतिसन्धीयते। काला-न्तरारभ्यावयविनामेकनियमाभावाच्च नानावयवानां तत्तत्पारार्थ्यकृतविप्रतिपत्तिः पूर्ववदेव प्रसज्येत। अतो नैकशेष (षि ?) परिग्रहादप्यैकार्थ्यम्। एवञ्च सर्वदा कार्यचिन्ताचतुरैरव-यवैरवयव्यनुवर्तनं क्रियत इति राजसामन्तवार्तामवयवेषु सञ्चारयन्नशेषलोकापहास्य इति कृतमत्र विस्तरेण। अतस्सिद्धमवयवा न चेतयन्त इति।

१. प्रत्यक्षाभिन्नज्ञानेन विषयीकरोतीत्यर्थः।

ननु किमनेनाप्रस्तुतोपालम्भेन ? न हि शरीरवत्तदवयवांश्च स्वतन्त्रांश्चेतनानातिष्ठान (म?)(मह?) इति चेत्सत्यम् ; तथाप्यनेन प्रपञ्चेन तस्यैव मूले निहितः कुठारः । तथाहि— यदा तावदवयवेषु चैतन्यसम्भावना नास्पदाना (नास्पदं?) लभते तदा कैव कथावयविनि ? न हि कारणमन्तरेण कार्यमुदयमासादयति । अवयविगतविशेषगुणानामवयवगतैरेव हि तज्जातीयैरुत्पादः । गुणश्चा (कारणश्चा ?) (इदश्चा?) वयवारब्धद्रव्यान्तरावयव्यभ्युपगमे वक्तव्यम् । यदा तावदवयवा एव कश्चिद्विशेषमापन्ना अवयवी, नार्थान्तरम् ; तदावयवचैतन्यनिरासमात्रेण चरितार्थता । नह्यवयवातिरिक्तमवयविनं पश्यामः । अत एव ह्यवयवास्संश्लेषविशेषमापन्ना एकोऽवयवीति प्रतिपद्यते । तत्र यद्गुणैरवयवैर्योऽवयव्यारभ्यते, तद्गुण एवासौ नान्यादृशः । न च स्थूलस्यै(त्वै ?)कत्ववदवयविभाव एव चैतन्यमुत्पद्यत इति वाच्यम् ; तस्यावयवित्वनिर्वाहकत्वाभावात् । तथात्वे वा स्थूलत्वैकत्ववत्सर्वावयविष्वनुवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात् ॥

अपि चावयव्यवस्थायामेव भवतु नाम चैतन्यम् ; तथापि अवयवेष्वेव तस्य वृत्तेः पूर्वोक्तेर्ष्यादिदोषस्तदवस्थ एव ; आश्रयान्तराभावात् । द्वित्वादिवद्यद्यपि साधारणमेकमेव चैतन्यं ; तथापि तेन स्वात्मानं नानाभूतं प्रतिपद्येरन्नेव । तत्र यथा द्वयोरिदमिति निर्दिष्टं फलं द्वित्वाधिकरणयोस्तयोरेव, तथा चैतन्यफलभागित्वमपि चैतन्याधिकरणानां तेषामेवेति सर्वं पूर्वोक्तं तदवस्थमेव । नहि साधारणफलसिद्धये कश्चिदेको विनाशावधि व्याप्रियते । अपिच यो गुणो यस्मिन्नवयविनि समवेतः, तद्गुणावान्तरजात्या तज्जातीयगुणवन्तस्तदवयवाः पृथग्भूताश्चेति दृष्टम् । यदि तज्जातीयगुणोऽवयवेषु नास्ति कथं तस्यावयव्यवस्थायां तेषु वृत्तिरुपपद्यते । अतश्चैतन्यमात्रस्यावयवेषु निवृत्तेरवयविनि चैतन्यनिरासः । एवं प्रयत्नादेरपि द्रष्टव्यम् ।

एतेन प्रत्येकासमवेतमपि भूतेषु चैतन्यं शरीराख्यसङ्घाते जायते मदशक्तिवत्, चूर्णहरिद्रासंयोगजरागविशेषवद्वेति प्रत्युक्तम् । तत्रापि गुणावान्तरजात्या तज्जातीयगुणस्य तदवयवेषु विद्यमानत्वात्

ननु च....[यदि त]व तमोद्रव्यं परिणामविशेष(षे ?)ण महदहंकारतन्मात्राभूत-

पञ्चकरूपमवतिष्ठत इति सिद्धान्तः ; तदा गन्धस्य नाप्सु, रसस्य न तेजसि, रूपस्य न वायावित्यादिक्रमेण कारणेषु कार्यगुणस्य समवायो नाभ्युपेतः । तत्तपूर्वावस्थं तदेव हि द्रव्य_मुत्तरोत्तरगुणवत्तालक्षणावस्थाविशेषमासाद्य पृथिव्यादिभावमनुभवति । तथावयवेबु कारणेष्व_समवेतमपि चैतन्यमवयविनि जायताम्, किन्नोपपद्यते इति चेत्; न तावदिदमागमावसेयम्; तद्विरुद्धत्वात् । देहातिरिक्तः कर्मफलभोक्ता ज्ञानानन्दमयोऽपहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणक-परमात्मशरीरभूतोऽपृथक्सिद्धतया तच्छरीरभूतो जीव इति वेदागमप्रसिद्धिः । प्रकृतिपरि-णामविशेषस्तु प्रमाणान्तरागोचरश्शब्दैकसमधिगम्य इति तथैवेष्यते । तत्रापि सावयवस्य नावयवासमवेतगुणाधिकरणत्वमस्ति । तत्र पुनरवयवेषु पूर्वं तदानीमप्यविद्यमानमवय विनि संपद्यतामिति सकलप्रमाणतर्कविरुद्धं को नाम श्रद्दध्यात्?

यत्तु शरीरचैतन्यसिद्ध्यर्थमन्यत्रापि सूक्ष्मचैतन्यं कल्प्यतामित्युक्तम्; तदपि कल्पक(कं?)(नं?)शरीरावयवचैतन्यनिरासेन प्रत्युक्तमिति वेदितव्यम् । अवयवेष्वतिसूक्ष्म-चैतन्यमस्त्विवतिचेन्न; अवयव(वि?)गुणविजातीयस्यावयवगुणविशेषस्य द्रव्यान्तरावयव (वि?) पक्षास्मत्पक्षयोरविशेषेणानुपपत्तेः । तन्तुपटादिषु शौक्ल्यादेस्तीव्रत्वादिरविशिष्ट एव । न हि तन्तुषु मसृणशौक्ल्येषु पटस्तीव्रशौक्ल्य इति युज्यते ।

यत्तु भूतसमुदायरूपशरीरगुणस्य प्रत्येकसमवायानपेक्षेति, तदपि प्रत्येकसमवायानपे-क्षायामप्यवयवसमवायान(?) पेक्षा दुर्निवारेति निरस्तम् । न चानुपलभ्यमानानां (नना?) नाश्र-यचैतन्य....[तत्सौक्ष्म्यादि] कल्पनादाश्रयन्तरकल्पनं गरीयः । प्रत्युत स्फुटप्रतीयमाननिगा (निर्भागा?) हंप्रत्ययवेद्यचेतनस्य देहात्पृथग्भावमात्रमतिलाघवात्प्रत्येतव्य....[म् । यत्तु (यस्तु] पृथिवीविशेषेषु गन्धादिविशेषकल्पनं दृष्टान्तः, (तत?) सूक्ष्मतरतमादिभावेन क्रमेण तद्गुणानामुपलम्भात् नात्यन्ताय कल्पनमेवेति विशेषः । यत्त्वनुमानादिप्रामाण्यानभ्युपग-मात्सर्वमिदमनर्थकमिति, तत् प्रतिज्ञाविरुद्धम्, सर्वस्यानभ्युपगमादित्यादिहेतूपन्यासादित्या-दिना प्रामाण्यसमर्थनप्रकरणे प्रत्युक्तम् । अतो देहातिरिक्तश्चेतनः ।

अपि च

कार्यकारणभावे सत्यन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ।
संस्कारोन्मेषसिद्ध्यर्थं दृ(र्थमदृ ?)ष्टं सिद्धमात्मनि ॥

कार्यस्य सर्वस्य कादाचित्कत्वात्पूर्वावध्यपेक्षयां पूर्वस्य चावधेः किञ्चिज्जातीयस्य तत्तत्कार्यजातीयादन्वयव्यतिरेकवत्तया नियतत्वात्कारणत्वसिद्धो (द्धौ?) भवति कस्यचिदपरिदृश्यमानकारणस्यापि कारणापेक्षा। तत्र फलं पुंसां प्रवृत्तेः। सा चेच्छया। इच्छा च ज्ञानेनेति दृश्यते। तच्च ज्ञानं प्रमितिस्स्मृतिर्वा भवति। तत्र स्मृतिरननुभूतानि (तान्नि ?) वर्तमानाऽनुभूतिमपेक्षते। सा च संस्कारद्वारेण कारणं, चिरं निवृत्तत्वात्। संस्कारश्चोद्बोधमपेक्षते। अनन्तेषु पूर्वानुभूतेषु केषाञ्चिदेव सदृशदर्शनादिलब्धोद्बोधसंस्काराणां स्मृतिदर्शनात्। इतरथा सर्वस्मरणप्रसङ्गात्। उद्बोधश्च संस्कारस्य क्वचिदन्वयव्यतिरेकवद्भिर्दृष्टैः[1]। यत्र तु न किञ्चित्कारणं दृश्यते, यथा किं कर्तव्यमिदानीमिति समानकार्येषु बहुषु चिन्तया तेषु कस्यचित्[2]समीचीनम्, तत्रादृष्टमेव कारणं भवितुमर्हति। तत्तददृष्टविशेषलब्धोद्बोधसंस्कारजनितान्वयव्यतिरेकस्मरणप्रभवं हि तत्तत्कार्यज्ञानम्। तच्चादृष्टमस्मिन्नेव शरीरे संपादित (सम्भावित?) (सम्पाद्यता?) मिति न युक्तम्; समानदेशस्थानां समानाभ्यासानामेव पुरुषाणामन्योन्यविलक्षणविचित्रस्मरणपाटवात्। तत् तत्संस्कारोन्मेषकारणभूतादृष्टाधिकरणतया शरीरातिरिक्तात्मसिद्धिः।

अपि चैकस्मिन्नेव जन्मन्यभ्यासातिशयो वैशद्यमप्रमोषञ्च करोतीति व्याप्तमुपलब्धम्। तदेतदुभयमिह जन्मन्यलब्धाभ्यासं जन्मान्तराभ्यासमनुमापयति। दृश्यते हि कस्यचिद्विषयविशेषे स्मृतिवैशद्यमप्रमोषश्च। यतः कर्तव्या (काव्या ?) नि विरचयति; न शास्त्रार्थमल्पमप्यवगच्छति। अपि चातिसूक्ष्मं शास्त्रार्थमवगच्छति; न किञ्चिदपि कवयितुं शक्नोति। शास्त्रेष्वपि कश्चिद्व्याकरणे प्रगल्भते, अन्यस्तु मीमांसायाम्। अपरश्च न्यायतर्के। एवं चित्रास्स्मृत्यादिशक्तयः प्रतिनियतविषयाश्च तत्तद्विषयाभ्यासमन्तरेणालब्धात्मान-

१. इयं पञ्चमी.

२. तेषु मध्ये किञ्चिद्विषयकमेव ज्ञानमित्यर्थः।

स्तमनुमापयन्ति । स यस्य, असौ जन्मान्तरस्थायी शरीरातिरिक्त इति सिद्धयति । न चात्र दृष्टाहारादिसामग्रीपरम्पराश्रयणेन समाधातुं शक्यम्; अभ्यास एव वैशद्यप्रमोषयोः कारणमित्यन्वयव्यतिरेकदर्शनात् तदन्यथाकरणेनादृष्टचरकारणान्तरकल्पनानुपपत्तेः । दृष्टस्य शरीरावस्थादेः, तन्मूलस्याहारविशेषस्य च व्यभिचारित्वात् । यत्तु केषाञ्चिदाहारणां.... [वैशद्यादि] (स्मृत्यादि?) हेतुत्वमायुर्वेदसिद्धमिति स्मर्यते, तदपि जन्मान्तरस्थायिन्यात्मनि संस्काराधारे सिद्धे स्मृतिसमर्थमनःप्रणिधानादियोग्यदेहधातुसाम्यादिहेतुत्वेनेति द्रष्टव्यम् । अन्यथा तन्मात्रहेतुत्वे व्यभिचाराभावप्रसङ्गात्[1] ।

तथा प्रथमप्रवृत्त्यन्यथानुपपत्त्यापि जन्मान्तरसिद्धिः । तत्र यदुक्तं यादृच्छिकं प्रथमकर्मेति, तत् चेष्टात्वाङ्गीकारेणान्यथा वा? न तावच्चेष्टायाः प्रयत्नवाञ्छाबुद्धिमाला-मन्तरेणोत्पत्तिर्युक्ता । अचेष्टारूपा तु क्रिया पुलकस्वेदादिवदुपजायमाना नास्माभिरनु-मानतया वर्ण्यते । शरीरपारार्थ्यादिप्रतिपादनार्थमनुमानजालमत्रानुसन्धेयम् । देहचैतन्ये प्रतिसन्धानमपि[2]............आत्मन्यपि समानमेतत् । यत् स्मरणे बहिरिन्द्रियानपेक्षत्वमिति चेन्न; अनुभवेऽपि प्राप्तिमन्तरेणानुग्रहार्थं तदनपेक्षणात् । इदं[3]....हापि प्राप्त्यर्थमवयवापे-क्षेति न वाच्यम्; अवयविसंयोगस्यैवाव्यभिचारिणः प्राप्तत्वात् । अत एवंविधकल्पना-मन्तरेणापि हि स्मरणादिव्यवस्था सिद्धान्त उपपद्यते ।

मम शरीरमिति च ज्ञानमात्मनि शरीरातिरिक्ते प्रमाणम् । न च शरीरशब्दः स्वरूपवचनः; लोष्टादावपि प्रसङ्गात् । यत्तु शिलापुत्रकस्य शरीरमिति प्रयोगः, सोऽप्यौ-पचारिक एव; पुत्रत्वारोपेण प्रवृत्तत्वात् । ममात्मेति व्यतिरेकनिर्देशो मम स्वरूपमितिवद्द्र-ष्टव्यः । आत्मशब्दो ह्यनेकवचनः ।

१. तादृशाहारे सत्यप्यभ्यासाभावे स्मृतिवैशद्यादेरदर्शनेन व्यभिचारस्य स्पष्टतया व्यभि-चाराभावस्यानिष्टत्वादिति भावः ॥

२. अत्र पत्रमेकं पतितमिति मातृकासु लिखितमस्ति

३. इहापि. पा.

स्वप्नावस्थायाञ्चोपन(र ?) तेषु बहिरिन्द्रियेषु योऽहमिति प्रत्यक्षं[1] प्रमीयते, नासौ देहो भवितुमर्हति ; तस्य बहिरिन्द्रियगोचरत्वात् । अन्तःकरणगोचरत्वमपि ज्ञानोपधानेन तस्यैवेति चेन्न ; तस्य स्मृतिमन्तरेण स्वातन्त्र्यवि(न्त्र्यायो ?)योगात् । तच्चात्मनः स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वात्, ज्ञानस्य च ज्ञानान्तरापे (रानपे?) क्षत्वेन स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वात् । ज्ञानावान्तरभेदा-(दत्वा?) च्चेच्छादीनामन्तःकरणस्य शक्तिकल्पनायां प्रमाणाभावादिति सिद्धमन्यत्र । शरीरस्य त्वात्मनः स्वप्रकाशत्वमयुक्तम्; शरीरावस्थानिबन्धनत्वे सावयवप्रकाशप्रसङ्गात् । द्रव्यमात्रनिबन्धनत्वे त्वशरीरावस्थायां भूतान्तरे प्रसङ्गात्, सर्वस्य च सर्वदा सङ्कोचानुपपत्तेः । उपवीतो (उपाधितो?) हि सङ्कोचो न स्वतः ॥

किञ्च

शरीरमेव चेदात्मा विश्वलोकप्रवृत्तयः ।
अदृष्टार्था न सिद्ध्येयुर्विश्ववैचित्र्यमेव च ॥

सर्वेषां हि बहुविदां पुरुषाणामदृष्टार्थाः प्रायस्संवादिन्यः प्रवृत्तयः । योग्यानुपलब्धिकृत-दृष्टहेतुचक्रस्यादृष्टमेव कारणं भवितुमर्हति । अतो ज्ञातृत्वेनाहम (मिति?) प्रसिद्धश्शरीरातिरिक्त आत्मेति सिद्धम् ॥

अत्र केचिदाहुः—प्रत्यगर्थ एवात्मा ; न ज्ञाता अहमर्थः, तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वायोगात् । संविदधीनसिद्धिकं हि सर्वं वस्तुजातम् । संविदो व्यतिरिच्यमानं परागर्थः । संवित्तु स्वात्मसिद्ध्यर्थमनन्यापेक्षा स्वात्मनश्चाव्यतिरिच्यमाना प्रत्यगर्थः । बहिः प्रकाशते परागर्थः अन्तः प्रत्यगर्थ इति हि तद्विवेकविदः । अन्तः स्वयं चाव्यतिरेके[2] पर्यवस्यति । संविदपेक्षया-चाव्यतिरेकस्संविद एवेति न संवेदिता प्रत्यगर्थः । सोऽपि स्वात्मापेक्षयाऽव्यतिरिक्त एवेति

१. इदं क्रियाविशेषणं, प्रत्यक्षप्रमितिविषयो भवतीत्यर्थः ।

२. अन्तश्शब्दः स्वयंशब्दश्चेत्यर्थः

चेन्न ; घटादयोऽपि स्वात्मापेक्षया न व्यतिरिच्यन्त इति तेऽपि तथा भवेयुः। तथापि ते स्वसिद्धिभूतां संविदमपेक्ष्य बहिर्भूता इति चेत् ; एवं संवेदितापीति पश्यतु भवान्।

अत्रोच्यते—

प्रत्यक्त्वं ज्ञातुरेव स्यान्न ज्ञानेऽप्युपपद्यते।
यस्मै प्रकाशते सर्वं तत्प्रत्यगिति तद्विदः ॥

संवेद्यं स्वप्रकाशञ्च जगद्द्वेधा प्रकाशते।
स्वप्रकाशे ह्यनन्यार्थे प्रत्यक्त्वमिति निश्चयः ॥

जडेषु घटादिभावेषु दृगधीनसिद्धिषु परात्त्वं दृग्व्यतिरेकमात्रकृतं तादृक् तादर्थ्य (उत दृक्तादर्थ्या?)भावकृतमिति विवेचनीयम्। यस्य हि विपक्षे बाधकस्तर्कोऽस्ति स एव प्रामाणिक पक्षः। यदि हि दृग्व्यतिरेकमात्रात्परात्त्वं दृक्तादर्थ्याभावेऽपि दृशि प्रत्यक्त्वं स्यात्। तस्याश्चात्मत्वे पुरुषार्थभाजनत्वायोग्यत्वाद्बन्धमोक्षौ नात्मन इत्यापद्येत। दृक्तादर्थ्यं हि पुरुषार्थभागित्वे निदानम्। यस्मै सुखं वा स एव सुखी वेति गीयते? यस्य सुखं भासते, स एवेति चेन्न; तस्यापि तस्मै प्रकाशमानस्यैव तत्त्वम्। इतरथा जडस्यापि सुखित्वप्रसङ्गः। तदनुकूलमपि हि कश्चिच्चेतनः प्रतिपद्यते। अनुकूलवेदनीयमेव हि सुखम्। तद्विधतिर्वा[1] (यद्वा?) परेण ज्ञायमानपुत्रजन्मनः पुत्रिणस्तदजानतोऽपि सुखित्वप्रसङ्गः। अतः तत्प्रतियोगिकं तदर्थज्ञानगोचरश्चानुकूलं सुखं, तथाविधं प्रतिकूलं दुःखं, तत्प्रतियोगिकानुकूलज्ञानं वा तादर्थ्यविशेषितं सुखम्, तथाविधं प्रतिकूलज्ञानं वा दुःखमिति सुखदुःखयोस्स्वरूपविवेकः। आत्मधर्मान्तररूपं सुखं दुःखं चेति भवताप्यनभ्युपगतमेव। येनापि वाभ्युपेतम्, तेनापि तदर्थप्रकाशगोचरतयैव तथेष्यते। अत एव हि जडात्मवादिनः तार्किकाग्रेसराः प्रत्येतुः प्रत्येतव्याद्व्यतिरेकः प्रत्यक्त्वमिति तल्लक्षणमाचक्षते। एतेन भवत्पक्षे बाधकप्रमाणमुक्तमित्यप्यनुसन्धातव्यम्। नचैवं क्वचित्पक्षे[2] बाधकमुत्प्रेक्षितुमपि शक्यम्,

१. तद्विदधति वा पा०.

२. तार्किकपक्षेऽस्मत्पक्षे वेत्यर्थः

परोक्ष (पराक्षु?) घटादिषु दृग्व्यतिरेकात्तत्त्वमित्यस्य विपक्षे दृशोऽपि (अदृशोऽपि?) तार्किकात्मनः प्रत्यक्त्वे दृशोऽपि धर्मभूतज्ञानस्य चा प्रत्यक्षे (त्त्वे?) न किंचिदत्र बाधकमस्ति। घटादेरपि प्रत्यक्त्वप्रसङ्गस्तार्किकपक्षे, तव त्वात्मनोऽपि परात्त्वप्रसङ्ग इति चेत् , स्यादेतदेवं, यद्यदृक्त्वादेव तार्किकः प्रत्यक्त्वं ब्रूयात्, अहं वा दृक्त्वादेव परात्त्वम्। नचैवमुभावप्यनु... (भि?) दध्वहे। प्रकाशमानस्य प्रकाशतादर्थ्यात् प्रत्यक्त्वम्। तद्व्यतिरेकात्परात्त्वम्। यथा यथं व्यतिरेकश्च विशेषणविशेष्योभयव्यतिरेकात्मना त्रिविधो द्रष्टव्यः। नचैवं सति तार्किकवद-स्मत्पक्षेऽपि प्रतीचो जडत्वप्रसङ्गः; प्रमाणान्तरेण तस्य स्वयंप्रकाशत्वसिद्धेः। तच्चोक्तमन्यत्र। एतत्सर्वमभिसन्धायाहुर्भगवद्भाष्यकारमिश्राः, 'जानामीति धर्मधर्मितया प्रत्यक्षप्रतीति-विरोधादेव' इति।

ननु चैवं सति भवत्सिद्धान्ते मोक्षस्य पारार्थ्यान (?) नुसन्धानलक्षणत्वात्परमात्मैक एव प्रत्यक्, अन्ये तु पराञ्च आत्मानः प्रसज्यन्ते इति चेन्मैवम्, तदानीमप्यात्मस्वरूपस्या-नन्याधीनप्रकाशस्य स्वस्मै भासमानत्वात्। धर्मभूतज्ञानस्यापि तस्मै भासमानत्वात्। कथमियं चतुर्थी घटते परमात्मशेषत्वादस्येति चेत्सत्यम्, तदानीं धर्मभूतज्ञानगोचरेण तद्विशिष्टेन रूपेणासौ परमात्मार्थोऽवसीयत एव। तथापि तद्विशेष्येण स्वप्रकाशेन रूपेण स्वार्थोऽवसीयते। रूपभेदाच्चाविरोधः। प्रकाशतादर्थ्यमात्रप्रयुक्तं प्रत्यक्त्वं भोक्तृत्वं च, परशेषत्वकृतं भोग्यत्वं चेत्यनवद्यमुभयमिति। प्रत्यक्त्वं चास्मदर्थः परात्त्वं युष्मदर्थः, प्रत्यक्त्वसमानाधिकरणञ्च ज्ञातृत्वं प्रत्यक्षं सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धमिति को नामास्मदर्थं पराञ्चं युष्मदर्थं प्रत्यञ्चं ब्रूयादृते देवानां प्रियात्।

अयं चात्मा कर्ता, स्वातन्त्र्यादेव यत्नं प्रति। स्वातन्त्र्यं कर्तृत्वम्। स हि तस्य क्रिया। परमात्मनीवास्मिन्नपि मुख्यं कर्तृत्वम्। अचेतनेषु केवलमुपचर्यते। इदमेव च जगद्वैचित्र्यं (त्र्य?) निदानम्। न ह्यचेतनं चेतनानधिष्ठितमेव तथा तथा परिणमते यथा-यथा सुखीवेद्या (खित्वाद्या?) पद्येत। न चेश्वरः स्वातन्त्र्येण तथा तथा परिणमयति 'समोऽहं सर्वभूतेषु, 'न मां कर्माणि लिंपन्ति न मे कर्मफले स्पृहा' 'निरञ्जनं निरवद्यम्' इत्यादि-

प्रमाणविरोधात्। अतो जीवस्वातन्त्र्यं एवं (न्त्र्यमेव?) पुण्यापुण्यद्वारेण विचित्रसुखदुःखापादकविश्वपरिणामे कारणम्।

ननु चेदं सिद्धान्तविरुद्धं बहुप्रमाणविरुद्धं च लक्ष्यते। तथा हि—विश्वप्रपञ्चशरीरः परमात्मेति सिद्धान्तः। 'यस्य आत्माशरीरं य आत्मानमन्तरोयमयति,' 'अन्तःप्रविष्टः शास्ता जनानां सर्वात्मा', इत्यादि श्रुतयश्च सर्वेषामात्मनां परमात्मशरीरतां तन्नियाम्यत्वञ्च प्रतिपादयन्ति। शरीरं चात्रापेक्षया स्वतन्त्रमिति वचनमसङ्गतम्; प्रत्यक्षविरोधात्। पारतन्त्र्यस्यैव तल्लक्षणतया तत्रैवाभिधानात्। किंच 'एषह्येवासाधु कर्म कारयति तं, यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्निनीषति। एष एवा साधु कर्म कारयति तम्, यमधो निनीषति, इत्युत्कृष्टापकृष्टगतिसाधनपुण्यापुण्यगतिकर्मसु बलाज्जीवान्परः प्रवर्तयतीति साक्षादेव श्रूयते।

स्मृतिश्च

अज्ञो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः।
ईश्वरप्रेरितो गच्छेत्स्वर्गं वा श्वभ्रमेव वा॥

ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृद्देशेऽर्जुन तिष्ठति।
भ्रामयन्सर्वभूतानि यन्त्रारूढानि मायया॥

तेषां सततयुक्तानां भजतां प्रीतिपूर्वकम्।
ददामि बुद्धियोगं तं येन मामुपयान्ति ते॥

तानहं द्विषतः क्रूरान्संसारेषु नराधमान्।
क्षिपाम्यजस्रमसुरा(शुभा)नासुरीष्वेव योनिषु॥

इत्यादिकमेवार्थं विशदयतीति। यदि च जीवस्स्वातन्त्र्येण कुर्यादीश्वरस्स्य तत्त्वमतिसंकुचितमेव स्यात्; सर्वजीवेषु तस्य निरवकाशत्वात्। ततश्च 'तमीश्वराणां परमं महेश्वरम्' इत्यादिकाः श्रुतयः प्रकुप्येयुरिति चेत्;

अत्रोच्यते—

जीवत्वाय स्वतन्त्रत्वमीश्वरायत्तमिष्यताम् ।
कर्मणां च फलं पुंसां परानुग्रहनिग्रहौ ॥

तत्र यत्तावदुक्तं शरीरत्वाज्जीवस्य परनियाम्यस्य स्वातन्त्र्यायोग इति; तत्र नियमनमेव नियाम्यस्य स्वातन्त्र्यमावहतीति ब्रूमः । यथा हि राजा भृत्यमादायामुं देशं नियच्छेति नियुङ्क्ते, राजशासनानुवर्ती च भृत्यस्स्वातन्त्र्येणानुतिष्ठति, एवमिहापि । अत्र त्वनिदंप्रथमपरात्मेच्छागोचरस्य जीवस्य तदनुरूपमनादिस्वातन्त्र्यमिति विशेषः । न हि यत्नेनैव नियमनमिति निर्बन्धः; अनुमतिदानमात्रेणापि तदुपपत्तेः । निवर्तनसमर्थस्यानुमतिरपि हि प्रवर्तनमेव । अत्र त्विच्छाधिक्यमप्यस्तीति विशेषः । नित्यस्यापि परापेक्षत्वं नित्यद्रव्याश्रितनित्यगुणवदविरुद्धमिति सर्वैरभ्युपेत्यम्[1] । ननु यदि निवर्तनसमर्थः, प्रतिषिद्धे कर्मणि प्रवर्तमानमेनं किं न निवर्तयेत्? तर्हि कूपे पतन्तमिव पुत्रमनुमन्यमानो निर्घृण इत्यापद्येत । स्यादेतदेवं, यदि साम्यमेनं न प्रतिबध्नीयात् । समस्तवस्तुनो जीवानामनुकूलप्रतिकूलयोः कर्मणोस्साधारणं स्वातन्त्र्यं दत्वा यद्यन्यतरकर्मप्रवृत्तेरर्वागेव तन्निरुन्ध्यात्, ततः स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यं जीवानां निष्फलमापद्येत । कस्मै चित्पुरुषार्थोपहितं यत्नमेव विहन्ति वि . . . यश्च मश्च(?) स्यात् ।

अथ प्रतिरूपप्रयत्नक्षणानन्तरं तत्प्रतिबन्धं निवर्तयत्विति मतम्, तदयुक्तम्; द्वितीयादिकर्मस्वनुकूलस्यापि संभवात् । तदानीमपि स्वातन्त्र्यस्यानपायात् । उपक्रमानुकूलशेषप्रवर्तनस्य मात्रयोपक्रमफलैकोटिनिक्षेपार्हत्वात् । यदि कृतस्य प्रतिकूलफलं न प्रयच्छेत्, उपक्रान्तस्य तस्य मध्ये निरोधं वा कुर्यात्, तत्र त्वपरस्यानुकूलयत्नं कृतवतः फलं प्रयच्छति; प्रतिकूलयत्नवतस्तु न फलम् । प्रत्युत निरोधमेव करोतीति सुमहद्वैषम्यम् । अथ तु पाक्षिकप्रतिकूलप्रवृत्तिशङ्कया जी वेषु स्वातन्त्र्यमेव कारुणिको न प्रवर्तयत्विति मतम्, तत्र ईश्वरस्वातन्त्र्यमेवोत्तरम् । धर्मिग्राहकप्रमाणसिद्धश्चैतत् । न चैतावता निर्घृण-

१. अभ्युपेतव्यम् पा०

त्वम् ; प्रसक्तदुःखनिराचिकीर्षारूपत्वात्तस्याः । निरुपाधिः परदुःखासहिष्णुता दयेति हि तल्लक्षणम् । साधारणस्वातन्त्र्यदानमात्रस्य तया विरोधाभावात् । स्वातन्त्र्यञ्च स्वतस्सत्यकामत्वसत्यसंकल्पाविर्भावदशायामपरिमितपुरुषार्थप्रसाद(ध?)कमित्येव भगवदौदार्यादाश्रीयते । संसारदशायां तन्निवर्तकञ्च (नञ्च न ?) युक्तम् । पुंण्यवतः पुण्यप्रवृत्तेर्निवारणायोगात्, पापवतः पापप्रवृत्तेरपि निवारणानुपपत्तेः, सपुण्यपापस्यापि तत्तदंशाभ्यां तत्तत्प्रवृत्तिनिवारणस्य प्रतिबन्धात् । कर्मानपेक्षत्वे विषमे पुंसि समस्य कर्मविरोधेन विषमस्य च वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यदोषप्रसङ्गात् व्यापारानुपपत्तिः । अतो निराचिकीर्षितजीवदुःखोत्पत्तिः जीवमात्रमूला, तन्निराकरणं च भगवतो लीला । न हि उत्पत्स्यमानमेव जानता निरसनीयमिति पर्यनुयोगावकाशः ; लीलाव्याघातप्रसङ्गात् । साम्यव्याघातप्रसङ्गश्च पूर्वोक्तः ।

ननूत्पन्नं दुःखमसहमानस्तदुत्पत्स्यमानमपि न सहेतैव । सर्वज्ञो ह्यसौ । न ह्यनागतं न वेत्तीति युज्यते । उत्पत्स्यमानं च सहमानः तदुत्पन्नमपि सहेतैव । असहमानोऽपि किंचित् (स्वित् ?) करोति, तस्य स्वयमेव नश्वरस्य दुःखस्य विनाशध्रौव्यात् । वैषम्य(भीते?) (रहि ?) तेन चेश्वरेण कारणे सत्यनुत्पादनायोगात् । अतो दयावसरो न दृश्यते । मैवम्, तथापि कश्चिदस्या(दस्त्य?)वकाशः करुणायाः, यस्य साम्यादिभिः गुणान्तरैः न प्रतिबन्धो दृश्यते । तथा सर्वसाधारणे शास्त्रप्रवर्तने साधुपरित्राणे सामान्य दृष्टा(?)संहारे च । विषमसृष्टिः चतुर्मखात् कर्मविशेषमूलात् (?) । ततः पूर्वं समष्टिसृष्टिः केवलकरुणामूला । लीलारसायैवेति चेत्सत्यम्, तथापि करुणासहचारिणी सा; समानविषयत्वादुभयोः । मोक्षोपायत्वेन लीलाविच्छेदसाधारण्यात् । न च करुणामतिपत्य लीलारसः कश्चित् । ततः उत्पत्स्यमानमेव दुःखं निरुणद्धि । तत्तु साम्यानुरोधेन ज्ञानादिनेति सिद्धं कारुणिकत्व-

१. ईश्वरः कर्मसापेक्षो निर्वतयेत्, निरपेक्षो वा ? आद्ये आह-पुण्येति । अन्त्ये-कर्मेति । तत्रापि समो विषमोवा ?; आद्ये पुण्यकृतः कार्ये प्रवर्तनं अन्यस्य निवर्तनञ्च साम्यबाधकत्वाद्विरुद्धम्, पुण्ये पश्चात्तनसुखवत्पापेऽपि तात्कालिकसुखभावाच्च; अन्त्ये वैषम्यमेव दोषः । अतो निवर्तनव्यापारो नोपपद्यत इति ।

मपि। ततो जीवेषु स्वातन्त्र्यविधानमीश्वरस्य स्वातन्त्र्यमुद्वेलयत्येव। न च करुणां प्रतिक्षिपति।

यच्चापरमुक्तं पुण्यपापयोः ईश्वर एव साक्षात्प्रेरयितेति, तत्पुण्यपापयोर्[1]त्यन्तप्रवृत्तजीवविशेषविषयम्, तत्फलभूतञ्चेत्यनुसन्धातव्यम्। तथैव हि तत्र तत्र प्रकरणे स्पष्टमुपलभ्यते। पुण्यस्य हि सुखं, पुण्यानुकूलं जन्म ज्ञानं, रुचिर्वसना चेति फलानि। पापस्य हि दुःखं, पापानुकूलजन्मादि चेति सर्वशास्त्रसिद्धमेतत्।

जीवानां परस्परभेदः प्रत्यक्षः स्वरूपभेदस्य स्वयंप्रकाशत्वात्। अयमेव हि प्रतियोगिज्ञानानन्तरं भेद इति व्यवह्रियते; प्रतियोग्युपलक्षिताकारे व्युत्पन्नत्वात् भेदशब्दस्य। भावान्तरस्याभावत्वं समर्थितमन्यत्र। तथा विरुद्धधर्माध्यासाच्च जीवानां भेदसिद्धिः। यदि सर्वत्रैकस्स्यादात्मा बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषकरणतदधिष्ठिता(ष्ठाना?)दि व्यवस्था न सिद्ध्येत्। न हि यमर्थमेको यदा जानाति, तदैव सर्वोऽपि तम्। तदा ह्यर्थान्तरप्रसक्तो वा सुषुप्त्याद्यवस्थापन्नो वा भवत्यन्यः। यदि त्वेकस्य ज्ञानमेव सर्वस्य ज्ञानं स्यात्, शिष्याचार्यबहुश्रुतमन्दमतित्वादिव्यवस्था न सिद्ध्येत। एकेन अनुभूतमर्थं सर्वे च संस्मरेयुः। सुखदुःखादेश्चाप्रतिसन्धानमात्मैक्ये न घटते। प्रतिसन्धातुरात्मन एकत्वे नानावयवावच्छिन्नसुखदुःखादिवन्नानादेहगोचरस्यापि तस्य प्रतिसंधानमवर्जनीयम्। तथा[2] कस्यचिदिष्टमेव तदैव कस्य चिदनिष्टमिष्टं वा (द्विष्टंवा ?) भवति। एकमेव द्रव्यमेकस्यैकदैव देहावयवभेदेनाप्यनिष्ट (प्यनिष्टमिष्ट?)ञ्च दृश्यते; तथा देहभेदेनापीति चेत्; सत्यम्। तथापि तत्तदंशभेदेनेष्टत्वानिष्टत्वाभ्यां प्रतिसन्धानवत् तत्तद्भेदेनापि (तत्तद्देहभेदेनापि?) तदवर्जनीयम्। तथा करणानि ज्ञानकर्माणि....[निर्वर्तयन्ति प्र]त्यातमनियतेपकारकाणि तत्तन्मात्राधिष्ठेयानि च भवन्ति। तदपि भोक्तुरधिष्ठातुश्च सर्वत्रैकतां व्याहन्ति। तथा सत्यन्धबधिराद्यभावप्रसङ्गश्च। यत्किंचिद्देहवर्तिभिरपि चक्षुरादिभिः कारणवत्तत्तद्विषयोपलंभसंभव-

१. अत्यन्तासिद्धिप्रवृत्त. पा०

२. तथैव कस्यचिदिष्टमनिष्टं वा. पा०

सिद्धेः। न ह्यत्र कतिपयचक्षुरादिवैकल्यनिदानोऽन्धादिव्यपदेशः; अन्धोऽहमिममर्थं न कथंचिदपि जानामीति तद्विषयोपलंभाभावपर्यन्तानुसंधानात्। तथा एकस्मिन्नेवार्थे कश्चित्प्रवर्तते; कश्चिन्निवर्तते; कश्चिदेव प्रतिबिभित्सति[1]। स्वार्थे प्रवर्तमानस्य परैः प्रायशः प्रतिबन्धसम्भावनन्तु सर्वदा सर्वैरेवास्योपजायते[2]। असङ्कीर्णं कार्यान्तरं हि तत्। न हि कस्मिंश्चित्प्रवर्तमाने सर्वेऽपि प्रवर्तन्ते। एकस्यैका प्रवृत्तिरेव सर्वेषां प्रवृत्तिरिति चेत्, तर्ह्येकैव सर्वेति कृतार्थता वा किं न स्यात्? एवं चैको घटः सर्वं जगदित्यपि स्यात्। तथाऽप्यात्मान्तरसद्भावे सिद्धे सर्वमेवं वक्तव्यम्; तत्रैव किं प्रमाणमिति चेत्, चेष्टादिलिङ्गमनुमानम्। तच्च प्रत्यक्ष स्वात्म(क्षम्। स्वात्म?) तादात्म्यमपि केनचिदनुमानेन सिद्ध्यतीति[3] चेन्न; तस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वाप्रत्यक्षत्वसुखत्वदुःखत्वे(सुखित्व दुःखित्वे?)त्यादिविरुद्धधर्माध्यासेन बाधात्। तस्य सर्वस्यौपाधिकत्वादविरोधे सत्यबाध इति चेत्, स किमुपाधिः शास्त्रसिद्धः, उत प्रमाणान्तरसिद्धः। नाद्यः; स्वाभाविके जीवभेदे तेषां परमात्मनो भेदे च तस्य तात्पर्यावधारणात्। 'नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानामेको बहूनां यो विदधाति कामान्' 'द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते, 'पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्ट स्ततस्तेनामृतत्वमेति' 'द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके,' 'अतोऽस्मिन् लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः' इत्यादेः।

'एको देवस्सर्वभूतेषु गूढः' इत्यादेरन्तर्यामिपरमात्मविषयत्वात्, जीवाद्वैतवादानां प्रकाराद्वैते पर्यवसानात्, अविद्याभेदप्रतिक्षेपस्य तद्वैधर्म्यविषयत्वाच्चास्यार्थस्य न विरोधः क्वचिदपि शङ्कनीयः ॥

यत्तु अविद्याज्ञानादिशब्दैस्तत्तत्रोपदिश्यते तत् यथा यथं प्रकरणादिवशेन कर्म, प्रकृतितत्त्वं वा विज्ञेयम्। न च तत्सिद्धिमात्रेण जीवभेदस्तत्प्रयुक्त इत्यापतति। कर्मणस्तु विशेषतो जीवभेदापादकत्वमेवेति न शास्त्रेणौपाधिकत्वसिद्धिः।

१. प्रतिपिपित्सति. पा०.

२. स्वार्थे प्रवर्तमानस्य सर्वदा परैः सर्वैरेव प्रतिबन्धसम्भावनं प्रायश उपजायत इत्यन्वयः—

३. न सिद्ध्यतीति. पा०

न च प्रमाणान्तरेण। तद्धि न तावत्प्रत्यक्षम्, तस्य शरीरगोचरत्वेऽपि तस्योपाधित्वेनाप्रतिपत्तेः। आत्माद्वैतोपलंभे सिद्धे हि शरीरभेदानुविधायिन्यास्सुखदुःखादिव्यवस्थायास्तदुपाधिकत्वसिद्धिः, यथा श्वेतस्फटिकनिश्चयानन्तरमेव जपाकुसुमस्य तद्रागोपाधित्वनिश्चयः। स्वयंप्रकाशप्रत्यक्षे तन्मात्रोपलंभबलादेवात्माद्वैतमपि सिद्धमिति चेन्न; आत्मान्तरस्य तत्र प्रथमं योग्यत्वासिद्धेः। अयोग्यस्यानुपलभ्यमानस्य तन्मात्रोपलंभेनाभावनिश्चयायोगात्। अधिकरणमात्रोपलम्भो हि प्रतियोगिनो योग्यस्यानुपलम्भात्मकः[1] तस्याभावमधिकरणं तद्धर्मं वा व्यवहारयतीति सिद्धमन्यत्र। अतः स्वरूपसिद्धिरेव स्वयंप्रकाशत्वेनेति नेतरप्रतिक्षेपः; तथाऽपि तत्र इतरविध्यभावात्तदभावः शङ्क्यत इति चेन्न; अनुमानेन तत्सिद्धेरुक्तत्वात्। अनुमानत्वमौपाधिकेऽपि भेदे पर्यवस्यतीति चेन्न; अन्योन्याश्रयत्वात्। औपाधिकत्वसिद्धौ हि आत्मलाभा (भेदा?) सिद्धिः, आत्मान्तराभावे च देहभेदोपाधित्वसिद्धिः सुखदुःखादिभेदभिन्नानुमानस्येति[2]। एवमपि यद्याशङ्क्येत, नीलादिगुणभेदोपाधिको घटादिव्यक्तिभेदः व्यक्तिभेदोपाधिको वा तत्तद्गुणभेद इति अन्यतरभेदापलापः प्रसज्येत। तत्रोभयमपि प्रत्यक्षेण भिन्नमुपलभ्यत इति चेत्, इहापि द्वयं प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यामुपलभ्यत इति तुल्यम्। नहि प्रत्यक्षे सत्युपाध्यनवकाश इति शक्यं वक्तुम्; स्फटिकारुण्यस्य स्वाभाविकत्वप्रसङ्गात्।

अपि च,

देहभेदोऽपि नैकस्य प्रतिसन्धानबाधकः।
सौभरिप्रतिसन्धानमिष्यते भिन्नदेहजम्॥

१. एकानुपलम्भस्यान्योपलम्भरूपत्वमभावस्य भावरूपत्वात्। तत्राधिकरणस्वरूपता तद्वृत्तिधर्मस्वरूपतेति पक्षद्वयाभिप्रायेणाधिकरणं तद्धर्मं वेत्युक्तिः।

२. सुखदुःखादिभेदप्रयुक्तपरस्परभेदविशिष्टात्मानुमापकहेतोरित्यर्थः।

एवमात्मभेदस्य धर्मिग्राहकप्रमाणसिद्धत्वादनुमानेनापि नोपाधिसिद्धिः। आत्मभेदापलापस्तु प्रपञ्चापलापसमानयोगक्षेम इति तत्परिहारेण तुल्यं परिहृतोऽन्यत्र[1]। देहोपाधिविधूनन-न्यायेनाऽन्यस्याप्युपाधेस्तत्त्वं निरस्तम्

किं च तन्न तावदन्तः करणम्; तस्यात्मभेदमन्तरेण भेदासिद्धेः। प्रत्यक्षस्यात्मनो ज्ञानोदयमा(यानु ?)नुगुण्येन बहिरिन्द्रियोत्तीर्णमन्तःकरणं प्रत्यात्मभेदभिन्नमनुमीयते; तत्कथ-मात्मभेदापलापे कारणं भवेत्? अहंकारस्त्वेकमेव तत्त्वं सर्वेषां साधारणमनुग्रहमातनोति तदनुगृहीताश्चात्मानः तत्तददृष्टोन्मिषितरजस्तमस्सहकृतास्तत्परिमाणानुकूलमहि (भि?) मानं कुर्वन्तीति शास्त्रस्थानां निर्णयः। एतद्विलक्षणस्त्वहंकारो न केनापि प्रमाणेन सिद्ध्यति। दृष्टात्मभेदपरित्यागायादृष्टतद्भेदकल्पनं लोकोत्तरप्रज्ञस्यैव शोभतेतराम्॥

न च अविद्याभेद एव जीवभेदकल्पकः, तद्भेदस्याप्यसिद्धेः। प्रत्यक्षं ह्यज्ञानं ज्ञानाभाव एव। तदतिरिक्तं भावरूपन्तु न कल्पनामन्तरेण सिद्ध्यति। दर्शनभेदोपपादनाय च तत्करणभेदः कल्पनीयः; न तु तदपह्नवाय। स्वयंप्रकाशश्चात्मभेदो दर्शनभेदकोटिनि-विष्टो न दृश्यपक्षे[2]निक्षेपमर्हतीति कथं तदभावायाविद्याकल्पनमुपपद्यते। यद्यप्येकस्मै न सर्वे स्वयं प्रकाशाः, तथापि स्वयं प्रकाशतयैव अनुमीयते (न्ते?)। दृश्यबाधाद्दर्शनमपि मिथ्येति वादश्च दृश्यशून्ये दृङ्मात्र आत्मनि निरवकाश एव। धर्मभूतज्ञानं हि दृश्यप्रवणं नाम, न स्वरूपम्। दृश्यबाधे दर्शनमपि मिथ्येत्यप्यसङ्गतम्। अन्यबाधस्यान्यमिथ्यात्वं प्रत्य-हेतुत्वात् इत्याद्युक्तमन्यथाख्यातिमाश्रित्य। यथार्थख्यातिसिद्धान्ते तु व्यवहारमात्रमेव बाध्यते, न दृश्यमपीति सुतरां दृग्भेदबाधानवकाशः।

१. अन्यत्र कृतेन प्रपञ्चापलापपरिहारेण आत्मभेदापलापोऽपि परिहृतः। परिहारस्य तुल्य-त्वादित्यर्थः।

२. दृश्यत्वे हि मिथ्यात्वम्; मिथ्याभूततद्भावायाविद्याकल्पनम्। एवमाविद्यकत्वात्पश्चा-त्तदभावावधारणं च स्यात् ब्रह्मवत्। स्वप्रकाशः पुनरात्मभेद इति भावः।

किमाश्रिता चाविद्या जीवभेदं कल्पयेत्? ब्रह्माश्रितेति चेन्न; तस्य तद्विरोधित्वात्। अविरोधित्वे चानिर्मोक्षप्रसंगात्। न चाविशदं रूपमविरोधि, विशदन्तु विरोधि निवर्तकं चेति वाच्यम्; निर्विशेषवैशद्यावैशद्ययोरसंभवात्। निर्विशेषस्यापि सद्वितीयत्वमवैशद्यम्, अद्वितीयत्वन्तु वैशद्यमिति विवेक इति चेन्न; आत्माश्रयत्वप्रसंगात्। सद्वितीयत्वलक्षणाविशदरूपावभासो ह्यध्यासहेतुः, स एव चाध्यासः। अधिष्ठानेन सहाध्यस्यमानस्य प्रकाश एवाध्यास इति सर्वसंमतम्। न चाद्वितीयं किंचित्पारमार्थिकमस्ति, यतस्तेन सद्वितीयत्वमवैशद्यमिति स्यात्। विशदावभासाद्भेदनिवृत्तावपि चात्माश्रयत्वम्; भेदनिवृत्त्यात्मकत्वाद्विशदावभासस्य। अवैशद्यञ्च किं स्वभावः, उत अविद्याकल्पितम्? स्वभावत्वे चानिर्मोक्षः। द्वितीयेऽन्योन्याश्रयत्वम्। अविद्यायाश्च मथ्यात्वादविद्यान्तरापेक्षयानवस्था। स्वपरनिर्वाहकत्वन्तु दृष्टे कार्य एव युज्यते कल्पयितुम्। दृष्टयदृष्टिभ्यामेव अध्ययनविधिशब्दशब्दादिप्रतिबन्द्युद्धारश्च[१] द्रष्टव्यः। कारणदोषमन्तरेण मिथ्यात्वमपि न शक्यते कल्पयितुम्; स्वतः प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमात्। बाधादेव मिथ्यात्वं परतः प्रामाण्येऽपि। अबाधादेवेश्वरज्ञानस्य न्याये सत्यत्ववदिति[२] चेन्न; इतः पूर्वं बाधस्यादृष्टत्वात्परत्रापि काले निर्दोषप्रकाशसिद्धत्वेन दृक्स्वरूपवदबाधानुमानात्। न्याये तु धर्मिग्राहकमेव मानमबाधं व्यवस्थापयति। अत्र तु धर्मिग्राहकमानं सत्यत्वमेवावगाहत इति विपरीतमेव; दोषस्य च परमार्थस्यैव भ्रान्तिनिर्वाहकत्वादधिष्ठानवत्। इतरथा ह्यधिष्ठानमपि सत्यं न स्यात्। एतेनाऽनादित्वादविद्यान्तरं नापेक्ष्यत इति प्रत्युक्तम्। अपरमार्थस्य स्वरूपानादित्वायोगात्। प्रवाहानादित्वे च घटाद्यविशेषप्रसंगात्। ब्रह्माज्ञानवादे बन्धमोक्षव्यवस्थाया असिद्धेरशास्त्रं सर्वमनर्थकमापद्यत इत्याद्यनन्तदोषाः कृत-

१. यथा स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः इत्यध्ययनविधिना वाक्यान्तरमिव स्वात्मापि गृह्यते, यथा च शब्द इति शब्दः घटादिशब्दमिव शब्द इति शब्दमपि वक्ति, तथा अविद्या स्वमिथ्यात्वेऽविद्यान्तरं नापेक्षत इति न युक्तम्; दर्शनादर्शनाभ्यां विशेषादिति भावः॥

२. न्यायमते ईश्वरज्ञानस्य प्रमात्वं यथा प्रमात्वबाधकाभावात् स्वीक्रियते, तथाऽविद्याया अपि मिथ्यात्वमपि मिथ्यात्वबाधकमानाभावादिष्यत इति शङ्का। अविद्यास्वरूपस्य पूर्वं पश्चाच्च बाधादर्शनेन सत्यत्वसिद्ध्या न मिथ्यात्वमिति परिहारः।

बुद्धिभिरनुसन्धातव्याः। जीवाज्ञानवादश्च यथायथं पूर्वोक्तैरन्योन्याश्रयत्वादिभिरपास्त एव। अतो जीवानां परस्परं परमात्मनश्च भेदस्स्वाभाविक इति परमात्मशरीरभूतस्तदनुगृहीतः कर्ता अहंप्रत्ययवेद्यः ज्ञानादिगुणकश्शरीरेन्द्रियबुद्धिमनःप्राणविलक्षणश्च जीवात्मेति सर्वमवदातम् ॥

इति श्रीभगवद्रामानुजमुनिवरमतधुरन्धरस्यात्रिगोत्रप्रदीप-
श्रीपद्मनाभार्यनन्दनस्य वादिहंसनवाम्बुदस्य
श्रीरामानुजार्यस्य कृतिषु न्यायकुलिशे
देहाद्यतिरिक्तात्मयाथात्म्यवादः
षष्ठः ॥

श्रीः

न्यायकुलिशे

सामानाधिकरण्य वादस्सप्तमः

भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तानां शब्दानामेकस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तिस्सामानाधिकरण्यमिति लक्षण-वाक्यम्। तदिदमसम्बद्धमिव दृश्यते। प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदो ह्यर्थभेदः। कथं तेषामेकस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तिस्सम्भवति? सा चेदङ्गीकृता कथं निमित्तभेद? इति॥

अत्र केचिदाचक्षते—भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तानामपि केषाञ्चिदेकार्थवृत्तित्वं सम्भवति, यथा शुक्लो गौरिति। न चात्रार्थैकत्वासम्भव इति वाच्यम्; निमित्तयोर्मिथो भेदेऽपि विशेष्येणाभेदात्तस्य चैकत्वादेकार्थत्वाविरोधात्। यद्येकवस्तुतादात्म्यं तयोः कथं मिथो भेदः? स चेत्कथमेतत्? न ह्येकस्य विशेष्यमात्रस्य स्वात्मनाऽभिन्नस्य भेदो दृष्ट इति चेत्, सत्यम्; अत्र तु दृश्यत एव। अतो दर्शनबलेन व्याप्तिमवधूय भेदाभेदयोरविरोध-मभ्युपगच्छामः। दृश्यते ह्ययं गौरित्यभेदेन जातिः। अयं शुक्ल इति च गुणः। सामा-नाधिकरण्यार्थ एव निरूप्यत इति चेन्न; प्रत्यक्षोपन्यासात्। यः खल्वयमिति प्रतिभातः पिण्डविशेषः स एव हि गौरिति प्रतिभाति। न च दण्डीत्यादिवद्गोत्वादिविशिष्टे विशेषण-तयैव गोत्वादयश्च भान्तीति वाच्यम्; व्यतिरेकेणानुपलब्धेः। यद्धि विशेषणं दण्डकुण्ड-लादि, तस्मिन्पृथगनुभूयमानेऽपि[१] तद्व्यतिरेकेण पुरुषोऽवगम्यते। (अतः?) तत्र युक्तं व्यति-रेकेणोपलब्धयोर्विशेषणविशेष्ययोस्तथा व्यवस्थापनम्। इह तु यदेवैकदा व्यक्तिरूपेणावसितं, तदेवानन्तरं जातिरूपेणापि नित्यमव (नित्यमवसीयत इत्यव?) (जातिरूपेणापीत्यव?) श्या-भ्युपगमनीयं दर्शनवशादेव द्वैरूप्यम्।

१. तस्य पृथगनुभवकालेऽपीत्यर्थः।

न चात्र दर्शने बाधकं किञ्चित् ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते। गुणजात्योर्भेददर्शनमेव बाधकमिति चेन्न; भिन्नविषयत्वात्[१]। ततोऽनुमानमिति[२] चेन्न; उपलब्धिविरोधात्[३]। गुणगुणिनोरेव भेदोपलम्भो बाधक इति चेन्न; तस्याविरोधापादकस्य बाधकत्वानुपपत्तेः, यथा शुक्लो गौरित्युपलम्भो गोत्वशुक्लत्वयोः। विरोधे सिद्धे बाधक एवेति चेत्, कथमत्र विरोधः? भिन्नाधिकरणत्वनियमात् (इति चेन्न;[४]) न हि घटपटयोरभेदो दृष्टचरः। तर्हि घटस्य स्वात्मना भेद इति चेन्न; व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तमात्रत्वादस्य विरोधस्थानत्वानुपपत्तेः। तथा शुक्लस्य पटस्यागोत्वं गोः कृष्णस्य चाशुक्लत्वं किं न पश्यसि? गोश्शुक्लस्य चोपलम्भाद्यदि तत्राविरोधनिश्चयः, एवमत्रापि भवान् समदृष्टिस्स्यात्; कृतमभिनिवेशेन॥

तथापि कस्यचित्केनचिद्विरोधः कथं निश्चेय इति चेत्, किमनेनोक्तेन? सौहार्दे तु वदामः। वैयधिकरण्यनियमादुपलम्भमात्रस्य नियमः। शुक्तिकायामपि रजतावभासादर्थस्य क[५] निश्चयः, विपरीतनिश्चयो वेति चेन्न; शुक्तिकायां रजतस्य प्रतिक्षेपात्। नेदं रजतमिति हि तत्र स्फुटः प्रतिक्षेपः। यदि च प्रतिक्षेपमन्तरेण शुक्तिरजतत्वयोरेकत्रावभासः स्यात्, कस्तत्र विरोधमुद्भावयेत्?

१. दर्शनस्य गुणजातिभेदविषयकत्वेऽपि गुणव्यक्तिभेदाविषयकत्वादित्यर्थः।

२. गुणजाती, स्वाश्रयव्यक्तिभिन्ने, मिथो भिन्नत्वादित्यनुमानं बाधकमिति चेदित्यर्थः॥

३. अनुमानमभेदग्राहिप्रत्यक्षबाधितमिति भावः।

४. अत्र 'इति चेन्न' इति अर्थसामञ्जस्याय पूरणीयमिति भाति। तदा चायमर्थः—गुणगुणिनोर्भिन्नाधिकरणत्वनियमाद्विरोध इति चेत्, तर्ह्येकाधिकरणत्वेऽविरोधादभेद इति सिद्ध्यति। एवञ्च घटपटयोः कदाचिदेकाधिकरणत्वादभेदस्स्यात्। ननु एकाधिकरणत्वेऽपि भेदाङ्गीकारे घटस्य स्वात्मनोऽपि भेदस्स्यादिति चेन्न; एकाधिकरणत्वेऽभेद इति नियमभञ्जनार्थं घटपटरूपव्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तकथनात् एकाधिकरणत्वादेर्भेदप्रयोजकत्वस्यास्मदनुक्तत्वादिति। विमृश्य निर्धार्यम्।

५ ऽ.व निश्चय इति पा०.

ननु कोऽयं प्रतिक्षेपः? यदि तत्राभावप्रत्ययः तर्हि तत्र[१] प्रतिपन्न इति भवतामविरोधमर्हतीति चेत्, स्यादेतदेवं, यदि भावनिषेधमन्तरेणाभावस्य रूपान्तरमुपलभ्येत। न तु प्रतियोगिनं प्रत्युदासीनमभावस्य स्वरूपं पश्यामः। भावे तु रूपान्तरेण प्रतिपन्ने सामानाधिकरण्यप्रतीतिवि (रवि?) रोधमेव स्थापयेत्। अन्यथा हि कथञ्चिदेकाधिकरणापेक्षया भावान्तरप्रतिपत्तिरेव पूर्वस्य बाध इत्यापद्येत। [२]भावाभावात्मकावेव भेदाभेदाविति चेन्न; भेदस्य स्वरूपलक्षणस्य भावात्मकत्वात्; अभेदस्यापि तादात्म्यरूपस्याभावत्वानुपपत्तेः। न चेतरेतराभाववत्तामात्रेण विरोधः; अतिप्रसङ्गात्। न चाक्षेपकत्वेन; शुक्तिकारजतत्ववदविनाभावासिद्धेः। अत्रैव प्रत्यक्षेण बाधात्। [३]प्रत्यक्षबलादविनाभावभङ्गस्तद्भङ्गेन तद्बलमिति चेन्न, [४]अनन्यथासिद्धेः प्रत्यक्षस्य। न हि सामान्य[५]मन्यत्र प्रत्येतुं शक्यम्; येन रजतादिवदारोपादिकल्पना स्यात्। न च 'अयं न गौः गौर्वा नायम्' इति बाधः। न चार्थक्रियावतोरनयोर्बाधशङ्कापि सम्भवति। कार्यवर्गस्तत्साजात्यञ्चार्थक्रियेति द्रष्टव्यम्। [६]सामान्यविशेषात्मकञ्च विश्वम्; तद्बाधे किं भविष्यति। अतो भेदाभेदयोरविरोधाज्जातिगुणादयस्स्वाश्रयेण भिन्नाभिन्नाः॥

विशेषणविशेष्यभावाच्च। न खल्वत्यन्तभिन्नयोः क्वचिदपि विशेषणविशेष्यभावा दृश्यते। दण्डी देवदत्त इति दृश्यत इति (चेन्न?) संयोगद्वारको हि तत्र विशेषणविशेष्यभावः; तेनैव चाभिन्नता, संयोगतद्वतोरनतिभेदात्। अत एव चौपाधिकाभेदापगमे

१. तत्रेत्यस्य प्रतिपन्ने, प्रतियोगिमत्तया ज्ञाते इत्यर्थः; इति भवन्मतेऽविरोध एव, प्रतियोग्यभावयोस्सामानाधिकरण्यादिति.

२. तर्हि भेदाभेदयोरपि परस्परनिषेधरूपतया विरोध एवेति शङ्कते—भावेति।

३. अन्योन्याश्रयं शङ्कते—प्रत्यक्षेति।

४. प्रत्यक्षबलमनन्यथासिद्धत्वादेव सिद्धमिति नान्योन्याश्रय इत्याह—अनन्येति.

५. सादृश्यमित्यर्थः

६. अयं गौरित्यत्र जातेर्व्यक्तेर्वा आरोपितत्वस्वीकारे विनिगमनाविरहेण सर्वबाधे किं स्यादित्यर्थः।

विशेषणतावगमः। ननु सम्बन्धाभावादिति चेत्, किमभिन्नानां विशेषणत्वे सम्बन्धित्वं प्रयोजकम्? न तर्हि सम्बन्धः स्वाश्रयं विशिंष्यात्; सम्बन्धान्तराभावात्॥

अस्ति हि समवाय इति चेत् तर्हि समवायीति प्रत्ययो न स्यात्। न हि तस्यापि समवायान्तरमस्ति। स्वपरनिर्वाहकोऽयमिति चेत्, किमयं स्वस्वाश्रयघटकस्स्वयमेव, अथ घटकस्सम्बन्धान्तरात्मा, विशेषणत्वे घटकान्तरनिरपेक्षो वा। नाद्यः; कर्मकर्तृविरोधात्। आकारभेदादात्मवदविरोध इति चेन्न; [१]तस्यापि सम्बन्धान्तरापेक्षायामनवस्था स्यात्। न द्वितीयः; तत्रैव भेदाभेदप्रसङ्गात्। तद्वरं प्रथममेवाभ्युपगमः। एवं हि तत्कल्पना न स्यात्। न च तृतीयः; आदावेव प्रसङ्गादतिप्रसङ्गाच्च।

न स्वभावतो व्यवस्था; एकस्यैव समवायस्यानन्तैस्सम्बन्धिभिर्विरोधेन वैशिष्ट्या-वैशिष्ट्ययोर्निर्वोढुमशक्यत्वात्। नानात्वे चानन्तकल्पना। अतस्तादात्म्यमेव वैशिष्ट्य-निर्वहणाय गत्यन्तराभावादभ्युपेतम्। इदञ्च सर्वत्र साक्षात्परम्परया वा यथासम्भवमूह-नीयम्॥

सहोपलम्भनियमाच्च। न च साहित्यमेकस्यैव सम्भवति। न च नियमः (मतः?) पृथगनुपलम्भलक्षणो भेदो[२] दृश्यते। ननु न पृथगनु (गु?) पलम्भोऽत्यन्तभेदव्यापकः; यत्तन्निवृत्त्याऽत्यन्तभेदनिवृत्तिस्स्यात्; पृथक् सिद्धेरुपाधित्वादिति चेन्न; साधनव्याप-कत्वात्॥

का चेयं पृथक्सिद्धिः? न [३]तावद्भिन्नदेशकालत्वम्; भिन्नदेशानां भिन्नकालानाञ्चा-पृथक्सिद्धिप्रसङ्गात्। न चैकैकम; भिन्नदेशानां भिन्नकालानां वा अपृथक्सिद्धिप्रसङ्गात्।

१. आकारस्यापीत्यर्थः, आकारिणीति शेषः

२. अत्यन्तभेदः नियमेन पृथगनुपलम्भसहचरितो न भवति। भेदे पृथगुपलम्भस्स्यादित्यर्थः.

३. अयं भावः—भिन्नदेशकालोभयकत्वं पृथक्सिद्धिरिति चेत्, देशमात्रभेदे कालमात्रभेदे चा-पृथक्सिद्धिस्स्यात्। भिन्नकालत्वं पृथक्सिद्धिरिति चेत्, देशभेदेऽपृथक्सिद्धिस्स्यात्। भिन्नदेशत्वमिति चेत्, कालभेदे। भिन्नदेशभिन्नकालान्यतरत्वमित्यपि न, सकलविभ्वाद्यपृथक्सिद्धिप्रसङ्गादिति.

नाप्यन्यतरत्वम्; समदेशकालानां विभ्वादीनामपृथक्सिद्धिप्रसङ्गात्। नापि पृथगाश्रयाश्रयित्वम्; गुणत्वादावतिव्याप्तेः। नापि [1]पृथगगतिमत्त्वं तद्विशिष्टं वा; रूपरसयोरव्याप्तेः। न चानाश्रितस्य सत्ता; सा चासम्बन्धयोर्विद्यमानता; सम्बन्धस्यैवाकृत्यादावभावात्। तथा चोपपादितत्वात्। न च विशेषणादिभावमपहायावस्थानम्; विशेषणत्वस्य तादात्म्यनिबन्धनत्वेन तदभावस्य भेदपर्यायत्वात्। भिन्नतयावस्थानमेव पृथक्सिद्धिरिति चेत्, आगतोऽसि मदीयं पन्थानम्। त्यजेदानीमुपाधिव्यसनम्। आत्मानं प्रत्यात्मन एवोपाधित्वायोगात्।

अयमपि गौरिति प्रत्ययाच्च। न ह्ययमिति प्रागननुभूतविशेषोल्लेखोऽन (?) नुभूततया गोत्वेन प्रतिसंधानञ्च केवलभेदेऽभेदे वा घटते। न चैवं व्यक्तिजातिगोचरो (रौ?) भेदाभेदः (दौ?); व्यक्तिश्च जातिश्चेति प्रतीतिप्रसङ्गात्। सम्बन्धे च सति सम्बन्धश्चेति प्रतीतिप्रसङ्गः।

अवयवावयविनोस्समानदेशत्वाच्च। मूर्तद्रव्यमत्यन्तभिन्नमूर्तान्तरोपष्टब्धावकाशमनुपलब्धमित्यवयवसमानदेशोऽवयवी घटस्तदनतिरेकीति लभ्यते।

अनुमानोदयाश्च (याच्च?)। कथमपरथा चार्वाकपरिपाटी पराक्रियेत? न खल्वेकेन प्रतिबन्धोपलम्भेऽपरमनुमेयं भवति; अतिप्रसङ्गात्। न च गृहीतमात्रावधारणायानुमानमिति प्रमाणान्तरमाश्रयणीयम्।

अतो भेदाभेदयोरपि विरोधाश्रयणेनैवमादिविरोधसहस्रपरिहारास्स्वयमूहनीयाः। अत एव जातिगुणादिनिमित्तानां शब्दानामसङ्कोचेनैकार्थवृत्तित्वं सम्भवत्येवेति॥

अत्रोच्यते—

प्रत्यक्षं तावद्भिन्नाभिन्नगोचरमिति न पश्यामः।

१. पृथग्वृत्तिमत्त्वम् पा०.

एकैकस्मिन्विशिष्टे वा बुद्धिर्जात्यादितद्वतोः ।
भिन्नाभिन्नत्वमन्योन्यं न समर्थयितुं क्षमा ॥

तथा हि—न तावदेकैकालम्बना बुद्धिर्भेदाभेदव्यवस्थापनाय पर्याप्ता ; तत्तन्मात्रमग्नत्वादर्थान्तरे व्यापाराभावात् । यद्यपि तत्त्वतो निराश्रयजात्यादिमात्रालम्बना निर्धर्मकधर्मिमात्रावगाहिनी च न काचित्प्रत्यक्षा बुद्धिश्चकास्ति ; तथापि तत्तदंशमाकृष्येयं व्यावर्ण्यते । न हि तत्र जातिमात्रस्फुरणे व्यक्तितादात्म्यप्रकाशस्सम्भाव्यते ; जातिमात्रगोचरत्वव्याघातात् । एवं व्यक्तिमात्रस्फुरणांशेऽपि द्रष्टव्यम् ।

ननु जातिरूपान्तर्गता व्यक्तिः, तत्स्वरूपान्तर्गता च जातिः तत एवान्यतरप्रतिभास एवेतरमिश्रगोचर इति चेन्न ; प्रतीतिस्वरूपमपहाय तथाकल्पनानुपपत्तेः । इतरेतरान्तर्भावे मिश्रगोचरत्वम्, मिश्रगोचरत्वे चान्तर्भाव इत्यन्योन्याश्रयापत्तेः । एकैकस्वरूपस्यैव व्यतिरिक्तप्रतियोगितया स्वात्मनो भेदात्मकत्वात्तत्रैव तदभेदप्रकाशानुपपत्तेश्च । उपपत्तौ विश्वात्मतैव स्यात् । तथापि जातिसंविदो व्यक्तिविषयः कटाक्षः कश्चिदुन्नेयः, येन तत्रैव वेदनमुपपद्यत इति चेत्, अहो भवतां संविदभिप्रायरहस्यवेदनम् ; यत् स्फुरणस्वरूपमपहायार्थसम्बन्धमस्यास्स्वगतमध्यवस्यति (न्ति?) तत्रैव वेदनन्तु तत्रैव तस्यास्सत्त्वात् । न ह्यन्यत्र विद्यमाना जात्यादयोऽन्यत्र प्रत्यक्षेणानुभवितुं शक्याः । स्फुरणं त्वर्थान्तरवत्परस्परमपि भेदं प्रतिपादयत्येवेत्युक्तम् । तत एव भेदाभ्युपगमः, अभेदस्तु यदेव वस्तु जात्यात्मना पूर्वं गृहीतं तस्यैव पश्चाद्व्यक्त्यात्मनोपलम्भादिति चेन्न ; तस्यैवेत्यत्र प्रमाणाभावात् । प्रत्युत न तस्यैवेत्येव हि स्फुरणमुन्नीतम् । तथापि यदि तस्यैवेति न स्यात्, तर्हि तदानीं योग्यानुपलब्ध्या निरासः प्रसज्यत इति चेन्न ; तुल्यत्वात् । न तावदेकज्ञानवेद्ययोरंशस्य योग्यानुपलम्भस्सम्भवति ; उपलम्भविरोधात् । क्रमेणोपलम्भे तु भवतोऽपि तुल्यम् । आकारभेदप्रकाशाभ्युपगमादेकाकारोपलम्भवेलायामाकारान्तरस्य प्रकाशाभावेन निरासप्रसङ्गात । एकतरमग्नत्वादपरस्यानिरास इति चेन्न ; साक्षादनुपपत्तेः (दनुवृत्तेः?) न हि व्यक्तिस्साक्षादनुवृत्तिपदम्, जातिर्वा व्यावृत्तः (त्ता?), उन्मज्जनाभावप्रसङ्गात् । अथ तत्र सहकारिसन्निधानम्, सन्तु वा सहस्रं विरोधाः, स्फुरणं तु न तस्यैवेति दुरपह्नवम् । इतरथा सर्वस्य सर्वविषयत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

यत्तु न सामान्यरूपं विशेषरूपं वा निर्विकल्पके चकास्ति, सम्मुग्धमेव भिन्नाभिन्नवस्तु भासत इति वदन्ति; तदतिस्थवीयः, विकल्पमन्तरेण तत्र भिन्नाभिन्नगोचरत्वस्य व्यवस्थापयितुमशक्यत्वात्। यद्धि विकल्पेन विविच्यते, तदेव हि पूर्वमपि गृहीतमिति वक्तव्यम्। अन्यथा अतिप्रसङ्गात्। तत्रैतावान्विशेषः—सविकल्पकेन सप्रकारं गृह्यते प्राङ्न तथेति। इदञ्चान्वारुह्य वचनम्। परमार्थतस्त्वविशिष्टालम्बनं न किञ्चिदपि विज्ञानं भवतीति।

स्यादेतत्। यद्यप्येकैकस्फुरणं न शबलप्रकाशनसमर्थमिति न तेन तत्सिद्धिः, तथाप्ययं गौरिति विशिष्टविषयकमेकं विज्ञानमनन्यथासिद्धेर्भेदाभेदमनयोरावेदयतीति। नैतत्सारम्। यतः—

> विशेषणविशेष्यत्वे भिन्नाधिकरणे स्फुटम्।
> विशिष्टत्वं कथं न स्यादभेदे धर्मधर्मिणोः॥

विशेषणविशेष्यातिरेकि न विशिष्टं नाम किञ्चिद्वस्त्वस्ति। ते तु मिथो भिन्ने संहत्य विशिष्टतया अनुभूयेते। न च संहतिरित्यर्थान्तरम्। तथाप्यनयोरभेदासिद्धेश्चा (द्धेः,[1] असिद्धेश्च। अ?) नयोरेवाभिन्नं रूपं संहतिरिति चेन्न; दण्डकुण्डलादेरपि तथाभावप्रसङ्गात्। न हि त्वन्मतेऽपि तत्र साक्षादभेदः। विशेषणत्वं तु साक्षात्। ज्ञानादीनामर्थेन तादात्म्यप्रसङ्गाच्च। अत एव न तादात्म्याद्विशेषणत्वम्। न च जातिस्वात्मनो विशेषणं विशेष्यं वा भवतीति दृष्टम्। न च तथात्वे किं कस्य विशेषणमिति व्यवस्था सिद्ध्यति। अतस्स्वभावादेव कस्यचित्प्रतिपन्नगुणभावेन यत्प्रतीयमानमुपयुज्यते तत्तस्य विशेषणमिति। इतरत्त्वद्योगा[2]दपाक्षिकमिति। एतावता तयोः परस्परमेकप्रतिपत्तावन्तर्भूतयोरुपकार्योपकारिभावमात्रं सिद्ध्येत्; न त्वभेदसम्भावनागन्धोऽपि।

१. संहतेरर्थान्तरत्वेऽपि न विशेषणविशेष्याभेदसिद्धिः। वस्तुतस्तदर्थान्तरत्वमेवासिद्धमित्यर्थे इयं पङ्क्तिस्स्यात्। शङ्कते—अनयोरिति।

२. इतरत्त्वयोगा. पा०

ननु दण्डादिषु विशेषणत्वमात्रं जात्यादौ तु तादात्म्यमपि प्रतीयते। इतरथा तच्छब्दे मत्वर्थीयप्रत्ययनिर्देशस्स्यादिति चेन्न; प्रतिबन्धासिद्धेः। पृथक्सिद्धेरुपाधित्वात्। यद्धि यद्विशेषणतैकस्वरूपं तेन तदपृथक्सिद्धम्; इतरत्पृथक्सिद्धमिति विवेकः। अपृथक्सिद्धमपि कर्म जात्यादिकं वा कदाचिन्मत्वर्थीयप्रत्ययापेक्षमिति चेत्, अभिन्नमपि तथेति तुल्यम्। नियमराहित्यमेव विवक्षितम्; तच्चाभिन्नेषु केषुचिदनपेक्षत्वदर्शनमात्रेण सिद्ध्यतीति चेत्, तर्ह्यपृथक्सिद्धेष्वित्यपि तुल्यम्। न च भिन्नत्वादपेक्षानियमादभि (मः; भि?) न्नेष्वपि शरीरेषु तदनपेक्षत्वदर्शनात्। न च तत्र गङ्गादिपदवल्लक्षणेति वाच्यम्; मनुष्यश्शरीरमिति सामानाधिकरण्यप्रसङ्गात्। यश्चापि तथा प्रयुङ्क्ते, सोऽपि निष्कर्षविवक्षया। ततोऽपि मनुष्यो ज्ञातेत्येवमादिप्रकारैरात्मसामानाधिकरण्यमेव दृश्यते। तथा देवत्वं मनुष्यत्वमिति निष्कर्षदर्शनाच्च। न हि लाक्षणिकशब्दानां लक्ष्यार्थ (र्थः?) तत्सम्बन्धो वार्थाल्लभ्यो निष्कृष्यमाणो दृश्यते। अतो भेदो विशेषणतावगमयोग्यतेत्येव वक्तुं युक्तम्। ननु (तु?) तादात्म्ये किञ्चित्प्रयोजनं पश्यामः।

एतदुक्तं भवति—विशेषणं द्विविधं, स्वाभाविकं तदुपाधिकञ्च। तत्र स्वाभाविकवाचकत्वं (चकं?) द्विविधं, निष्कर्षकमनिष्कर्षकञ्च। तत्र निष्कर्षकं विशेषणोपाधिकञ्च वाचकं मत्वर्थीयापेक्षम्; इतरत्तदनपेक्षमिति नात्र कश्चिद्भेदाभेदोपयोग इति। अत एव विशेषणविशेष्यभावाच्चेत्यनुमानं निरस्तम्।

यदि च प्रत्यक्षेण भेदाभेदावेकाधिकरणतया प्रतिपन्नौ, तथापि तयोरन्यतरेणेतरबाधान्नोभयप्रामाण्यमध्यवसितुं युक्तम्। यत्त्वविरोधादबाधनमिति, तन्न; भेदाभेदयोरितरेतराभावात्मकत्वान्नेदं रजतमितिवद्विरोधस्य दुर्वारत्वात्। विलक्षणत्वं भेदः, तदभावोऽभेद इति हि सम्प्रदायः। यद्यप्युभयमर्थान्तरम्, तथापि विरोधो दुष्परिहरः।

तादात्म्यमभेद इति चेन्न; तादात्म्यश (त्म्याभेदश?) ब्दयोर्भेदाभावविवक्षामन्तरेण पुनरुक्तयोरर्थान्तराभावात्। न हि भेदमपहाय गोत्वाश्वत्वयोस्तादात्म्यविरोधे निबन्धनं किञ्चिदुपलभ्यते। बहिरेवं न त्वत्रेति चेन्न; नियामकाभावात्। शौक्ल्यदैर्घ्यादिषु बहिरपि तथा विरोधानुपलब्धेः। क्वचिद्विरोधितायां सामान्यतस्सिद्धौ सर्वत्र तत्स्वभावानपायात्।

वैजात्यं (त्यात्?) नियम इति चेत्, कुत एतत्?। अत्र सामानाधिकरण्यादिति चेत्, शुक्तिरजतत्वादावपि तथाभावप्रसङ्गात्। वैजात्ये वा (चा?) विरोधः; अविरोधे च वैजात्यमिति परस्पराश्रयणञ्च। न हि रूपान्तरेण वैजात्यमुपलभ्यते। किञ्च—

तत्रेतरेतराभावो यत्र भेदः प्रतिष्ठितः।
तत्र चेत्स्यादभेदोऽपि स्वयं स्वाभावभाग्भवेत्॥

न च भेदे सत्यपीतरेतराभावो नास्तीति वाच्यम्; व्यक्तौ रजतारोपो न शुक्तिकायामिति विवेकस्य विलयप्रसङ्गात्। ततश्च....[इतरेतराभा]वभाजोर्जातितद्वतोर्मिथस्तादात्म्ये स्वयमेव स्वाभावभाजनमिति भावाभावयोरविरोधस्स्यात्।

१ततस्सामानाधिकरण्यप्रतीतावपि नाविरोधसिद्धिः। आकारभेदादविरोधसिद्धिरनवस्थादुस्था॥

यत्तु जातिव्यक्त्योरन्यत्राप्रतीतेरत्यन्तबाधः प्रसज्यत इति, तत्रोत्तरम्—कस्तयोर्बाधमारचयति? न हि वयं जातिं व्यक्तिं वा बाधामहे; किन्तु तयोस्तादात्म्यम्। प्रतीतिश्च तयोरेकत्रैव देशे भवतु कामम्; अविरोधित्वात्; नैतावता तादात्म्यमिति।

यत्तु सहोपलम्भनियमादिति, तन्न; विरुद्धत्वात्। साहित्यस्यात्यन्तभिन्नैकनिष्ठत्वात्। तद्गोचरस्य नियमस्य च तत्स्थापकत्वमेव। पृथगनुपलम्भस्तन्नियम इति चेत्, तत्रेदं विकल्पनीयम्—स किं भिन्नाकारतया ग्रहणाभावः, अथ भिन्नाश्रयतया, आहोस्विद्भिन्नप्रदेशतया, उत ज्ञानद्वयेन, प्रत्यक्षेण विशेषणविशेष्यभावमपहायेति वा। तत्र नाद्यः पक्षः; असिद्धत्वात्। सिद्धौ वा भेदविरोधात्। न हि भिन्नानामपि भिन्नकारण (भिन्नाकारेण?) बुद्ध्यभावः। न द्वितीयः; तत एव। न हि जात्यादिसामानाधिकरण्या (समानाधिकरणा?) व्यक्त्यादयः; जातिगुणयोर्मिथस्तादात्म्यप्रसङ्गाच्च। न तृतीयः; एकप्रदेशवर्तिनामाकाशकालादीनां भेद(नामभेद?)प्रसङ्गात्। ज्ञेयभेदस्य ज्ञानभेदं प्रत्यप्रयोजकत्वेन चतुर्थोऽपि

१. क्वचिद्विरोधितायामिति पूर्वोक्तमुपसंहरति—तत इति.

पक्षोऽनादरणीय एव। पञ्चमस्तु विरुद्धः; विशेषणविशेष्यभावस्य भेद एवोपपत्तिरित्युक्तत्वात्। तथा सोपाधिकः। न खलु तादात्म्याभावाद्घटपटौ पृथगुपलभ्येते; अपि तु पृथगवस्थानात्। तदपि तादात्म्याभावेन साधयाम इति चेन्न; भेदेन प्रतिपन्नयोरपि गुणगुणिनोः पृथगनवस्थानसिद्धौ तत्र पृथगुपलब्धेरेवोपाधित्वात्। ततश्शङ्कितोपाधित्वं वा। अतस्तादात्म्याभावस्य पृथगुपलम्भेन व्याप्त्यभावात्कथं पृथगनुपलम्भेनाभेदसिद्धिः। तादात्म्याभावस्थानेऽत्यन्तभेदपदप्रयोगेऽप्ययमेव न्यायोऽनुसन्धेयः।

अयमपि गौरिति तु प्रतिसन्धानमेकोपाधिविशिष्टवदेकजातिवैशिष्ट्यादुपपद्यते। अयं गौरिति सामानाधिकरण्यं विशेषणविशेष्ययोर्भेद एवोपपद्यत इति ह्युक्तम्।

यच्चावयवावयविनोः (नोरिति?) भेदेऽप्यभेदसाधनायोपन्यस्तम्, तद्भेदानभ्युपगमादेव परिहरणीयम्। न हि वयमन्योन्यसंश्लेषविशेषभाजमवयवकलापमन्तरेणावयविनमपरमभ्युपगच्छामः। अभ्युपगमे वा ये वाभ्युपगच्छन्ति, तेषाममूर्तत्वसमानदेशत्वयोर्विरोधोऽन्यत्रेति व्यवस्थापनीयम्। न च भेदाभेदपक्षेऽपि समाधानमन्यथा सम्भवति; भेदांशे विरोधस्यावर्जनीयत्वात्।

अनुमानोदयान्यथानुपपत्तिरपि नात्र भेदं साधयितुमर्हति। सामान्यविशेषयोर्विशेषणविशेष्यभावेनैवोपपत्तेरतिप्रसङ्गः खल्वेवमेव परिहर्तुं शक्यते। यश्चैषां कश्चिदुद्घोषः—एकैकत्र प्रसक्ता दोषा न समुच्चये सम्भवन्तीति—तदपहास्यम्; उभयदोषोपसंहारस्यैव सिद्धेः।

तदेवं भेदाभेदयोरविरोधः प्रमाणपथपरिभ्रष्ट इति कथमेतदवलम्बनेन सामानाधिकरण्यम्?

अन्ये तु वदन्ति—समानाधिकरणं वाक्यमखण्डार्थं प्रतिपादयति। अपरथा कथमेकार्थवृत्तित्वम्? न तावत्प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमेकम्, पर्यायत्वप्रसङ्गात्। न च तद्विशिष्टम्; विशेषणभेदेन विशिष्टताभेदात्। नापि प्रधानार्थैकत्वम्; व्यधिकरणवाक्यस्यैव तथात्वात्। ननु लक्षणवाक्यस्थप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदपरित्यागेनैकार्थत्वनिबन्धनः (न्धः?) किङ्कृत इति?

अहो भवतां लक्षणवाक्यार्थाभिज्ञता ! न खल्वस्मिन्वाक्ये प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदोऽर्थत्वेन विवक्षितः ; एकार्थवृत्तित्वविरोधात् ; अपि तु पर्यायपदव्यावृत्त्यर्थः । भिन्नप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तत्वेन व्युत्पन्नानां शब्दानां यत्रैकार्थवृत्तित्वं तत्र सामानाधिकरण्यमिति लक्षणवाक्यार्थः । न चैकार्थतैव सर्वथा हेया ; एकवाक्यताविरोधात् । एवमेकार्थवृत्तित्वविधानात्पर्यायत्वमेव प्रसज्यत इति चेत् , स्यादेतदेवम् , यदि समभिव्याहारलब्धैकार्थत्वात्पर्यायत्वमुच्यते । व्युत्पत्तिलब्धात्तु तत् । तथापि किं पर्यायव्यवच्छेदेन । एवमप्येकार्थवृत्तिसिद्धेरिति चेन्न ; (यतः?) फलभेदः । न हि घटः कुण्ड इति पदद्वयप्रयोगे प्रतिपदं प्रयोजनभेद उपलभ्यते । नीलमुत्पलमित्यत्र-त्वनीलानुत्पलव्यावृत्तिलक्षणफलोपलम्भादपर्यायत्वं बहुमन्यामहे । न चैतावता अर्थभेदापातः। यदि च पदान्तरं न प्रयुज्येत, विशेषणान्तरान्वयस्स्यात् । तत्परिहाराय तत्प्रयोगः । यदि च निमित्तविवक्षा आश्रीयेत, ततो विशेषणविशेष्यभावेनान्वये जातिगुणादीनामन्योन्यसमवाय-स्स्यात् । एकपदोपात्तस्य ह्यन्येन विशेषणम् । अतश्च निमित्तानादरः । यद्यपि नीलमुत्पल-मित्यत्र निमित्तभूतविशेषणान्वयः प्रतीयते, तथापि नासौ शब्दशक्तिकृतः । प्रमाणान्तर-सिद्धस्य तु शब्देना (ब्देन?) बाधमारचयति, अन्यपरत्वात् । यथा गामनयेत्युक्ते तद्गतगुण-जात्यन्तरेष्वपि प्रतिलब्धानयनेषु गोत्वातिरेकी न शब्दार्थः ॥

अत एव हि सत्यज्ञानादिवेदान्तवाक्येषु शब्दैकसमधिगम्यमखण्डैकरसं ब्रह्म सिद्ध्यति । तत्र हि जगत्कारणतयोपलक्षितस्य 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्' इति सजातीयविजातीयस्वगतनानात्वरहितस्य कारणत्वकृतविकाराश्रयत्वादिदोषपरिजि-हीर्षया स्वरूपशोधनाय प्रवृत्तानि निष्प्रत्यूहमखण्डवाक्यार्थं बोधयन्त्येव साक्षादपि च कति-चिन्निषेधन्ति निश्शेषमभेदजातम् ॥ अतश्शोधकवाक्यान्तरानुरोधात् , कारणवाक्यैकार्थ्यात् , सामानाधिकरण्यस्वाभाव्याच्च शब्दैकसमधिगम्यं ब्रह्म सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्यैर्निश्शेषविशेषशून्य-मेवेति ज्ञायते । न च तत्तन्निषेधवशादभावरूपविशेषणसमुन्मेषप्रसङ्गः ; अशेषभावनिषेधेऽ-भावस्यापि तत्त्वता निवृत्तेः । भावप्रतियोगिको ह्यभावः । स च भावस्य क्वचिद्वृत्तावास्पदं लभते । इह तु सर्वथा सर्वभावेषु विलीनेषु को निषेधार्थ इति ?

अत्रोच्यते—

एकोक्तानतिरेकश्चेन्निष्फलं स्यात्पदान्तरम् ।
अतिरेके कथन्नु स्यादखण्डार्थाभिधायिता ॥

यदि हि नीलमुत्पलमित्यादिपदेष्वेकपदप्रतिपन्नात्पदान्तरप्रतिपन्नं नातिरिच्येत, ततो निष्फलमेव पदान्तरमापद्येत ।

यदुक्तं व्यावृत्तिभेदः फलमिति, तन्न ; व्यावर्त्यभेदाभावात् । तदभेदश्च प्रतिपाद्यभेदाभावात् । प्रतिपाद्यप्रतियोगी हि व्यावृत्तो युक्तः ; अन्यथा अतिप्रसङ्गात् । यदि च नीलपदस्य नीलिमविशिष्टार्थो न विवक्षितः, किमित्यनीलव्यावृत्तिरेव फलति । नीलपीतसाधारणं हि विशेष्यम् । ततोऽपीतव्यावृत्तिरपि फलमित्यापद्येत । अविवक्षितमपि यमर्थं स्मारयति तत्प्रतिव्या (तियोगि व्या?) वर्तत इति चेत् , तर्हि गौश्शुक्ल इत्युक्ते दशानामपि प्रतियोगिनो व्यावर्त्या भवेयुः । व्याघातादेक एवेति चेन्न ; निमित्ताविवक्षायामव्याघातात् । तद्विवक्षायां हि सास्नादिमत्त्वबाणत्वादेरेकत्र विरोधः । अविवक्षायान्तु सास्नादिमतामबाणादीनाञ्च[1] केषाञ्चित्संभवात्तद्व्यवच्छेदो युज्यत एव ॥

निश्शेषव्यवच्छेदप्रतियोगिव्यवच्छेदो दुर्भणः । [2]स च विवक्षितः । तस्मादसमुच्चय इति चेन्न ; भवत्पक्षे तदसम्भवः । न ह्यखण्डवाक्यार्थपक्षे नीलपदस्य सकलानीलव्यवच्छिन्नार्थता सम्भवति ; तस्यापि वाक्यार्थस्य नीलगुणत्वाभावेनानीलत्वात्तद्व्यवच्छेदस्य तस्मिन्ननुपपत्तेः । यद्यपि प्रमाणान्तरगम्येषु नीलादिषु लोके वैशिष्ट्यावगमात्प्रतियोगित्वाभावः , तथापि वेदे शब्दैकसमधिगम्यस्स खल्वखण्डार्थस्सकलविशेषशून्य इति सर्वपदव्यवच्छेद्यतामर्हतीति कथं तत्तत्पदार्थत्वम् । अतस्तत्तन्निमित्ताविवक्षायामेकार्थ एव न सिद्ध्यति ।

१. सास्नादिमतां बाणादीनां पा०

२. व्यवच्छेदप्रतियोगिनां सर्वेषां व्यवच्छेदोऽत्र विवक्षितः। तत्र अनीलव्यवच्छेदापीतव्यवच्छेदादिसर्वव्यवच्छेदग्रहणे तत्प्रतियोगिसामान्यव्यवच्छेदो दुर्वच इत्यनीलसामान्यव्यवच्छेदपरत्वमित्यर्थः ॥

अथ तस्यार्थत्वादव्यवच्छेद्यत्वम्; त्यज तर्हि निश्शेषव्यवच्छेदव्यसनम्। सर्वेषाञ्च समानाधिकरणवाक्यानामेक एवार्थः परस्परार्थव्यत्ययो वेत्यापद्येत। निमित्तविरोधाविरोधयोरविशेषेण घटः पट इति सामानाधिकरण्यं प्रसज्येत।

व्यधिकरणवाक्यस्थानाञ्च पदानामेकार्थविवक्षा किमिति नाश्रीयेत। न च प्रकृत्यर्थातिरिक्तप्रत्ययार्थविरोधादैकार्थ्यं व्यधिकरणवाक्येषु न सिद्ध्यतीति वाच्यम्; ऐकार्थ्यविरुद्धानामशेषाणां त्याज्यत्वेन निर्णयात्। त्यागमन्तरेणैकार्थ्यमेव न सिद्ध्यतीति चेन्न; न हि समानाधिकरणवाक्यान्यपि तथा न स्युः। तथाप्यैकार्थ्यं यत्प्रकारजुषां व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धं, तत्प्रकारजुषामेव तदभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति चेन्न; भवद्विवक्षितैकार्थ्यस्य प्रमाणान्तरागोचरत्वात्। प्रमाणान्तरगोचरत्वेऽपि व्युत्पत्त्यगोचरत्वात्। न हि समानाधिकरणवाक्यप्रतिपाद्यं तत्तन्निमित्तविरहीति क्वचिदुपलब्धम्। न च प्रमाणान्तरागोचरेऽपि जायमानं 'विन्ध्याटव्यां मदमुदितो मातङ्गगणस्तिष्ठति' इति वाक्यात् ज्ञानमविशिष्टविषयं दृष्टम्। अतो व्युत्पत्त्यनुसारेण वाक्यार्थनिर्णयस्तत्तन्निमित्तविशिष्टतयैव। अपरथा अतिप्रसङ्गः॥

अपि च भावाभावयोरितरनिषेधात्मकत्वादनीलनिषेधो नीलमेवेति नीलमविवक्षितम्, अनीलनिषेधस्तु विवक्षित इति व्याहतं को नामान्योऽभिदध्यात् ऋते देवानां प्रियात्? यदि च तत्तन्निमित्तप्रतियोगिव्यवच्छेदं फलमभिलष्यते, तर्हि तत्तद्व्यवच्छेदविशिष्टस्यार्थस्य प्रतियोगिव्यवच्छेदत्वं (?) भेदादेकार्थता व्याहन्येतैव.

अथ विशेष्यमात्रत्वाद्व्यावृत्तीनां न भेदशङ्कावकाशः, तर्हि तन्मात्रस्य प्रथमपदेनैव सिद्धत्वान्निष्फलमेव पदान्तरमापद्येत। यदि च तस्याशब्दार्थत्वं, तदानीं शब्दस्य तदेव निष्फलत्वम्। अथ तस्य व्यवच्छिन्नरूपस्य लक्ष्यत्वेन मुख्यार्थभेदाभावादेकार्थतेति मतम्, तर्हि लक्ष्यस्य धर्मिणो मुख्यार्थत्वाभावादेकार्थतापि न सिद्ध्येत्; निमित्तमुख्यानुसारित्वात्तन्मुख्यत्वस्य, यथा सिंहो देवदत्तः, यथा वा त्वत्पृष्टः पुरुषः स्थाणुः इत्यादिषु॥

अथवा (?) व्यवच्छेद्यस्य कुत्रचिदपि पारमार्थिकत्वाभावात्तत्प्रतियोगिनो[1] व्यव-

१. तत्प्रतियोगिकस्य व्यवच्छेदस्य.

च्छेद्य (च्छेद?) स्यापि पारमार्थिकत्वानुपपत्तेरर्थभेदानापादकत्वम्, तर्हि प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तेन किमपराद्धम्? यत् तदपनुद्यते।

एवं समानाधिकरणवाक्यार्थमपि वाक्यार्थान्तरवद्विशिष्टमेवोपगम्य पश्चात्सर्वमिथ्यात्वमुपपाद्यताम्; किमनेनैकार्थग्रहणेन। न चाभावस्य स्वगतविशेषाभावादविशेषकत्वमिति; स्वगतविशेषाभावे तद्विशिष्टस्यैव व्यावृत्तेस्स्वरूपभेदमात्रेणैव विशेषकत्वानपायात्। न च विशेषणत्वमपि तत एव निवर्तत इति वक्तव्यम्; विशेषणत्वस्य विशिष्टतापेक्षायामनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात्। इष्ट एवायमर्थ इति चेत्, अभावेऽपि तथेष्यताम्; स्वरूपभेदस्य प्रतिसम्बन्धिविशिष्टत्वेन वक्तुं शक्यत्वात्। न च[1] स्वसमवेतमिव (मेव?) विशेषणमित्यभ्युपगम्यैवमेषितुं शक्यम्। न च भावान्तराभाववादिनामर्थान्तराभावाद्विशिष्टता न स्यादिति वाच्यम्; अभावाख्येन भावभेदेनैव विशेषणतापत्तेः। अतस्सामानाधिकरण्यं सर्वथा विशिष्टपरमेव। यदि परममुख्यार्थव्यतिक्रमो लक्षणाभ्युपगमश्च भवतामभिरुचितः, ततो व्यावृत्तिलक्षणा आश्रीयताम्। एवमाद्यभिसन्धायोक्तं **भगवद्भाष्यकारपादैः**—'इयांस्तु विशेषः एकस्मिन्पक्षे पदानां मुख्यार्थता, अपरस्मिंश्च तेषां लक्षणा' इति।

किञ्च लक्षणवाक्यसिद्धयोर्निमित्तभेदैकार्थ्ययोरन्यतरत्र किं (?) कुतो भवतां पक्षपातः?। विरोधादिति चेत्; निमित्तभेदविरोधादेकार्थतैवाप्रामाणिकी हीयताम्। किमव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धनिमित्तत्यागेन?[2] कश्चात्र विरोधः? किमेकार्थवत्प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभेदयोः,[3] अथ गुणजात्योः परस्परसमवायप्रसङ्गलक्षणः, किं वा निमित्तयोरेव। नाद्यः; अन्यगतभेदस्यान्यगताभेदेनाविरोधात्। विशेष्याभेदेनैकार्थत्वमिति विवक्षितत्वात्। न च तत्तद्विशेषणविशिष्टत्वरूपस्यैकत्वानुपपत्तिदोष इति वाच्यम्; विशिष्टत्वं हि विशेषणसम्बन्धः, कथं तद्भेदस्य

१. स्वसमवेतमेव विशेषणमिति नेत्यभ्युपगम्य प्रतिसम्बन्धिविशिष्टत्वेनापि स्वरूपभेद एषितुं शक्य इत्यर्थः।

२. निमित्तत्यागो व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धो नेति किं तत्करणेनेत्यर्थः। अव्युत्पत्तीत्यत्र व्युत्पत्तीति वा पाठस्स्यात्।

३. एकार्थसम्बन्धिनी ये प्रवृत्तिनिमित्ते तद्गतयोर्मिथो भेदयोर्विरोधः किमित्यर्थः।

विशेष्यभेदापादकत्वम्। तदेकत्वे च विशिष्टभेदाभावः, प्रधानगोचरत्वाद्विशिष्टशब्दस्य। न च शब्दस्य विशिष्टाभिधानं विरुद्धम्; निमित्तविशिष्ट एव व्युत्पत्तेस्तदभाव एवाभिधानविरोधात्। न द्वितीयः; विशेषणानां विशेष्यनिष्ठत्वापेक्षणात्। न ह्यन्यसमवायस्यान्यविशेषणत्वोपयोगः; अतिप्रसङ्गात्। न च गुणजात्योरेव मिथो विशेषणत्वम्; तथा अप्रतिपत्तेः। तथात्वे चानिष्टत्वाभावात्। न च शाब्दे व्यवहारे परस्परसमवायप्रसङ्ग इति वाच्यम्; प्रसञ्जकाभावात्। [1]न हि शब्दस्य विशेषणत्वं तथात्वेनेति क्वचिद्दृष्टम्। तदा वा कृतं विवादेन; दर्शनबलादविरोधोपपत्तेः। तस्मादेकेन पदेनोपस्थापितस्य विशेष्यस्यान्यानि विशेषणानि भवन्ति; न सर्वस्य। अत एव ह्याकाङ्क्षादित्रयं कारणमन्वयस्येति वदन्ति नीतिविदः। न च तृतीयः; समानाधिकरणपदोपात्तानां नीलत्वोत्पलत्वादीनामेकाश्रयसम्बन्धे विरोधाभावात्।

नापि सोऽयं देवदत्त इत्यादिषु विरोधश्शङ्कनीयः; तदेककाल (तद्देशकाल?) (तदेतत्काल?) (तदिदङ्काल?) योर्देवदत्तसम्बन्धाविरोधात्। इतरथा क्षणभङ्गप्रसङ्गात्। इदानीं तत्कालसम्बन्धो विरुद्ध इति चेत्, किमिदानीमस्यापि कालस्य संयोगः? न हि कालस्य कालान्तरापेक्षा; अनवस्थानात्। यत्रापि विरोधः, तत्रापि तयोरन्यतरस्यैव बाधो युक्तः। ....[न हि] पुरुषस्स्थाणुरित्युक्ते द्वयोरपि बाधो दृश्यते।

अपि चात्र प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तव्यतिरेकेण शा(श?)ब्दस्याभिधाने[2] व्युत्पत्तिनैरपेक्ष्यं प्रसज्येत। ततश्च समानाधिकरणवाक्यबलाना(वाक्यं बालाना?)मखण्डार्थमवबोधयेत्। एवं तावल्लोके विशिष्टगोचरत्वम्। वेदेऽपि तथा अभ्युपगन्तव्यम्; लोकवेदाधिकरणन्यायात्। तथा च सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्येषु व्यावृत्तिलक्षणा न सङ्गच्छते।

न च कारणवाक्यैकार्थ्ये सिद्धेऽखण्डार्थत्वं न्याय्यम्; एतद्वाक्यानुरोधेन तेषामेव विशिष्टार्थत्वोपपत्तेः। न च तेषामप्यद्वैतपरत्वम्; न हि निखिलजगन्निमित्तोपादानभावोप-

१. शब्दाधीनं विशेषणत्वं परस्परसमवाये सत्येवेति न दृष्टमित्यर्थः।

२. अभिधायकत्व इत्यर्थः

योगितया ज्ञानशक्त्यादिगुणसागरीभूतं निखिलचेतनाचेतनशरीरकं परमात्मानमभिदधद्वाक्यं निर्विशेषपरमिति युक्तं वक्तुम्। न च शोधकवाक्यान्तरेण निर्विशेषत्वसिद्धिः; निषेधस्य सामान्यगोचरस्य विहितविशेषव्यतिरिक्तगोचरत्वात्, विशेषनिषेधसमानविषयत्वाच्च। तथा हि नीतिविदो वदन्ति।

तस्मात्समानाधिकरणवाक्यार्थोऽन्यथा वर्णनीयः। स उच्यते—अयमत्र तावल्लक्षण-वाक्यार्थः, प्रवृत्तिरभिधानं तस्य निमित्तं कारणम्। शब्दाः खलु कस्मिंश्चिदर्थे वर्तितुं निमित्ततया किञ्चित्सामान्यमवलम्बन्ते। एतदुक्तं भवति—शब्दानां वाच्योऽर्थो द्विविधः, द्वारभूतः उद्देश्यश्च। वृद्धव्यवहारे व्युत्पन्नानां व्यवहाराय प्रयुज्यमानानाञ्च तेषां व्यवहार्ये द्वारिणि प्राधान्येन वृत्तिः। द्वारभूते जात्यादौ तदवच्छेदायानन्त्यव्यवहा(व्यभिचा?)रपरिहाराय च तदर्थतयेति[१]। तत्प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं भिन्नं येषां, तेषामेकस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तिर्यमभिधातुर्नि (तुं नि?) मित्तान्वेषणं तस्मिन्नेकस्मिन्नित्यर्थः। तत्र प्रवृत्तिस्सामानाधिकरण्यमिति। अत्र भिन्नप्रवृत्ति-निमित्तानामिति पर्यायपदव्युदासः। एकस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तिरिति व्यधिकरणानामिति। एवं तावल्लक्षणवाक्यं समञ्जसं भवति। न चात्र व्युत्पत्तिव्यवहारविरोधः; तन्निमित्तविशिष्टस्यैव सर्वत्र प्रतीतेः। इतरथैव हि विरोध इत्युक्तम्। न चात्र भेदाभेदविरोधः; निमित्तनिष्ठत्वाद्भेदस्य, उद्देश्यगतत्वादेकत्वस्य।

एवं लोके व्युत्पत्तिव्यवहारयोर्विशिष्टविषयतया सामानाधिकरण्यस्य सुदृढं निरूढत्वाद्वेदेऽपि तत्तद्गुणविशिष्ट एव परमात्मा सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्यैस्सिद्ध्यतीति सर्वं समञ्जसम्।

इति श्रीभगवद्रामानुजमुनिवरमतधुरन्धरस्यात्रिगोत्रप्रदीपश्रीपद्मनाभार्यनन्दनस्य
वादिहंसनवाम्बुदस्य श्रीमद्रामानुजाचार्यस्य कृतिषु न्यायकुलिशे
सामानाधिकरण्यवादस्सप्तमः.

१. प्रधानशेषतयेत्यर्थः

श्रीः

॥ सत्कार्यवादोऽष्टमः ॥

श्रुतिरेवैकविज्ञानाद्वदन्ती सर्ववेदनम् ।
सत्कार्यवादं प्रस्तौति संस्थानं जातिमेव च ॥

तथाहि—'येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवत्यमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातम्' 'आत्मनि खल्वरे दृष्टे श्रुते मते विज्ञाते इदं सर्वं विज्ञातम्' इत्यादिश्रुतिभिरेकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानमुपदिश्यते । तच्च कथमित्यपेक्षायां 'यथा सौम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृण्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्' इत्यादिभिरुपपाद्यते। तदवगच्छामः कारणद्रव्यमेवावस्थान्तरापन्नं कार्यद्रव्यमिति। कथमन्यथान्यज्ञानादन्यस्य विज्ञानं स्यात् ॥

तादात्म्ये वा कथं हेतुहेतुमद्भावः ? न हि घटज्ञानेन घटज्ञानमित्युच्यत इति चेत्, सत्यम्। न ह्यत्र कार्यकारणभावेन ते (द्वे ?) ज्ञाने उपदिश्येते; किन्त्वेकज्ञानेन सर्वं विषयीकृतं भवतीति। अत ओदनपाकं पचतीतिवत् प्रत्ययार्थ एव द्वितीयश्रुतविज्ञातादिशब्देन विवक्षित इति नेयम्। एकसर्वशब्दयोस्तु कार्यकारणावस्थाद्वयान्वितविषयत्वेना (त्वेन ना ?) धिकविषयत्वम् ।

ननु च कथं तर्हि कारणावस्थविज्ञानेन कार्यावस्थस्य विषयीकृतत्वम्। कार्यावस्थायास्तदगोचरत्वादिति चेत्, सत्यं नावस्थाविषयः; तथापि तस्य द्रव्यस्य ज्ञातत्वव्यपदेश इत्यदोषः। यथा हि तिष्ठतो देवदत्तस्य दर्शनेन गच्छतोऽपि दृष्टत्वव्यवहारः। अपूर्ववदेव देवदत्तो गच्छतीत्युक्ते हि प्रतिब्रवीति, 'दृष्ट एव पूर्वं तत्रासीनः' इति। एवमिहापि भवितुमर्हति । दर्शनान्तरेषु एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तवाक्यार्थसङ्गतिः **भाष्यकारपादैरेव** तत्र प्रपञ्चितत्वान्नेह प्रस्तूयते ॥

अत्रेदं विमर्शनीयम्—कथं कारणद्रव्यमेव कार्यतामनुभवतीति। तत्र हि केचिदाहुः—

कार्यं भिन्नमुपादानाद्बुद्धिशब्दान्तरादिभिः ।
अन्यथा हि प्रपञ्चोऽयं प्र(यमप्र ?) त्यक्षः प्रसज्यते ॥

तथाहि—न तावत्कारणमेव कार्यमित्यभ्युपगन्तुमुचितम्; बुद्धिभेदात्। स्वरूपभेदो हि बुद्धिभेदव्यवस्थाप्यः। स चोत्तभ्यते विरुद्धधर्माध्यासेन। अतो वक्ष्यमाणैर्धर्मभेदैरुत्तम्भितो बुद्धिभेदस्तावत्कार्यकारणद्रव्ययोस्स्वरूपभेदं व्यवस्थापयति। शब्दभेदादयश्च विरुद्धा धर्माः। तन्तवः पट इति शब्दभेदः। सूक्ष्मः स्थूल इति परिणामभेदः। बहवः एक इति सङ्ख्याभेदः। निम्नोन्नताद्यवयवसन्निवेशभावाभावात्मा आकारभेदः। आच्छादनादिसामर्थ्यासामर्थ्याभ्यां कार्यभेदः, शक्तिभेदश्च। कार्यस्य स एव; कारणस्य तु स चासश्चेति कालभेदः। एवमादयो विरुद्धा धर्मा नैकस्मिन्नेव कल्पन्ते ॥

यदि च प्रागपि कार्यद्रव्यं स्यात्, कारकव्यापारो निष्फलस्स्यात्।
नित्यानित्यविभागोऽपि न क्वचिद्द्रव्येषु स्यात्।

अथावस्थाभेदमाश्रित्यैतत्सर्वं समाधीयत इति मतम्, तन्न; विकल्पासहत्वात्। तथाहि—किमवस्थाभेदः कार्यकारणयोरनुगत एव, उतानियतः, किं वा कार्ये वा कारणे वा व्यवस्थित एव? नाद्यः कल्पः; द्रव्यस्वरूपवत्तस्यापि सत्तादिलक्षणस्याव्यवस्थापकत्वात्। किञ्चिद्व्यवस्थितं हि क्वचित्स्वानुवर्तिनमन्यमपि धर्मं व्यवस्थापयितुमीष्टे। अनुगतं हि नामान्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण वा धर्मान्तरविकल्पं प्रत्यप्रयोजकमेव। [१]अनियतस्य तु दूरे नियामकत्वम्। [२]नियतश्च स्वाभावसहायः पूर्वोक्तविरुद्धधर्मपक्षनिक्षेपमर्हति। न च कश्चिद्विरुद्धो धर्मस्तथाविधं धर्मान्तरमविरुद्धमापादयति। स्वयमविरुद्ध इति कथं नियतः? अविरोधो ह्युभयत्रान्वयदर्शनेन निर्वाह्यः; यथा शीतोष्णानुगतस्य द्रव्यत्वादेः।

१. द्वितीयं दूषयति—अनियतस्येति.
२. तृतीये आह—नियतश्चेति.

कश्चासौ[१]? यदि संयोगादिलक्षणोऽभ्युपगम्यते, कथमसौ प्रागपि विद्यमानः कार्यावस्थां नियच्छेत्। अथ तद्विशेषः, स किं लक्षणः येन कार्यं जायते? स एवेति चेन्न; कार्यासिद्धौ तदसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात्। ननु तथाप्यसावस्त्येव; इतरथान्योन्याश्रयापत्तेः। प्रत्यक्षश्च; संयोगजातीयत्वादिति चेत्, न; तथाप्येकत्वस्थूलत्वादीनामाश्रयान्तरमन्तरेणानिर्वाहात्। न हि संयोग एवाश्रयो युक्तः, गुणत्वात्। न च संयोगिनः; तेषामनेकत्वादस्थूलत्वाच्च। एकत्वानेकत्वयोः स्थूलत्वास्थूलत्वयोश्च [२]एवमविरोध इति चेत्, तर्हि किमाश्रयमन्तर्भाव्य कथ्यते[३]। तर्हि भेदाभेदवाद एवाङ्गीकृतस्स्यात्। अन्यथा ह्यनाश्रयस्य गुणस्यानवस्थानप्रसङ्गः[४]। अभेद एवाङ्गीकृत इति चेन्न; विरुद्धधर्माध्यासाद्भेदस्यापि दुरपह्नवत्वात्। न च क्वचिद्देशे तयोस्सामानाधिकरण्यं दृष्टम्; येनाविरोधोऽपि कथ्येत। किञ्च संयोगोपाधिकमेकत्वमिच्छतां क्वचिदपि साक्षादेकासिद्धेः, पुनरनेकासिद्धौ द्रव्याभावे गुणाद्यभावाच्च सर्वलोकापलापः प्रकारान्तरेणोपस्थित इति साधु भवता प्रपञ्चापलापः परिहृतो भवति। इदमेव साक्षादेकमिति चेत्, किमयं वाङ्मात्रेणोपचारश्श्रद्धास्यते। तर्हि नानात्वमेवौपचारिकमस्तु, एकत्वन्तु न हातुं शक्यमिति चेत्; अहो भवतां प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वाभिलाषमहिमा; यत्कारणमपहाय कार्यं तिष्ठापयिषन्ति।

किञ्च

> योग्यता सर्वभावानां यावदाश्रयभाविनी।
> अतः प्रत्यक्षताणूनां स्थूला प्रत्यक्षतापि वा ॥

शक्तिर्हि यावदाश्रयभाविनी कार्यानुगुणशक्तिवादिभिरुपेयते। स्थूलश्चार्थः प्रत्यक्ष ज्ञानजनक (नन?) शक्तस्तद्गोचरो भवति। स एव चेदणुभावेनापि वर्तते, कथं तदानीं

१. किञ्चासाववस्थाभेदः किंरूप इत्यर्थः.

२. कार्यत्वकारणत्वादिवदित्यर्थः.

३. आश्रयमन्तर्भाव्य कथ्यते किम्? इत्यन्वयः.

४. आश्रयरहितश्चेद् गुणोऽयं न तिष्ठेदित्यर्थः.

प्रत्यक्षो भवेत्। अणुत्वेन वा (?) वर्तमानानामशक्तिनिश्चयात्। तेषामेव[१] प्रत्यक्षे स्थूलत्वे प्रत्यक्षता न स्यात्। अथ स्थूलत्वमेव [२]सहकार्यसत्त्वादिविशिष्टस्यैव शक्तस्य द्रव्यस्य प्रत्यक्षतेति मतम्; किं तत् स्थूलत्वम्? किं महिमगुणशालित्वमेव वैशेषिकोक्तमुपक्र-(पग?) म्यापेक्षिकमनापेक्षिकं च महत्त्वम्, तर्हि परमाणुकारणत्वाद् द्व्यणुकादिप्रक्रियादीना मभ्युपगमप्रसङ्गः। अथापेक्षिकमेवानन्तम्, तर्ह्यतिसूक्ष्मेष्वप्रतिष्ठं प्रत्यक्षत्वं प्रसज्येत।

किञ्च योऽयं पृथिव्यादीनां द्रव्याणां परस्परभेदः, यश्च घटपटादीनामेवानन्तप्रकारः, स सर्वो भवतां न सिद्ध्येत्। उपादानादभिन्नस्योपादेयस्य मिथोऽपि भेदानुपपत्तेः; उपादाने च पृथिवीत्वादेस्तदुपयोगिनो भेदान्तरस्याभावात्। अस्ति नस्स्वरूपभेद इति चेन्न; घट-द्वयविलक्षणस्य घटपटभेदस्य तेनानिर्वाहात्। निर्वाहे वा कथं तेनैव स्वर्णेन रुचकस्वस्तिक-वर्धमानादिकार्योत्पादः क्रमेण सङ्गच्छते। किञ्च संस्थानमेव भवतां भेदः; तस्यैव जाति-रूपत्वात्, जात्यादेरेव भेदत्वात। अतो नानासंस्थानभाक्षु द्रव्येषु भवद्भिरेव भेदः कण्ठोक्त्या समर्पित इति किं तद्विरुद्धेन सत्कार्यवादग्रहणेन। किञ्च कार्यद्रव्यं भूत्वा (अभूत्वा;[३]) भवतीति सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धम्। अवस्थादृष्टान्तोऽर्थानुमानेनापि सिद्धमिति[४] किमर्धजरतीन्या-येन। न च साङ्ख्यवत्सर्वं कार्यं सदेवोत्पद्यत इति भवतामभ्युपगमः। न चोपादाननिय-मादिसाङ्ख्योक्तहेतुजालावलम्बनमस्ति; अवस्थास्वसत्कार्यवादसमर्थनाय तेषां प्रत्युक्तत्वात। अतो वरं स एव[५] द्रव्येष्वाश्रितः। किन्तरां सत्कार्यवादक्लेशेनेति।

१. अणूनामेव प्रत्यक्षमिति स्वीकारे स्थूलत्वे कथं प्रत्यक्षमिति भावः.

२. स्थूलत्वं सहकारीकृत्येत्यर्थः। सत्त्वमर्थक्रियाकारित्वम्। सत्त्वाद्विशिष्टस्येति पा०.

३. अभूत्वा भवतीति पाठो युक्तः न्यायभाष्याद्यनुसारी च; पूर्वमस्थित्वा पश्चाद्भवतीत्यर्थः.

४. अर्थानुमानेऽपि सिद्ध इति पा०.

अवस्थादृष्टान्तोऽस्यानुमानेऽपि सिद्ध इति पाठस्स्यात्। सिद्धमिति पाठे कार्यद्रव्यस्याभूत्वा भवनं न केवलं सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धम्। किन्तु अवस्थादृष्टान्तोत्थानुमानेनापि सिद्धमिति भावानुगुणं भावनीयम्.

५. अवस्थायामङ्गीकृतस्स एवासत्कार्यवादः द्रव्येष्वेवास्त्विति ॥

अत्रोच्यते—

कार्यकारणयोरैक्यं प्रत्यभिज्ञानतस्स्थिरम् ।
विरुद्धधर्मसम्बन्धो व्यवस्थाभेदबन्धनः ॥

पश्यामो हि वयं तदेव मृत्तन्त्वादिद्रव्यं संस्थानान्तरमासाद्य घटपटादिभावमनुभवतीति। तत्र यदुक्तं स्वरूपभेदो बुद्धिभेदेन सिद्ध्यतीति; तत्रासिद्धो बुद्धिभेदः। प्रत्युताभेदस्यैवोक्ताकारया बुद्ध्या साधितत्वात्। ततश्च न विरुद्धधर्माध्यासादिभिरुत्तम्भयितुं कल्पयितुं वा शक्यते। ननु उपादानानुवृत्तिरेव दृश्यते; न तु कार्यस्य प्रागपि सत्तेति चेन्न; तस्यैव द्रव्यस्यावस्थान्तरप्राप्तिरिति प्रतीतेः। न हि तस्मिन्ननुवर्तमाने द्रव्यान्तरं समस्तीति प्रत्येति। अत एव समानाधिकरणप्रत्ययोपपत्तिः। इतरथा ह्युपादानोपादेययोर्व्यधिकरणप्रत्ययो भवेत्। कथं च भवता दुग्धादिभिर्दध्यादिष्वारभ्यमाणेषु प्रत्ययानुवृत्तिस्स्यात्। न हि तत्रावयवागमो दृश्यते; दुग्धावयविनस्तदवयवानां वा दध्यनारम्भकत्वाभ्युपगमात्। परमाणूनां दुग्धदधिजातीयानामप्रत्यक्षत्वात्। दध्यवयवानां च पूर्वमसत्त्वात्। अत एव भ्रान्तिरसाविति चेन्न; निर्बाधत्वात्। तन्तुपटादिभ्यो विशेषाभावात्। अतः प्रत्यक्षमेव निरपेक्षमेवमादिषूदाहरण सहस्रेषु कार्यकारणयोरवस्थाभेद एव न द्रव्यभेद इति व्यवस्थापयति। एवं स्थिते कयानुपपत्त्या द्रव्यान्तरमध्यवस्येम। विरुद्धधर्माध्यासोऽप्यवस्थाभेदात्सङ्गच्छते। सा चावस्था संयोगादिलक्षणा प्रत्यक्षसिद्धा। तत्र यत्तावदुक्तं, नियतस्तु विरुद्धधर्मान्तरमेवेति; स्यादेतदेवं, यदि धर्म (र्मि ?) द्वयनिष्ठतया स्वयं स्वाभावश्च प्रतीयेयाताम्। एकधर्मिण्येव कदाचित्स्वयमुत्पद्यत इति सर्वैरवसितत्वात्। संयोगो ह्यसमवायितया[1] भवद्भिरपीष्यमाणस्तन्त्वादिष्वेव समुपजायते, नार्थान्तरे। स तु स्वाधिकरणे स्वाधीनधर्मान्तरमपि व्यवस्थापयतीति किं नोपपद्यते।

कथमेकत्वं बहुषु व्यवस्थापयेदिति चेत्, तत्किमेकत्वबहुत्वयोर्निरुपाधिकयोर्विरोधः, उतोपाधिभेदापादितयोरपि ? न प्रथमः; बहुषु प्रत्येकमेकत्वाभावप्रसङ्गात्। न द्वितीयः;

१. असमवायिकारणतयेत्यर्थः।

संयोगविशेषस्यैवोपाधित्वात्। न चैवमौपाधिकत्वे स्वाभाविकैकत्वालाभः; अस्यैव स्वाभाविकत्वात्। हेतुरेव ह्यत्रोपाधिरिति गीयते। तच्च..............................

[1]स्थितावप्यपेक्षितम्। तदपाये ह्येकत्वं नश्यति। एतावानत्रावयोर्विशेषः—संयोगादसमवायिकारणाद्द्रव्यं जायते, अस्मादेकत्वं त्वन्मते। अस्माकं तु संयोगादेव संयोगिष्वेकत्वमिति। न चैवं भेदाभेदप्रसङ्गः; समवायिद्रव्यातिरिक्तस्य द्रव्यान्तरस्य प्रसङ्गाभावात्।

एतेन स्थूलत्वं व्याख्यातम्। पिठरपाकवादिनां परिमाणद्वयस्यैकाधिकरणत्वं कालभेदेन तत्तदुपाधितो निरुह्यत एव। तत्र चोपाधिभेदेनेति न विशेषः; दृष्टत्वादेव हि तत्राप्यविरोधः।

यत्तु विरुद्धधर्माध्यासाद्भेदोऽपि दुर्वार इति; तत्रासिद्धिः; विरोधाभावस्योक्तत्वात्। एतेन च साक्षादेकत्वासिद्धिः प्रत्युक्ता। न चान्यगतमेकत्वमन्यत्रोपचर्यते। न च नानात्वमपि साक्षान्नास्ति। यथा हि प्रत्येकमेकत्वेऽपि तेषामेवापेक्षाबुद्धिगृहीतानां तेन रूपेण बहुत्वाधारत्वम्, एवमपेक्षाबुद्धिगृहीतानां बहुत्वेऽपि तामपहाय संसर्गगृहीतानामेकत्वमेवेति सांदृष्टिकमेतत्। स्वातन्त्र्ये चापेक्षाबुद्धिरात्मानं लभते। संयोगविशेषस्तु स्वातन्त्र्यं विरुणद्धि। अत एव हि कथञ्चित्स्वारसिकं न लभ्यते नानात्वम्। न चेतः पर[2] किञ्चिदेकत्वं क्वचिद्दृष्टम्, यदलाभादलोपचारं मनुषे। अतो न प्रपञ्चापलापप्रसङ्गः॥

यच्चापरमुक्तं योग्यता यावदाश्रयभाविनीति, तत्र कार्यप्रतिसम्बन्धिनि कारणे योग्यतेत्यविवादम्। तत्र यावत्कारणमस्ति, तावद्योग्यतापि स्यात्। कारणं चावस्थितमेव द्रव्यं न केवलम्। तत्रावस्थाः द्रव्यस्वरूपव्यपदेशहेतवः। तास्संस्थानं जातिरिति चापदिश्यन्ते। न हि केवलस्य द्रव्यस्य व्यपदेशो भवति। द्रव्यमित्यपि गुणाश्रयत्वोपाधिको व्यपदेशः। जात्यवस्थितस्यैव द्रव्यस्य तदवस्थानिबन्धनान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां कारणत्वनिश्चयः। तथा निश्चितस्यैव

१. तच्चेत्यनन्तरं स्थिताविल्यतः पूर्वं किञ्चिद्गलितमित्यालोच्यते। परन्तु क्वचित् तत्सूचकान्तराळकल्पनमन्यत्रेवेह न लक्ष्यते। तदत्र यदि किञ्चिदस्ति, तर्हि अवयविस्थितावपीति रीत्या चिन्तनीयम्॥

२. अन्यदित्यर्थः.

सहकारित्वेन संयोगादिः प्रतिपत्तिमवतरति। संयोगरूपरसादयो हि गुणास्स्वेनैव रूपेण कार्यकारणभावादिकमनुभवन्ति। तथा च यस्य येन रूपेण कारणत्वं निश्चायते, तस्य यावदाश्रयभाविनी शक्तिरित्युक्ते सति, न परमसूक्ष्माणां प्रत्यक्षता परमस्थूलानां वा तन्निवृत्तिरापादयितुं शक्यते। किं वावस्थाव्यतिरेकेण द्रव्यमेव तत्तत्कार्यशक्तमस्तु; अवस्थाभिरनुगृह्यताम्। नापि (तथापि?) नातिसूक्ष्मप्रत्यक्षतापत्तिः; अपेक्षितमहत्त्वविशेषस्यैव यथादर्शनं सहकारित्वोपपत्तेः। तद्विशेषाश्च स्वत एव परस्परतो व्यावृत्ताः कार्यदर्शनानुगुण्येन सहकारितां प्रतिपत्स्यन्ते॥

एतेन भेदासिद्धिः प्रत्युक्ता। अवस्थाभेदनिबन्धनस्य द्रव्यभेदस्य विशिष्टगाचरस्य विशेष्यद्रव्याभेदेऽपि सिद्धेः। यत्र हि विशेष्यानुवृत्तिः स्फुटतरमवसीयते, तत्रापि विशेषणभेदाद्विशिष्टभेदः प्रतिलभ्यते। यत्र त्वाकाशादिषु विशेष्यस्य द्रव्यस्य धर्मान्तरवत्तया स्फुटतरानुवृत्तिप्रत्ययाभावः, तत्रावस्थाभेदनिबन्धनद्रव्यभेद एवावसातुं शक्यते। नैतावता अवस्थातिरिक्तद्रव्यापलापप्रसङ्गः; दर्शनस्पर्शनाभ्यामेकार्थग्रहणादिभिर्गुणगुणिभेदप्रतिपादकैस्तत्सिद्धेः। अतः स्थानभेदव्युत्पादनमप्यनवद्यम्; कार्यकारणयोरेव द्रव्ययो स्तथाविधस्य भेदस्येष्टत्वात्। न चैवं भेदाभेदप्रसङ्गोऽपि; अनन्यापेक्षयोरेकत्रानभ्युपगमात्। यद्यपि परैर्व्यक्तिद्वये कार्यद्वये वा जात्यात्मना कारणात्मना चा[१] भेदः, व्यक्त्यात्मना कार्यात्मना च भेद इत्युपाधिरप्यङ्गीकृतः। तथापि तैर्जातिव्यक्त्योः कार्यकारणयोश्च निरुपाधिकौ भेदाभेदौ साक्षादभ्युपगम्येते। न चैवं क्वचिदस्माकमस्त्यभ्युपगमः; संस्थानतद्वतोस्संस्थानयोश्चात्यन्तभेदात्। तदाश्रयद्रव्यस्य चात्यन्ताभेदात्। तस्य तु विशिष्टाकारेण भेद इत्यत्र न कश्चिद्विरोधः। संस्थानस्थैर्यनिबन्धनो द्रव्यस्थिरत्वव्यपदेशः। आत्मादिषु तन्नित्यत्वनिबन्धनो नित्यत्वव्यपदेशः। अचेतनेषु प्रकृतिद्रव्ये द्रव्यस्वरूपनिबन्धनं (नः?)। कालेऽपि कार्यकारणात्मनि प्रकृतिवदेवेति न नित्यानित्यविभागाभावोऽपि॥

१. वा इति पा०.

न च केवलं सङ्कल्पमात्रेण सर्वमिदं सङ्गिरामहे, येन सर्वत्र सत्कार्यवादो विपर्ययो वा स्वीकर्तुमुचित इति पर्यनुयो (यु ?) ज्येमहि। प्रमाणशरणास्तु[१]—प्रमाणन्तु प्रत्यभिज्ञानमचेतनमेवानुवृत्तं गोचरयति; नावस्थावद्भेदम्। अतः कस्यायमुपालम्भः? यदि च नैवं कारणकार्यद्रव्यस्वरूपनित्यत्वावस्थाभेदानभ्युपगच्छेम, कथं तर्ह्यमूर्तानां महदहङ्कारतन्मात्राकाशादीनामुत्पत्तिमुपपादयेम? न हि तत्रावयवसंयोगादवयविनोऽर्थान्तरस्यासत उत्पत्तिश्शक्या वक्तुम्। न च तेषामनुत्पत्तिरेव; श्रुतिसिद्धत्वात्तदुत्पत्तेः। सावयवेषु भूतेषु च भूतान्तरप्रकृतिकत्ववादस्त्वदुक्तावयवाधीनावयविनिष्पत्तिं प्रतिक्षिपति। न चासां श्रुतीनामर्थापहारस्तर्कविरोधो वा शक्यः कल्पयितुम्; प्रमाणविरोधे तर्कस्याभासस्थितेः।

ननु च 'आकाशाद्वायुः' इति च श्रूयते। तत्राकाशैकदेशस्य वाय्वात्मना परिणतस्य क्रियासमवायात्पूर्वदेशप्रहाणाप्रहाणविकल्पानुपपत्तिः। तथा च (हि ?)—प्रहाणं तावद्दुर्घटम्; हेयस्य देशस्याभावात्। भावे चाकाशस्यैव वायुतानुपपत्तिः। न हि तदेवाकाशादिकारणपरम्परावस्थितद्रव्यं वायुतावस्थां प्राप्य देशान्तरं गतमपि तत्रैव यथावस्थितमिति सम्भवति। आकाश एव कुत्र तिष्ठतीति तद्देशविमर्शे यद्यपि स्वपरनिर्वाहकत्वाद्देशान्तरनिर्देश उपपद्यते, तथापि विभागस्य स्वात्मन्यनुपपत्तेर्देशान्तरापेक्षा विद्यत एव। अत आकाशातिरिक्तदेशकल्पनापि स्यात्। किञ्च तस्मिन्देशे सच्छिद्रता स्यात्। न (नि ?) छिद्रत्वं हि सलिलराशिवदुद्धृतविवरपूरणेनेति, तर्हि सक्रियत्वप्रसङ्गः। तच्चायुक्तम्; विभुत्वात्प्रकृतेः। अप्रहाणमपि दुर्घटम्; देशान्तरसञ्चारिणो वायोरेव समवायदेशे निष्कम्पावस्थानविरोधात्। निष्क्रियत्वसक्रियत्वयोरेकत्र विरोधात्। सक्रियस्य पूर्वदेशाविभागे क्रियास्वभावविरोधात्; पूर्वदेशविभागपूर्वकदेशान्तरसंयोगजननस्वाभाव्यात्तस्याः।

अत्रोच्यते—

श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वादिति सूत्रकृता स्वयम्।
एवामाद्यनुयोगानामुत्तरं प्रतिपादितम्॥

१. सर्वमिदं सङ्गिरामह इत्यनुवर्तते.

श्रुत्या प्रमाणभूतया योऽर्थः प्रतिपादितः, तदन्यथानुपपत्त्या कल्प्यतां काममर्थान्तरम्, अर्थापत्तिश्चेत्प्रबला। नो चेत् पर्यनुयोग एव नास्ति, अन्यथाप्युपपन्नत्वात्। विरोधोऽपि यथासंभवं सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रमाणसिद्धेषु निरवकाशः। न च वस्त्वन्तरसाधर्म्यादनुमानं प्रसरति वैधर्म्यादिति .... [1]सम्बन्धिनस्सर्वाकाशदेशसम्बन्धेऽनुपाधित्वाच्च। अमूर्तस्य तु सर्वगतस्य पूर्ववन्निरंशत्वादेवाद्रव्यस्य च संयोगस्यानुपाधित्वात्। अन्यसमवेतस्य वा सम्बन्धात्। अतोऽनवयवत्वासिद्धेस्सावयवस्य एकदेशविकारोपपत्तिः। उत्तरयोस्तु कल्पयोर्व्याप्तिविरहः। अस्पर्शस्यारम्भकान्तररहितस्यापि स्वाभाविकदेशभेदाश्रयणेन संयोगवत्कार्यान्तरस्यापि व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः। यथा चावयवा एवावयविनः प्रादेशिकसंयोगादिव्यवस्थापकाः। न ह्यवयवान्तराणि सन्ति। न चावयवसमवायमन्तरेणावयविनि साक्षात् संयोगान्तरसमवायस्त्वयाभ्युपगम्यते। संयोगान्तरस्यापि त्ववयवा एव प्रदेशव्यवस्थापकाः। न हस्तपुस्तकसंयोगाज्जायमानो देवदत्तपुस्तकसंयोगश्चरणादिदेशे दृश्यते। एवमारभ्यमाणाः कार्यभेदा एवारम्भकदेशासङ्करकारिण इति किं नोपपद्यते। आरभ्यमाणसिद्ध्युत्तरकालं तेषामुपाधित्वं पूर्वमेव देशविभागोऽपेक्षित इति चेन्न; समवायवदुपपत्तेः। यथा हि—अवयवेष्ववयविसमवायो न कार्त्स्न्येन। व्यासङ्गस्तु[2] भागसिद्धेः पश्चादेव। भागसिद्धिश्च समवायापेक्षेति परस्पराश्रयत्वेऽपि तैरेव भागैस्तुल्यकालमेव वृत्तिविशेषसिद्धिः, तथा तैरेव कार्यैस्तत्प्रदेशभेदसिद्धिः। न च वृत्त्यन्तरत्वादवयववृत्तेर्न भागापेक्षेति वाच्यम्; परिणामान्तरत्वादत्राप्येकदेशादिविकल्पानवसरप्रसङ्गात्। एतत्सर्वमुत्तरं वैभवादुक्तमस्माभिः। पूर्वोक्त एव स्वाभाविकदेशभेदः पारमार्थिक इत्यनुसंधेयम्। एतेन द्रव्यस्य सर्वस्य स्वाभाविकभेदोपपादनेन निरवयवाः .... न च धर्मिग्राहकप्रमाणविरोधः, अवयविभागज .... [व्य] क्तिपर्यवसानभूमेस्सूक्ष्मस्य वस्तुनस्सिद्धत्वात्। ते .... त् प्रदेशभेदा एव हि स्पर्शवायूनामवयवाः। न च तस्य स्वतः प्रदेशभेदा न सन्तीति वाच्यम्; दिक् संयोग .... [भेदबलेन तत्सिद्धेः, न च दि] गुपाधि-

१. अत्र गलितत्वादनन्वितमिव लक्ष्यते।

२. व्यासङ्गः विभज्य समन्तात् सम्बन्धः—व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वम्।

कदेशभेदादेव संयोगभेदसिद्धिः ; परस्पराश्रयप्रसङ्गात्। एकदिक्संयोगग्रस्ताखण्डस्वरू .... रात् विनाच दिक्सम्बन्धात् प्रदेशभेदासिद्धेः। अतो द्व्यणुकस्यावयवसंयोगादिना द्व्यणुकान्तर .... पक्षीणावयवत्वे द्व्यणुकान्तरसंयोगालाभात् त्रसरेणु निष्पत्तौ विश्वसिद्धिरपि त्वत्पक्ष एव प्रा .... गोचरं ज्ञानमात्रं दृष्टान्त इति .... न्वे संयोगवत् प्रदेशभेदानपेक्षणात्। व्यवहारयोग्यतालक्षणस्वभावविशेषात्मक .... सर्वप्रतियोगिकमेव। तथापि तस्य सङ्कोचकैः कर्मभिः प्रतिबद्धत्वात् संसारिषु तारतम्य .... हि तत्त्वविदां प्रक्रिया। अतो मूर्तं सर्वं सावयवं द्रव्यं च सर्वं संशयं न .... रुणद्धि। एतेन यत्परैरुक्तं भूतेष्वेकमेवैकस्यारम्भकं न द्वाभ्यां त्रिभिश्चतुर्भिर्वा .... तः अनुग्राहकत्वमेवेतरेषामिति, तदपि प्रत्युक्तम्। अर्थान्तर-स्यावयविसंज्ञस्य तत्स .... [मुदायेना] रम्भे हि तदवकाश इति ॥

इति श्रीभगवद्रामानुजमुनिवरमतधुरंधरस्यात्रिगोत्रप्रदीप-

श्रीपद्मनाभार्यनन्दनस्य वादिहंसनवाम्बुदस्य

श्रीमद्रामानुजार्यस्य कृतिषु

न्यायकुलिशे

सत्कार्यवादोऽष्टमः ॥

University Notes

VICE-CHANCELLOR

His Excellency the Governor of Madras has been pleased to nominate the Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar, our Vice-Chancellor, as a member of the Madras Legislative Council.

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We congratulate Diwan Bahadur S. E. Runganadham, M.A., M.L.C., our Ex-Vice-Chancellor, on his appointment as Vice-Chancellor of the Madras University.

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The Degree of Doctor of Science was conferred by the London University on Dr. S. Ramachandra Rao, M.A., PH.D., Professor of Physics. We congratulate him on the well-merited honour.

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Dr. B. V. Narayanaswamy Naidu, Professor of Economics, has been elected Honorary General Secretary and Treasurer of the Indian Economic Association. He has also been elected as Associate Editor of the Indian Journal of Economics.

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COURSES OF STUDIES

The syllabus in Chemistry for the Intermediate Examination was revised and made more definite. In the scheme of examination separate marks were alloted to laboratory record note-books in Physics and in Chemistry as in Botany and Zoology.

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The English Honours course was reorganised with a view to giving greater importance to Literature. The new course will come into effect from July 1937.

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PUBLICATIONS

The Syndicate has sanctioned the publication of the following works :

1. A Monograph on Jagannatha Pandita by V. A. Ramaswamy Sastry, M.A., Lecturer in Samskrit.

2. Philosophy of Aesthetic Pleasure by P. Panchapakesa Sastry, Pandit in Samskrit.

3. Trimsacchloki.

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BUILDINGS

The following buildings are nearing completion :—

1. Administrative Buildings and Convocation Hall.
2. Music College.
3. Guests' Quarters.
4. New Hostel Buildings.

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Reviews

Svarasiddhānta Candrikā.—By Śrīnivāsayajvan edited by Mr. K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastriar of the Department of Sanskrit, Annamalai University. Price Rs. 5.

Svarasiddhānta Candrikā is the work of Śrīnivāsayajvan, the disciple of Rāmabhadra Dīkṣita, the famous *Vyākaraṇācārya* of the Tanjore District in the latter half of the 17th and the former half of the 18th centuries. The author clearly exhibits his thorough mastery of the Taittirīya śākhā of the Yajurveda with Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara bhāṣya and all the works on Sanskrit grammar available in his time. He combines with his scholarship, a keen critical acumen and a dispassionate attitude in his discussion, which are indispensably necessary for those engaged in research. Wherever he differs from another, he frankly gives expression to it, whether he is the *Sūtrakāra,*[1] *Vārtikakāra,*[2] *Mahābhāṣyakāra,*[3] *Haradatta,*[4] *Svaramañjarīkāra, Parimalakāra* or *Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita.* He himself states at the commencement that, since many mistakes were found in the *Svaramañjarī,* he felt the necessity to write this work. In the body of the book he condemns, sometimes vehemently, not only *Svaramañjarīkāra,* but also the author of its commentary, the *Parimala.* The *Parimala* was the work of Girinātha, the son of the famous commentator Mallinātha (14th c.) and pupil of Nṛsimha, the author of the *Svaramañjarī.* He also condemns on many an occasion the views of the *Vedabhāṣyakṛt.* This *Vedabhāṣyakṛt* seems to be Bhaṭṭabhāskara and not Sāyaṇa, since many of the statements here are direct quotations from the Bhāṣya of the former or the summary of his views there. His lucid exposition of the different theories and the discussion thereon under तस्यादित उदात्तमर्धह्रस्वम् (Pp. 9-13), उदात्तस्वरितपरस्य सन्नतरः (P. 50) गतिकारकोपपदात्कृत् (P. 180), एकश्रुति दूरात्सम्बुद्धौ (P. 371), विभाषा छन्दसि (pp. 379-382) are very fine. Whenever he condemns Haradatta, Nṛsimha or Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita, he quotes for his

1. बहुलग्रहणस्य चिन्त्यं फलम् (p. 93);; इतिकरणस्य फलं चिन्त्यम (p. 341)
2. तेन परादिश्च...इत्यादि सिद्धम् (p. 171)
3. भाष्ये...न तु अस्य वस्तुतः कार्यकालत्वम् (3. 357)
4. हरदत्तादिमते...चिन्त्यम् (pp. 85-86)

authority the *Mahābhāṣya*. In two or three instances he states, in support of his views, the views of Cokkanātha Makhin, the author of the *Bhāṣyaratnāvalī* and his *prācārya*. In two places he gives the views of his own *ācārya* Rāmabhadra Dikṣita.

The plan of this work was not newly conceived by him, but it is only an improvement on that adopted by Bhattoji Dīkṣita in his *Siddhānta-kaumudī*, on the model of the early part of the same work. In a few of the sutras, he adopts a reading different from that adopted by Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita, takes उदाराश्वेषु क्षेपे as one sūtra on the strength of the *Mahābhāṣya*, though it is taken as two by Bhaṭṭoji and mentions वा भाषायाम् (p. 265) which is not found in Bhaṭṭoji's work. The examples cited here from *Bhāṣā* are generally the same as given by Bhaṭṭoji; while those from the Vedas are taken here from the Taittirīya ṣākhā; but even there if the passage given by Bhaṭṭoji finds a place both in the Ṛgveda and the Yajurveda, he always prefers to give it.[5]

The sentence अलाबूशब्दोऽपि...अनुदात्तः इति (P. 61, *ll*. 12 & 13) and इति (p. 37, ll. 9 and 13) do not seem to fit in well.

Brahmasri K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastriar, being an *adhītaveda* and *Vāiyākaraṇa* like the author, is well qualified to edit this work. He has done full justice to his qualifications. The printed book, as it stands now, clearly shows how much pains he should have taken to edit it. In the *upodghāta* he lucidly and briefly mentions the benefits of language, proves the priority of the Prātiśākhyas to *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, gives a general description of *Svara* from all sources and proves that Ācārya Pāṇini also might have thought of *svarita* to have had a higher pitch than *udātta*. He then gives four reasons for the *ēkaśruti* to have come in vogue in later Sanskrit. One of them is the use of *śleṣa* by poets. Would it not have been possible to read the same *śloka* with different tones? Another is the composition of Purāṇas for the sake of *women* and *śūdras*. Is it not said that the *Rāmāyaṇa* was sung? What would have been the harm if the Purāṇas also were sung in the same manner? It seems to me that *ekaśruti* came in vogue outside the sacrifices only after Sanskrit ceased to be the spoken language. Mr. Sastriar adds at the end of the upodghāta a short note on the life of the author, and the method of his treatment. Punctuation in certain places in the body of the book may have been more carefully attended to. For in-

5. इन्द्रेवो वामुशन्ति हि (p. 338) अग्निर्मूर्धा दिवः ककुत्पतिः (p. 373)

stance, the statement containing the *sādhya* may not be separated from that containing the *hētu* by the mark " । ".* A comma may have been used instead, as he has done in other places.

At the end of the book the editor gives the index of the *svara* sūtras of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and the phiṭ sūtras, and the vedic quotations, the list of authors and works quoted and corrigenda. It is quite clear that he has taken great pains to prepare them. Still in the bibliography he has failed to mention याज्ञवल्क्यस्मृति (noted in p. 331). Some of the errors have escaped his notice and hence do not find a place in the corrigenda.[6] The Sanskrit world is much indebted to the authorities of the Annamalai University in having enabled Mr. Sastriar to edit this work, to Mr. Sastriar for having critically edited it and to the Madras Law Journal Press for the neat execution of the work.

* Cf. p. 36, l. 8 ; p. 115, l. 4. etc.

(6) इकार (for अकार) in p. 107 l. 11; पर्यालोन (32, 21) परिमाषात्वे (35, 4), विभकत्युदात्तस्वं (36, 8), सर्वानुदात्तांयम् (36, 17), पर्याय for . पर्यायौ (48, 18) (cf. 372, l. 6) असिद्धस्वेऽपि (91, 1) अणप्रयय: (112, 17), क्रौञ्चायना: (129, 20) पूवाद्ब्रेञ: (199, 16), गतिकरको (206, 11) पष्ठया: (222,17) नियामसास्ति (250, 21), प्रम्नोतीति (355,11), प्रयस्लात् (354,6), आरम्म: (357, 19)